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Alain Robbe-Grillet has long been a favorite object of investigation of literary 
criticism within French studies. A prolific writer, filmmaker, and theorist, he is often 
considered as the primary member of the group known as the New Novel, a collection 
of mostly French authors active in approximately the 1950s-1970s who sought to 
reinvent the novel through innovative narrative structures. While critical interest on 
Robbe-Grillet has slowed in recent years, he retains the reputation within literary 
criticism of being difficult to solve. 
Robbe-Grillet’s project, both literary and theoretical, is characterized by 
opposition to what he sees as the humanism of nineteenth-century literary realism. He 
seeks to invent narrative structures and elaborate a theoretical vision that would: (1) 
move away from humanism as a narrative and epistemological model, (2) invent a 
new conception of the human subject, and (3) more accurately reflect the state of the 
postwar Western world, which he views as being characterized by complexity, 
continual change, and technoscientific innovation.  
  
Critical posthumanist theory, which coalesced as a relatively coherent theory 
primarily in Anglophone humanities departments in the 1990s, addresses many of the 
same issues and adopts many of the same approaches as Robbe-Grillet. In my 
dissertation, I argue that Alain Robbe-Grillet should be considered a posthumanist 
author because of the a-humanist bent of his literary and theoretical project and the 
similarities that exist between his vision and that of posthumanist scholars. 
Furthermore, contemporary posthumanist scholars such as Stefan Herbrechter and 
Mads Thomsen have argued for the use of literature as a field for further development 
of the theory, as well as for use of the theory as an investigative tool for literary 
studies. Despite this, only a handful of full-length texts have been published on the 
link between narrative and posthumanist theory, and I have found no full-length 
studies produced on French-language texts. In this way, this dissertation provides a 
new understanding of Robbe-Grillet, contributes to the development of posthumanist 
critical theory, and demonstrates the potential utility of this theory as a tool for 
literary criticism in an interdisciplinary approach that combines French literary 
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The author Alain Robbe-Grillet was a prolific and writer and filmmaker who 
was active from the 1950s until his death in 2008. He produced many novels and 
films, and one collection of short stories, as well as several projects that blended 
genres and media, including three “ciné-romans” or “movie-novels;” a book 
combining written fiction with visual art, produced in collaboration with René 
Magritte; and a series of semi-autobiographical texts he called “romanesques.” He 
also produced a sizeable body of theoretical commentary, originally published in the 
form of articles and essays in various print journals and newspapers, many of which 
were then compiled in two full-length books: Pour un nouveau roman (1963), which 
he produced himself, and Le Voyageur (2001), which was compiled and edited by 
Olivier Corpet and Emmanuelle Lambert. He also recorded a series of critical 
commentaries for the channel France Culture, produced in 2003. 
His first works were novels, beginning with Les Gommes.1 Robbe-Grillet has 
been an enigma for the critical establishment since he first began publishing in the 
1950s. At his debut, the unconventional nature of his novels shocked and destabilized 
-- but also fascinated. Some of the most prominent critics of the time, such as Roland 
Barthes, considered him a serious challenge. This only further tempted critics to take 
on the enigma he posed: 
This irretrievability profoundly troubles a certain 
institutionalized conception of literature (which judges the 
                                                
1 Although Les Gommes (1953) was his first published novel, he had already written Un Régicide, 
which he first proposed to a publishing house in 1949. After it was refused, he wrote and published 
several other novels, beginning with Les Gommes, before resubmitting Un Régicide for publication at 




novels unreadable) and the unease provoked by Robbe-
Grillet’s texts might be demonstrated across a whole spectrum 
of critical reaction, ranging from outbursts of indignant 
hysteria to the more serious attempts to retrieve these texts 
(Heath 67).  
 
These critics seized on his unconventional style of his writing, which did not conform 
to norms and standards of “traditional” novels. His work has been compared to 
mathematical patterns and to music, due to its repetitions, variations, self-reflexivity, 
and circularity. It is also full of uncertainty and contradictions, and characterized by a 
lack of conclusion and resolution. 
 Robbe-Grillet saw himself as a “modern” author taking up the reins from 
writers like Flaubert, Joyce, Kafka, and Faulkner, which he names as his 
predecessors. Much of what he produced was explicitly in response and opposition to 
the writers Balzac and Sartre, writers who he felt represented a particular humanist 
narrative code that modern society and modern writers had moved beyond. For him, 
Balzac was the epitome of the realist style, which he felt was the greatest expression 
of this outdated code. He reproached Sartre his existentialism, which he saw as a 
return to the “tragedy” of the humanist mindset. 
 Although he insisted on the individuality and uniqueness of his work, early 
critics insisted on grouping him loosely with other contemporary writers who were 
producing similarly nonconformist works, though not always in the same way or for 
the same reasons. Through the influence of the critical establishment, this group of 
writers, which included Nathalie Sarraute, Claude Ollier, Claude Simon, Robert 
Pinget, and Marguerite Duras,2 became known as the “Nouveau Roman” or “New 
                                                
2 The group of writers that constituted the “Nouveau Roman” was not fixed, and some critics include 




Novel.” Eventually, Robbe-Grillet begrudgingly accepted the title of “chef” of the 
New Novel, which also came to be known as the “Ecole du Refus” (School of 
Refusal) or the “Ecole du Regard” (School of the Gaze) due to the writers’ common 
rejection of conventional norms and the prevalence of observing characters.3 
Eventually, with a new generation of new post-structuralist writers that critics 
associated with the group beginning in the 1970s, a “New New Novel” was signaled 
by the critical establishment. Robbe-Grillet participated in the conversations 
surrounding the New Novel and the New New Novel but never felt entirely 
comfortable considering these writers as a coherent group. 
Over the years, Robbe-Grillet has consistently remained a critical object of 
investigation, resurrected each time a new theory (constructivism, structuralism, 
phenomenology, and most recently, various science theories) might provide insight 
into his mathematically patterned, intricately structured texts. But throughout these 
attempted recuperations, he retains his reputation for being “irretrievable.” Criticism 
of Robbe-Grillet today continues to be characterized by fascination and frustration. 
One of the many ways in which critics have sought to recuperate him is by 
dividing him into multiple Robbe-Grillets, each reflecting the different lines of 
inquiry through which they investigated him. In 1963, in the preface to Bruce 
                                                                                                                                      
consisted of those who were captured in a 1959 press photo taken at the entrance to Les Editions de 
Minuit by Mario Dondero and included Alain Robbe-Grillet, Claude Simon, Claude Mauriac, Jérôme 
Lindon (editor), Robert Pinget, Samuel Beckett, and Claude Ollier. Alain Robbe-Grillet, for his part, 
insisted on including Duras as part of the group, despite her objections (“Comment le Nouveau Roman 
est-il né?” 5:08-5:49) 
3 The origin of the label “Ecole du Refus” comes from the title of an article on the Nouveau Roman 
written by Bernard Pingaud in 1958 (Pingaud, 1958). The term “Ecole du Regard” was attributed to the 
Nouveau Roman group by Claude Simon, on a photograph he took of Robbe-Grillet; Irene Albers 
explains, “Simon s’y réfère dans un photocollage intitulé “Robbe-Grillet (l’École du Regard)” : dans le 
portrait de Robbe-Grillet, il a inséré, à l’invers, une paire d’yeux qui regardent dans une autre 




Morrissette’s book Les Romans d’Alain Robbe-Grillet, the first major full-length 
study of his works, Roland Barthes posited two Robbe-Grillets: a Robbe-Grillet 
“destructeur des sens” and a Robbe-Grillet “créateur des sens” (Morrissette Romans 
8). In 1972, Stephen Heath proposed three Robbe-Grillets: The anti-humanist Robbe-
Grillet, the Robbe-Grillet of extreme subjectivism, and the Robbe-Grillet that deals 
with the mind, consciousness, and perception – the phenomenological Robbe-Grillet.4 
The problem with multiplying Robbe-Grillets is that it does not solve the problematic 
at hand. Such multiplications of Robbe-Grillet involve ignoring or leaving aside 
major aspects of his vision as well as his own claims about his project. 
 Indeed, it is not just his novels that confuse and obfuscate, but also his 
theoretical texts. Robbe-Grillet used his fictional work to develop, evolve and 
elaborate a changing, loose textual “theory” that would articulate his project and his 
worldview. His theory continually changed, in part because it was often written in 
response to the critical establishment’s evaluation of his fiction, rather than by a drive 
to develop his own cohesive theory, and critics have always been further frustrated by 
the fact that it often seems to be at odds with his fictional work. Thus, critics seeking 
to interpret his work have often felt as though they must choose one or the other; they 
work on his theory or they work on his fiction while putting his theory aside; Jean 
Miesch, Bruce Morrissette, and Jean Alter all admit to doing this in their respective 
full-length studies of Robbe-Grillet.5 But, although he says he privileges his fiction, 
Robbe-Grillet saw both as working in tandem, informing each other. His fiction and 
                                                
4 In his book The Nouveau Roman: A Study in the Practice of Writing (1972). 
5 Which are Les Romans d’Alain Robbe-Grillet (Morrissette, 1963), Robbe-Grillet (Miesch, 1965), and 




his theory are inherently intertwined, and any investigation that does not take both 
into account cannot constitute a satisfactorily thorough analysis of his work. 
Meanwhile, a relatively recent theory that has significant potential for 
evaluating Robbe-Grillet in light of these issues has been making its way through the 
discursive disciplines of the humanities. Posthumanist theory, in brief, constitutes a 
general questioning of humanism, and its theoretical approach to this issue consists of 
taking up various scientific theories and combining them with those of the 
humanities, in particular French theory. Although it coalesced starting in the 1990s, it 
is only recently making its way into the humanities, and especially into literary 
studies, in a remarkably significant way. One major problematic along which Robbe-
Grillet’s work has been evaluated but never satisfactorily “retrieved” is that of 
humanism versus anti-humanism. Robbe-Grillet’s work is directly related to his 
criticism of humanism and his questioning and reconceptualization of the human 
subject; recognition of the primacy of this theme in his work resulted in early critical 
debates that sought to recuperate him respectively as “humanist,” “antihumanist” or 
“chosiste,” recuperations which Robbe-Grillet himself refused.6 Posthumanist theory 
likewise developed as a response to a general questioning of what it means to be 
human and formed largely, but not exclusively, in opposition to humanism. I will 
elaborate in more detail on the specifics of this theory and its relation to Robbe-
Grillet’s opposition to humanism in Chapter 1. As I hope to demonstrate with this 
project, posthumanist theory may provide the critical tools necessary to address the a-
                                                
6 “Prenant dans les années cinquante mes romans comme des machines infernales lui permettant 
d’exercer la terreur, [Barthes] va s’éfforcer de réduire leur glissements sournois, leurs fantômes en 
filigrane, leur autogommage, leurs béances, à un univers chosiste qui n’affirmirait au contraire que sa 




humanist bent of his project -- without dividing him into multiple Robbe-Grillets -- 
while simultaneously investigating the other problematics important to his work, such 
as subjectivity versus objectivity, and the notion of perception and cognition. It also 
allows for a reconciliation of his theory and his fiction, and responds to the more 
recent trend within literary studies and Robbe-Grilletian criticism to use scientific 
theory for analysis of his work.  
In fact, as early as 1992, perhaps sensing this movement, Raylene Ramsay 
published Robbe-Grillet and Modernity: Science, Sexuality and Subversion. Another 
scientifically-driven, though not exclusive, evaluation of Robbe-Grillet’s work is Ben 
Stoltzfus’s The Target: Alain Robbe-Grillet and Jasper Johns (2006), a study 
comparing the works of the two artists through the lens of autopoeisis, a theoretical 
concept borrowed from biology, modified by systems theory and the cognitive 
sciences, and incorporated into posthumanist theory.  As posthumanist theory is 
making its way into the discursive disciplines, this particular branch’s potential for 
literary evaluation is compelling. Stoltzfus is correct to seize on the potential of such 
a theory for textual analysis of Robbe-Grillet not only because of this general trend 
within the humanities, but also because Robbe-Grillet himself posits the use of 
scientific theory for evaluation of his work, and the connection between art and 
science generally. “The fact that the new non-Newtonian logic and non-Cartesian 
universes find clear correspondences in Robbe-Grillet’s enterprise of (self) 
knowledge…suggests a certain power of generalization of the new paradigms,” says 




aspect of his theoretical vision, as well as responding to the double “French” and 
scientific sides of Robbe-Grillet’s own theoretical background.  
Indeed, a general trend toward a mixing of science and literature is occurring 
generally across the humanistic disciplines, of which the increasing traction of critical 
posthumanist theory is reflective; in fact, Ira Livingston calls this development “the 
most important axis of literary and cultural theory throughout the past century” (1). 
Posthumanist theory has rapidly been gaining traction in the discursive disciplines 
and does not seem to be slowing anytime soon. Herbrechter continues, “It is no 
wonder that, in the face of the challenges that these new sciences, after the so-called 
‘science wars’, the question of the human and the question of the relationship 
between literature and life come back to haunt the humanities;” and as Mads 
Thomsen puts it, “The posthuman horizon is not likely to go away, and this book, like 
many others, is written in media res of a process that many would prefer to have 
avoided” (Introduction 5; 1). A responsible humanities department should 
acknowledge this movement that bridges the humanities with the sciences and be 
prepared to critically engage with this trend and with posthumanist critical theory.  
As critical posthumanism gains momentum and develops more thoroughly, 
posthumanist scholars have signaled that the next major developments of this theory 
can and should take place in the literary domain. They advocate for the use of 
literature as a means of exploring and developing the theory – much like Robbe-
Grillet did with his own literary theory through production of fiction – as well as for 
the use of critical posthumanist theory as an interpretive lens for literary criticism. “I 




valuable contributions to the debates surrounding the posthuman, of which modes of 
reflection are not, or are less capable,” says Thomsen (9). After all, “analyses along 
these lines will also have the side-effect of revealing how a constellation of literary 
works present fresh nuances, and gain new actuality after being seen in the light of 
other visions of human change” (Thomsen, 9). The last decade has seen the 
publication of a handful of full-length books on the link between the posthuman and 
narrative and literature, most of them published in the last few years, such as Bruce 
Clarke’s Neocybernetics and Narrative (2014), Literature and the Posthuman (2017), 
Posthuman Metamorphosis: Narrative and Systems (2008), Herbrechter’s 
Posthumanist Shakespeares (2012), and Thomsen’s The New Human in Literature 
(2013), cited above. Each of these undertakes preliminary textual analyses of selected 
texts and outlines the potential of literature as a field for the development of the 
theory, as well as the usefulness of the theory for literary analysis. However, only 
Herbrechter’s book seriously undertakes a thorough posthuman evaluation of texts 
that are not recent science fiction ones; and his book consists of a collection of essays 
on different Shakespearean works by various scholars. No single full-length 
posthuman study of a particular literary text or particular author has yet been 
published, and little to no evaluation of French texts exists, despite the significant link 
between French theory and critical posthumanist theory (I will outline this connection 
in more detail in Chapter 1).  
This is the case despite the call by posthumanist scholars that such projects 
need to be undertaken, in particular from texts whose existence precedes that of 




as Herbrechter,  “retroactive” readings -- application of posthumanist theory to texts 
that precede it historically – is not only acceptable and justified, but advocated. 
Herbrechter speaks of “retrofitting,” or evaluating classical texts such as Shakespeare 
through the new posthumanist lens, while Thomsen says, “The theme of the 
posthuman can reinvigorate the status and use of canonical works of art and literature. 
Finally, the study of human change and the posthuman offers an approach to art and 
literature that may elicit new understandings of classical works” (Introduction 12; 
12). And while more recent texts that explicitly feature the posthuman, especially in 
the field of science fiction, constitute an interesting and fruitful object of 
investigation, Thomsen in particular calls for the examination of texts other than 
those of science fiction: “While these are certainly worth examining in the context of 
this theme, as has been done by a number of scholars, there are less obvious works of 
twentieth century literature that may be of even greater interest” (2). I argue that the 
texts of Robbe-Grillet could constitute such a work. 
This dissertation therefore responds to two different demands within the 
humanities: on the one hand, the continued desire within French studies to retrieve the 
“irretrievable” Robbe-Grillet and the irresistible potential of shining a new light on 
decades-old problematics. And on the other hand, using literature as a developmental 
space for posthumanist critical theory, as well as a demonstration of the utility of 
critical posthumanist theory as a tool for literary criticism. As far as I am aware, this 
dissertation would constitute the first project to bring together critical posthumanist 
theory and literary texts under the umbrella of French studies, a project which seems 




lines of thinking within French theory. Furthermore, by applying theory that has roots 
in the sciences to a major figure in French literature, this dissertation constitutes a 
multidisciplinary project that falls in line with the general movement towards 
interdisciplinary studies and the bridging of arts and sciences that is currently en 
vogue within the humanities.  
I hope to prove that Robbe-Grillet’s project can be considered a posthumanist 
one, in that his particular vision and project correspond in manifold ways to those of 
posthumanist critical theory. A few things that are worth noting for the purpose of 
this study: Whether Robbe-Grillet is successful in his fiction in shaking off the mantle 
of humanism is up for debate -- after all, critical consensus in the 1960s and 70s, for 
example, was that Bruce Morrissette was able to rather convincingly produce a 
humanist Robbe-Grillet from a thorough examination of his fictional works; Jean 
Alter for his part unapologetically defends the fact that his conclusions run in direct 
opposition to the stated intention of the author.7 Robbe-Grillet himself admits to 
being a victim of the humanist mindset.8 Rather, what is being examined here is his 
overall critical vision and the manifestation of that vision as it occurs in his fiction. 
Nor am I evaluating the validity of his ideas. I am merely elaborating his theoretical 
vision and the way in which this vision manifests in his fiction, in order to 
demonstrate in what way that vision – whether accurate or misplaced - can be 
considered posthumanist.  
                                                
7 In La Vision du monde d’Alain Robbe-Grillet: Structures et significations (1966). 
8 “Même si je dis qu’à l’intérieur de moi il n’y a rien…en fait il y a en moi tout le monde qui m’a 
précédé: les civilisations occidentales, l’histoire judéo-chrétienne, l’histoire grecque, les civilisations 
celtiques et que sais-je encore. Il y a donc aussi une morale humaniste, et par conséquent à chaque 
instant, dans mon expérience vécue…je continue néanmoins à ressentir la vieille idée d’une conscience 




I have chosen to work on a single author rather than a selection of different 
authors for a few reasons. Firstly, Robbe-Grillet’s work lends itself to evaluation 
through posthumanist critical theory on so many levels that there is much to be said 
about the way in which they align. Space dedicated to other authors would have 
limited my exploration of these ideas. Secondly, as I mentioned previously, the 
intersection between posthumanist critical theory and literature is relatively new, and 
little to no critical literature exists on the link between posthumanist theory and 
French literature. I therefore would not have had much critical recourse for a “big-
picture” evaluation of several authors. Additionally, this means that this project thus 
constitutes a preliminary critical investigation and I wanted it to be as thorough as 
possible.  
Many lines of investigation using posthumanist theory other than the ones I 
propose here could be opened up in Robbe-Grillet’s work, as well as that of other 
authors. Posthumanist critical theory may allow for explorations of Robbe-Grillet’s 
work that address the aspects of his narrative technique that Richardson terms 
“unnatural narrative” while also addressing his stance against humanism, for 
example.9 In the future I would like to examine the notion of communication within 
Robbe-Grillet’s work, in particular through the systems-based sociological theory of 
communication of Niklas Luhmann, which I will explain in detail in Chapter 6. I am 
also interested in pursuing the question the relationship of textual creation and 
autopoeisis. In terms of other authors who have been read or understood under the 
umbrella of the French New Novel, the biological aspect of autopoeisis and 
Luhmann’s communication theory might productively be used to analyze Nathalie 
                                                




Sarraute’s pre-verbal concept of communication. The posthumanist notions of 
Nature/Culture and the idea of the preponderance of landscape and diminution of the 
human subject could be a fruitful line of investigation for the works of Claude Ollier, 
to name a few. 
As Robbe-Grillet was a prolific writer, and my strength is in textual rather 
than cinematic studies, I have chosen to limit myself to his written texts, fictional and 
theoretical, to provide a reasonable field of investigation; however, there is plenty of 
potential for posthumanist evaluation of his cinematic works. My project is divided 
into two sections: theory and fiction. The first half of this dissertation will examine 
the theoretical parallels between posthumanist critical theory and Robbe-Grillet’s 
own critical vision. The second half evaluates the manner in which these visions 
manifest themselves within Robbe-Grillet’s fiction. In the first chapter, I present a 
brief and general outline of posthumanist theory and its genealogical development, as 
well as its overall relation to Robbe-Grillet, situating each of them in their 
sociohistorical contexts. In Chapter 2, I examine the specific criticisms of humanism 
that Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars share, and demonstrate the affirmative 
alternatives they propose in their place. In Chapter 3, I examine the ways in which 
Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars envision the repositioning of the humanist 
human subject. In Chapter 4, I analyze the ways in which the posthumanist 
affirmations outlined in Chapter 2 manifest themselves in La Maison de rendez-vous 
and Topologie d’une cité fantôme. In Chapter 5, I analyze the ways in which the 
posthumanist repositioning of the human subject manifests itself in Dans le 




processes of cognition in Robbe-Grillet via Niklas Luhmann’s systems-theory based 
theory of communication and society, following the posthuman affirmations made in 
the previous chapters, in order to demonstrate in what ways posthumanist models of 
subjectivity can be used to evaluate Robbe-Grillet’s texts.  
When referring to Robbe-Grillet’s theoretical commentary, for those essays 
that have been compiled within Pour un nouveau roman, I will refer to the book, 
since it was compiled by Robbe-Grillet himself and the span of time it covers is 
relatively short (essays published between 1958 and 1963). In the interest of saving 
space, I will refer to this book as PUNR in further references. For those theoretical 
articles and essays compiled in Le Voyageur, I will refer to the individual essay or 
article from which the comment came, rather than the book, in order to signal the 
specific time and context in which the comment was made, as the book covers the 
entirety of his career (articles published from 1947 to 2000) and was compiled by 
editors, and as it is essential to this dissertation to indicate the consistency of Robbe-
Grillet’s theoretical ideas over a span of time and media. The works in the second half 
of this paper were selected in view of the presence of the thematic within the text as 
well as the historical distance of each pair of texts from each other; by selecting texts 
that are situated relatively far away from each other in terms of publication date, I can 





Chapter 1: Alain Robbe-Grillet and Posthumanist Critical 
Theory -- A Summary 
1.1 Robbe-Grillet and Humanism 
In his theoretical writings, Robbe-Grillet expresses viewpoints regarding 
humanism that, while variable across time and contexts, reflect a relatively consistent 
worldview that lines up neatly with many of the principal tenets of posthumanist 
theory.10 In fact, when looked at from a posthumanist standpoint, they become 
remarkably consistent. His critical commentaries, interviews, and essays tend to 
concentrate in particular on the following lines of thought: a changed and changing 
“modern” world; man’s place within that world; the role and responsibility of 
literature vis-à-vis man and his world; and the notion of writing, and by extension, 
creation. In each of these principal lines of questioning, Robbe-Grillet’s ideas adhere 
to an unmistakable current of post-humanist sentiment.  
Pinning down a coherent Robbe-Grilletian worldview has been a tricky issue, 
not the least because of his spontaneous writing style and his changeability. Critics 
have often accused Robbe-Grillet of inconsistency in his critical writings,11 a charge 
which Robbe-Grillet himself readily acknowledges, stating, for example, that among 
the essays compiled in Pour un nouveau roman, there exists “une direction 
divergente, ou parallèle, ou même franchement antagoniste…[elle est] extrêmement 
                                                
10 Early praise for Morrissette’s book Les Romans de Robbe-Grillet (1962) was often due to the fact 
that Morrissette was able to prove the existence of a coherent Robbe-Grilletian worldview from the 
“chaotic structure” of his fictional works; Frank Wagner evokes “la cohérence des positions robbe-
grilletiennes” (Erickson 209; Wagner 128). 
11 Laurent Lesage, for example, characterizes Robbe-Grillet’s work as “intrinsic difficulty complicated 




sensible dans le cours des articles qui [le] constituent,” and admitting in the work 
itself, his only full-length critical text, that “il n’y [a] qu’un parallélisme assez lâche 
entre les trois romans que j’ai publiés à ce jour et mes vues théoriques sur un possible 
roman futur” (Morrissette “Discussion: Robbe-Grillet no. 1, 2…X” 140; PUNR 46).  
However, for him, this changeability in theory is not negative or problematic, 
but instead productive. He tends to view it as the result of the natural evolution of the 
mindset of an author in practice, for whom the formulation of critical ideas is a 
continual phenomenon that takes place over the course of the act of writing: “Mes 
romans ont certes pour moi un aspect théorique, mais ils ne peuvent représenter 
chacun que leur propre théorie, chaque roman étant à la fois la construction et la 
destruction de sa théorie” (Pinget 338). He also views changing critical views as part 
of a fruitful continual exchange between theory and fiction:  
Chacun estimera… normal qu’un livre de deux ou trois cents pages 
ait plus de complexité qu’un article de dix; et, aussi, qu’il soit plus 
facile d’indiquer une direction nouvelle que de la suivre, sans qu’un 
échec – partiel ou même total -- soit une prévue décisive, définitive, 
de l’erreur commise au départ (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 46).  
 
Thus, changeability is a norm and expectation, rather than a fault. As Paul Surer notes 
in his review of Barthes’ introduction to Morrissette’s book, “On serait même tenté de 
dire [qu’il est] contradictoire (nous savons que notre romancier n’admet pas cette 
critique: il ne se contredit pas, affirme-t-il; il modifie son point de vue)” (330).  
Additionally, Robbe-Grillet views such changeability as the product of an 
ongoing productive process of literary innovation: “Ces textes ne constituent en rien 
une théorie du roman; ils tentent seulement de dégager quelques lignes d’évolution 




innovation and evolution that are so relentless as to escape even his own attempts at 
pinning it down; in an interview on the television show Apostrophes he reproaches 
the participants who try to define him and his literature, saying that he has only ever 
reclaimed the right to perpetual and permanent invention, “c’est-à-dire le refus de se 
figer à des règles -- même fixées par moi!” (“Le style c’est l’homme” 21:13-21:18).  
While these particularities have frequently frustrated critics in the past, looking at 
them as a posthumanist mindset alleviates the problem somewhat, for, as I will 
demonstrate, this notion of continual change can be considered an instance of 
emergence and therefore is actually quite valid from the standpoint of posthumanist 
theory. Regardless of the variation in his theoretical ideas over time, however, 
consistent lines of thought can be detected throughout his theoretical oeuvre, in 
particular in regards to the idea of humanism.  
While not exclusively founded upon direct opposition to humanism, 
posthumanism has its roots in a generalized skepticism of its validity as well as in 
French anti-humanist theory. This is the first line of convergence between Robbe-
Grillet and the posthumanists. That Robbe-Grillet was ardently opposed to humanism 
as an artistic and critical approach is well established, so much so that by the 1990s 
critics came to invoke the phrase “new humanism”12 when writing about Robbe-
Grillet, while others took his a-humanist standpoint as such a given that they 
addressed the topic tongue-in-cheek; Raylene Ramsay, for example, describes his 
work as a “ludic intertextual journey through the ruins of humanist enlightenment” 
(“Ruins” 231). Earlier critics, of course, attributed to him and those they grouped 
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under the heading “Nouveau Roman” the label “école du refus” to describe his 
resistance to those ideas he would eventually identify as humanist, while Melvin 
Friedman describes early criticism as seizing (perhaps too eagerly) on his “distinct 
anti-humanist tendencies” (Friedman 133). Much of the early debate around whether 
Robbe-Grillet was chosiste or humaniste, while later demonstrated to be 
problematic,13 illustrates nonetheless the centrality of the question of humanism in 
Robbe-Grillet’s vision.  
In effect, in all of his theoretical writing, Robbe-Grillet has displayed a steady 
antipathy for humanism, although he did not use the term “humanism” consistently 
until publication of his essay “Nature, Humanisme, Tragédie,” in 1958. Before then, 
Robbe-Grillet uses various terms to refer obliquely to humanism: “la vérité humaine 
supérieure;” “une civilisation mentale…du passé;” “conceptions essentialistes de 
l’homme;” “romantisme systématique;” his most well known being the “mythe de 
profondeur” (PUNR 20, 17, 22, 37, 22). He uses the word “myth” because he believes 
that humanism had previously been broadly accepted as truth in Western thought, and 
also is fundamentally fallacious. Robbe-Grillet also employs the term “profondeur” in 
a specific and particular way, using it basically as shorthand for humanism, or, as he 
says, “la civilisation humaniste de la profondeur tragique” (Mansuy 98). In later 
critical commentary he often discusses humanism in terms of “ideology” and “codes.” 
The publication of “Nature, Humanisme, Tragédie” marked his first real attempt at 
developing and explaining his anti-humanist sentiments as such. But if the word 
“humanism” is absent in his earlier work it is not because the idea was not there -- it 
                                                
13In the same 1976 article, for example, Friedman summarizes succintly, “The early chosiste 
pronouncements of Barthes and others seem rather elementary and even misguided. Much of what was 




was indeed present – rather, his theoretical ideas had not yet fully coalesced in 
opposition to a target he was willing to name as humanism.  
Thus, a criticism of humanism, whether implicit or explicit, has been present 
in Robbe-Grillet’s theoretical work from the very beginning (in one of his first 
published essays in 1955, he evokes the “mythes du XIXe siècle;” in his first 
televised interview in 1957 he speaks about certain “systèmes d’interpretation” that 
“faussent complètement” the nature of the world) (PUNR 10; “Jalousie” 7:29-7:53). 
Eventually, Robbe-Grillet, for his part, stated unequivocally that elimination of 
humanism is a key component of his literary project: “Il y a effectivement de ma part 
la volonté de faire disparaitre tout ce qu’on peut appeler l’humanisme” (“Chemins” 
9:08-9:15). All in all, both Robbe-Grillet and most of his critics – for once in 
agreement – maintain that the question of humanism has been central to his vision 
from its earliest days. The importance for Robbe-Grillet of this loss of “profondeur” 
in relation to of the “modern” moment, therefore, should not be underestimated; it is 
essential to understanding his project. 
Posthumanist theory, similarly, most often positions itself in relation to 
humanism/s, but tends to take a softer stance than anti-humanist theories. 
Posthumanism does not necessarily base itself exclusively in opposition to humanism, 
but rather attempts to acknowledge, confront, and “work through” or deconstruct 
many of its most problematic tenets while still “[showing] ‘care’ for the human” 
(Herbrechter Introduction 3, 4). Most posthumanist scholars view posthumanist 
theory as an affirmative renewed conceptualization of the human and his 




the pessimism inherent in French antihumanism critiques of humanism, such as 
Foucault’s apocalyptic declaration of the “death of man.” (Foucault 342).  Critics like 
Rosi Braidotti recognize the contributions of anti-humanist thought has made, and 
offer tentative hope that posthumanism may validate their concerns while overcoming 
their limitations; Braidotti, for example, thinks of the impasses faced by anti-
humanist thought as imposed by “lethal binaries” that may be overcome by 
posthumanism’s more open-ended, pluralistic approach:  
Posthumanism…traces a different discursive framework, looking more 
affirmatively towards new alternatives…The posthumanist perspective 
rests on the assumption of the historical decline of Humanism but goes 
further in exploring alternatives, without sinking into the rhetoric of 
the crisis of Man. It works instead towards elaborating alternative 
ways of conceptualizing the human subject (The Posthuman 37). 
 
Despite the impression of some early critics, especially in the wake of publication of 
For a New Novel,14 Robbe-Grillet’s approach was not meant to be simply “anti” or a 
negation of that which he criticized. To counter the elements of humanism that he 
finds troubling, Robbe-Grillet proposes positive alternatives. As R.O. Elaho states, 
“l’école du refus – Cette description n’est pas tout à fait valable car R-G dépasse le 
stade du refus; il propose, lui, des “solutions” (106).  
And the similarities do not end at opposition to humanism. Neither 
posthumanist theory nor Robbe-Grillet’s literary project are simply a humanism call-
and-response. To see it that way would be too reductive. While starting from a 
viewpoint of criticism of humanism, both posthumanist scholars and Robbe-Grillet 
move away from this point of departure, toward the creation and elaboration of new 
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alternative mindsets that address other ideas. Elements of his work that do not 
necessarily directly address humanism, such as his notion of creation, open up 
exciting new possibilities of interpretation when examined using his a-humanist 
stance as the starting point. With critical posthumanism as a guide we can look to new 
methods for interpretation of various elements of his work, which is, notably, an 
approach welcomed by Robbe-Grillet himself.  
1.2 Sociohistorical Origins of Critical Posthumanist Theory 
The term itself can be traced to an article by influential postmodern scholar Ihab 
Hassan, who remarked in 1977 that  
We need first to understand that the human form - including human 
desire and all its external representations - may be changing radically, 
and thus must be re-visioned. We need to understand that five hundred 
years of humanism may be coming to an end, as humanism transforms 
itself into something that we must helplessly call posthuman (Hassan 
843). 
 
Hassan’s comment reflects the reality of his historical moment, characterized by a 
burgeoning doubt in Western intellectual and general culture about the validity of 
humanism as the dominant model for knowledge and representation, a doubt brought 
on by a range of historical and epistemological factors. At the time Hassan was 
writing, structuralists, poststructuralists, postcolonialists, and deconstructionists were 
all setting humanism in their critical sights, and the postmodern age was dawning. In 
everyday life, technology was advancing and proliferating at an unprecedented rate, 
no longer exclusively consigned to the purview of an intellectual elite but 
increasingly accessible to the average Joe, a circumstance originating in the World 




years after the publication of Hassan’s article, as Neil Badmington points out, a 
notably a-humanist event occurred when Time Magazine selected as its 1982 Man of 
the Year the computer, a choice rife with posthuman significance. Badmington says, 
Breaking with more than half a century of convention, the cover of the 
first issue of Time to appear in 1983 featured a different type of star. 
‘Several human candidates might have represented 1982,’ wrote the 
magazine’s publisher…’but none symbolized the past year more 
richly, or will be viewed by history as more significant, than a 
machine: the computer.’ This time, it seemed, humans had failed to 
leave their mark (Introduction 1). 
 
Badmington goes on to describe the cover’s visual representation of the computer 
centered in the frame, with a forlorn-looking human figure placed off to the side, for 
him an accurate figurative depiction of the contemporary situation of the human in 
regards to technology (Introduction 1). 
The displacement of the human by the mechanical/computational and its 
relationship to the non-human came to be an increasingly common theme in both 
academic and popular culture of the period. As a brief illustration in regards to 
popular culture, I’ll cite some examples from cinema, for, as Badmington points out, 
commercial movies from around this time often depict the human being as 
confronting a non- or a-human other; The Exorcist (human/supernatural), Jaws  
(human/animal), and Star Wars: A New Hope (human/alien-robotic-animal other), for 
example, all rank among the most popular films of the 1970s.  
This trend increased in the 1980s, as many of the highest-grossing and most 
widely popular films continued along this tack: the Star Wars franchise, 
Ghostbusters, E.T., Back to the Future, Terminator, Beetlejuice, Aliens, Poltergeist, 




type depict humanity as coming under threat by a non-human other, and the storyline 
operates in such as a way as to reaffirm the notion of a singular and peerless 
humanity; the hero and humanity triumph over the non-human other, usually through 
some sort of quintessentially human quality, a human “essence.” (Even in E.T., where 
the alien/non-human is good and certain men are bad, the separation between human 
and non-human remains unbridgeable, with every entity ultimately restored to his 
“proper” side of the divide when E.T. returns home to his own kind).  But the mere 
fact that this motif occurs so consistently in films from this time period hints at a 
collective uncertainty about what it means to be human. (It is also notable that many 
of the most popular films from that time that do not feature a non-human other tend to 
emphasize a loss of innocence, as well as depict coming-of-age experiences broadly 
considered as “universal” and “uniquely” human, serving as a reactionary reply to 
this uncertainty: Sixteen Candles, The Breakfast Club, Fast Times at Ridgemont High, 
Ferris Bueller’s Day Off).   
But films featuring the non-human, especially those of the 1980s, did not 
merely stop at the “us-vs.-them” mentality. Many of these films combined the human 
with the non-human: Terminator is a part-human, part-robot assassin. Marty McFly 
manages to keep his (human) identity intact by visiting the future with the help of his 
time-traveling Delorian in Back to the Future. The city of Los Angeles in the film 
Blade Runner is equally populated by humans and human-like robots, which, 
significantly, are indistinguishable from each other.  
It was this image of the technologically enhanced human, or cyborg, that 




human, not only shaky from the onslaught of technology and its integration, but also 
under attack from anti-humanist thought, as well as from a postmodern mindset that 
no longer gave credence to the kind of Lyotardian grand “metanarrative” that 
humanism had previously provided (Lyotard Condition xxiv). The figure of the 
cyborg (“cyber organism”), so prevalent in the mass culture landscape of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, serves as the jumping-off point for Donna Haraway’s now-
famous academic essay “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-
Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century” (1985), which, although not containing the 
term “posthumanism” itself, many scholars, including Stefan Herbrechter and Rosi 
Braidotti, point to as one of the chief points of origin of posthumanist critical 
thought.15 
In it, she argues that while technology has made us ever more doubtful of the 
existence of the “inherent” and “essential” in the human – and was right to do so -- it 
is not just the border between man and machine that is at stake. The boundaries 
between the human and all of its “others” - animals, the (ecological) environment, 
monsters, and aliens, to name a few - are crumbling; perhaps they have never been 
valid in the first place. At the very least they should be fundamentally questioned. 
And while many theorists had previously attempted to problematize humanism, for 
Haraway, none had provided a theoretical framework that satisfactorily reflected her 
current technoscientific sociohistorical reality, encapsulated by the image of the 
cyborg. Already the postmodern moment had influenced Western thought through its 
refusal of binaries and a valuation of fragmentation, multiplicity, and transgression 
                                                




over boundaries and essences. Haraway’s observations on the cyborg constitute an 
illustration and shoring up of these notions from a technological and feminist 
standpoint. 
Specifically, in her essay, she approaches the cyborg from the standpoint of 
“socialist feminism,” targeting the Freudian psychoanalytical paradigm of oedipal-
derived gender. Haraway’s critique therefore falls within the bounds of feminist 
critical theory, one of many late-twentieth-century theoretical approaches that took 
aim at the humanist framework via the problematic of marginalization, alongside 
postcolonial and queer theory. But Haraway’s essay is particularly interesting in that, 
rather than reclaiming a gender identity marginalized by the hegemony of a 
white/male/European model (for instance, as in the case of other feminist theorists, a 
reclamation of the female gender), she postulates that we have moved beyond gender 
entirely: For Haraway we are living in a “post-“ society, in a world and a moment that 
is post- nearly everything, including gender. Furthermore, and importantly, while the 
notion of an essentialist, universally shared humanity usually won the day in film and 
popular culture, Haraway’s essay posits the notion of the cyborg – man as other - as 
valid and accurate. She accepts, rather than disparages, a new amorphous, unbounded, 
dubitative vision of the human, as it appears in both life and artistic representation, 
thus laying the groundwork for its further examination in critical theory. “I am 
making an argument for the cyborg as a fiction mapping our social and bodily 
reality…the cyborg is our ontology…it is a condensed image of both imagination and 




Haraway’s essay is not simple, nor is it unproblematic. It was both heralded 
and criticized by scholars and continues to be so nowadays. But its importance in 
launching posthumanist theory as a consolidated critical approach is substantial. It 
was one of the first publications to put forth in one text several of the various threads 
commonly gathered today under the umbrella of posthumanist theory, including the 
decentering of man; the breaking down of boundaries between human and various 
others; fractured identities; simultaneous similarity and difference; technological 
hegemony; information theory and systems models; a rejection of essentialism, 
dualities, and binaries; and an embrace of polymorphism, flow, and exchange. Her 
essay takes these lines of thought up from various disciplines, ties them to her socio-
politico-cultural moment, brings them together, and points them toward a future of 
posthumanist critical theory. It charged into its social moment with a synthesis of 
ideas and recognition of sociocultural malaise that was sorely needed at the time. As 
Badmington notes, “Although they shared a common concern with the end of human 
sovereignty, theory and mass culture were kept generically apart. When they 
eventually met, however, posthumanism was born” (Introduction 8). 
The prevalence of the cyborg and the breaking down of boundaries in mass 
culture that inspired Haraway to write continued to increase and to inspire scholars to 
follow Haraway’s initial path of questioning. Writing in 1993, Bruno Latour 
investigated this phenomenon and its relation to modernity in We Have Never Been 
Modern (1993), inspired by his dismay at the incapacity of something as mundane as 
a daily newspaper to decisively categorize a phenomenon as firmly established and 




cited by scholars as reasons to investigate the post/human include the growth of an 
ear on a mouse’s back, the cloning of Dolly the sheep, and the Navy’s use of dolphins 
in weapons technology programs, among many others.16  
Towards the end of the 1990s, posthumanism was increasingly investigated 
more systematically as a critical theory.17 In 1999 N. Katherine Hayle’s How We 
Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, 
another key text in posthumanist theory, appeared. Although posthumanism as both a 
notion and a term did exist before Hayles’s book, Hayles’s work in particular, 
especially as it built upon the work of Haraway, made “posthumanism” more 
academically widespread, in part because of the extent to which her ideas found an 
audience confronted by a rapid surge of technological and scientific developments in 
both mainstream and academic culture, and who were hungry for a way of situating 
them in relation to the human: “The real breakthrough, however, undoubtedly comes 
with N. Katherine Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman (1999)” (Herbrechter 
Analysis 36). This may be because she openly advocated for the adoption of theories 
from other disciplines, especially the sciences, and additionally because she was 
among the first to propose a somewhat comprehensive vision of what “the 
posthuman” and its accompanying comprehensive critical theory might entail. 
With her book, Hayles acknowledges her own critical malaise in the face of 
certain technological developments and, more specifically, puts into the question the 
quasi-ubiquitous critical division between “information” and “materiality,” often 
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characterized as the distinction between “mind” and “body” in various manifestations 
of humanist thought.18 Noting that many technological developments of her time, 
such as the notion of downloading human consciousness into a computer, trouble this 
distinction, or worse, erase it, Hayles highlights the importance of rethinking the 
notion of the human, specifically the “liberal humanist subject,” as she puts it: 
The overlay between the enacted and the represented bodies is no longer a 
natural inevitability but a contingent production, mediated by a technology 
that has become so entwined with the production of identity that it can no 
longer meaningfully be separated from the human subject…This realization, 
with all its exfoliating implications, is so broad in its effects and so deep in its 
consequences that it is transforming the liberal subject, regarded as the model 
of the human since the Enlightenment, into the posthuman (Became 2). 
 
Thus did critical posthumanist theory begin to coalesce as a viable discipline, with 
these texts serving as its first major textual points of reference. As it has since 
developed, posthumanist theory has taken up the threads of several major theories in 
many disciplines that align with this technoscientifically driven destabilization of the 
human, borrowing from the sciences, information theory, and the humanities, 
especially French studies. The most important of these are French antihumanism and 
cybernetics/information and systems theory (which was then extrapolated into 
theories of communication, cognition, and sociology currently used by posthumanist 
theory). I will now outline a brief genealogy of posthumanist thought that 
demonstrates the role that each of these plays in contemporary posthumanist critical 
theory, and examine to what extent Robbe-Grillet can be said to be familiar with and 
influenced by these same theories. 
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1.3 A Brief Genealogy of Critical Posthumanist Theory 
A principal characteristic of critical posthumanist theory is that it brings 
together theory from the humanities with those of the sciences. The posthumanist 
critical theory that debuted in the 1990s was a singular creature that merged 
humanities critical theory, especially that of French theorists, with contemporary 
theoretical developments in more scientific fields, including cybernetics, chaos 
theory, information theory, cognitive science, sociology, and systems theory 
(cybernetics and neocybernetics uniting much of these last in a cohesive manner); 
Bart Simon names the particularity of “a critical posthumanism” as an 
“interdisciplinary perspective informed by academic poststructuralism, 
postmodernism, feminist and postcolonial studies, and science and technology 
studies” (2-3). The particular iterations of these two distinct branches of theory – 
from the humanities and the sciences -- that inform posthuman critical theory 
developed more or less independently along parallel timelines throughout the second 
half of the 20th century before being combined as posthumanist theory in the 1990s. I 
shall now outline the development of each in turn before demonstrating how they 
come together within the bounds of posthumanist critical theory. 
Most posthumanist scholars view posthumanist critical theory as being a 
natural and logical successor of several major theoretical trends within the humanities 
in the mid- to late-20th century thought, many of which found their most extensive 
expression within French studies. Posthumanist theory is seen as variously taking up 
the reins of poststructuralism, postcolonialism, (post-) feminism, deconstructionism, 




precursors of posthumanist theory comes from Rosi Braidotti in her book The 
Posthuman (2013). She views posthumanism as a natural descendant of anti-humanist 
strains of thought (although it must not itself be confused with anti-humanism) that 
appeared during the second half of the 20th century, and of French anti-humanist 
theory in particular.  
For Braidotti, the period immediately after World War II was a time when 
“the Humanist ideal came to be questioned quite radically,” especially by French 
intellectuals, who “acquired a special international significance as spokesmen for the 
age” (The Posthuman 16, 19). She views certain pivotal historical events of the 1960s 
and 1970s, such as decolonization, social feminist movements, and youth activism, as 
generating new antihumanist epistemologies by forcing those involved for the first 
time to seriously question the dominance of the Humanist ideal in the Western 
mindset, especially within Europe. For her, “up until the 1960s, philosophical reason 
had escaped relatively unscathed from its responsibilities of domination and 
exclusion,” and the growing exposure and acknowledgement of marginalized groups 
such as women, minorities, and colonized peoples, as well as their theorizing by 
French intellectuals such as Luce Irigaray and Frantz Fanon, irrevocably destabilized 
the dominance of the white male European universal in both the critical and the 
popular psyche (Braidotti The Posthuman 20).  
Braidotti cites those of the generation of ’68, also known as the “post-
structuralist generation,” as being particularly influential: “France occupies a very 
special position in the genealogy of anti-humanist critical theory” (Braidotti The 




Things, in which he questions man’s place at the center of world history and decries 
his “delusions of grandeur,” the Humanist ideal of the human had already been 
radically put into question by many of the dominant radical and political discourses of 
the post-World-War-II French intellectual set (Braidotti The Posthuman 23). Braidotti 
also cites the later theories of Derridean deconstructionism and Lyotard’s 
postmodernism, successors to the epistemological lineage begun by the intellectual 
generation of ’68, as being taken up by posthumanist theory. The expansive 
multinodal rhizomic networks of Deleuze and Guettari have also been adopted as a 
model by posthumanist theorists seeking a decentered and multidirectional paradigm. 
The problematics raised by these French theories correspond in many ways to those 
raised by Hayles and Haraway, such as differentiation; the dissolution of grand 
narratives (such as that of humanism); the marginalization of non-human others and 
minorities by the humanist white male hegemonic model of the human subject; and 
plurality, fragmentation, and decentralization. 
Thus do the poststructuralists, feminists, postcolonialists, and antihumanists of 
French theory, as well as their successors, serve as one major constituent of 
posthumanist theory. However, according to Braidotti, as useful as these theories and 
as salient as their problematics are, these lines of thought have their limitations, 
which, for Braidotti, ultimately keep them from being in and of themselves viable 
platforms from which to re-examine the notion of the human. For her, antihumanism 
as a whole has too many internal contradictions to serve as a productive theory and 
also hinges on the negative while failing to provide a workable affirmative 




offer negative critiques but also “propose new and alternative ways to look at the 
human from a more inclusive and diverse angle” (Braidotti The Posthuman 28). In 
addition, these theories fail to address the cybernetic, technological and informatics 
aspects of the posthuman raised by Hayles, Haraway, and others. For her, this is the 
promise of posthumanism, which carries on the legacies of the poststructuralism, 
antihumanism, and postmodernism of French studies in a way that seeks to surmount 
their limitations and adds to them through theories adopted from the sciences. 
The majority of scholars who have discussed the genealogy of posthumanist 
critical theory in book-length studies share the general content of Braidotti’s 
genealogy. Stefan Herbrechter, for example, also points to what he refers to as 
“French Theory,” in particular post-structuralism and deconstructionism, as a key 
precursor to and constituent of posthumanist critical theory, and gives special mention 
to the thinkers Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, and Lacan (Analysis 196). Like Braidotti, 
Herbrechter points to French antihumanist thought generally as being an important 
forerunner to current posthumanist theory, but, like Braidotti, is careful to note that 
posthumanist theory is essentially different from and not be confused with (strictly) 
antihumanist thinking. 
Like the French thinkers cited by Herbrechter and Braidotti, the intellectuals 
involved in the development of concurrent theories in the sciences later adopted by 
posthumanist theory were confronting a conceptual reconfiguration of the human. 
The developments that were made as a result of this confrontation were turned into 




breeding grounds in the development of those theories was the Macy Conferences of 
1941-1960.  
 Bruce Clarke and Mark B.N. Hansen offer one of the most concise summaries 
of the generation of this strain of cybernetic theory their edited book Emergence and 
Embodiment: New Essays on Second-Order Systems Theory (2009). They state that 
starting in the 1940s, scientists concerned with the development of command-and-
control systems started using information and communication theory to develop 
artificial intelligence, which combined biological and computational systems (Clarke 
and Hansen 2). They named their new field “cybernetics” and quickly found that such 
a mixing of the biological and the technological “raised new issues about the 
‘definition of man’: If human behaviors can be duplicated by machines, how is one to 
“differentiate man” from other entities?” (Clarke and Hansen 2). This question was 
attacked by leading information and cybernetics scientists at the Macy Conferences 
throughout the years it was held, and from there the emerging “cybernetic discourse 
entered psychology, anthropology, and other social sciences and from there, in the 
1950s and ‘60s, the humanities and the creative arts” (Clarke and Hansen 2).  
One of the most influential theories to come out of the Macy Conferences is 
that which is known as second-order cybernetics, or neocybernetics. In brief, 
cybernetics proved useful as an approach to the problematic of the human by positing 
the constructive nature of knowledge and reality, but being based upon binaries such 
as form/substance and virtuality/actuality, was ultimately deemed too simplistic. 
Through the Macy Conferences a new theory was developed – neocybernetics -- that 




complex models of communication and information, and, after being extrapolated by 
scholars such as the sociologist Niklas Luhmann, subjectivity and cognition. Indeed, 
Clarke points out that neocybernetics has informed “some of the most important 
theoretical and critical conversations going on today in the cognitive sciences, chaos 
and complexity studies, and social systems theory” (Clarke and Hansen 5). 
They also note that many of the French thinkers cited by Braidotti, such as 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, were also influenced by this same branch of 
scientific theory and have used it for analysis in their own work (Clarke and Hansen 
5). The Macy theories thus have a history of informing French theory. Clarke and 
Hansen also note that the development of the Macy Conference theories was 
“historically concurrent with the postwar spread of linguistic structuralism in Europe” 
of the type cited by Braidotti (Clarke and Hansen 2). Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, 
French intellectuals and inheritors of the “French Theory” cited by Herbrechter, and 
theorists in the discipline of science philosophy, situate their work squarely between 
the two domains, drawing from both of these two strains of theory. Their work has in 
turn has been adopted and elaborated by posthumanist critical theory. Thus are these 
two threads of theory – scientific and humanities -- not only taken up by posthumanist 
theory, but also have a preexisting history of informing each other. Additionally, the 
two theories were co-present and intertwined at precisely the time Robbe-Grillet 
began to write, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Clarke and Hansen state that “a 
growing body of scholarly work is rethinking the shape and evolution of the relations 
among science, technology, sociology, psychology, philosophy, history, literature, 




where both posthumanist critical theory and Robbe-Grillet situate their respective 
projects. 
 Robbe-Grillet was himself an inheritor of the French antihumanist intellectual 
tradition and of course well familiar with structuralism and poststructuralism. Like 
posthumanist scholars, he claims to be witnessing a particular historical moment that 
is changing what it means to be human: “Si ces objets-là [in Balzac] sont, comme on 
dit, plus “humains” que les nôtres, c’est seulement – et nous y reviendrons – que la 
situation de l’homme dans le monde qu’il habite n’est plus aujourd’hui la même qu’il 
y a cent ans” (PUNR 117). And that in this moment, he is acutely aware of the 
nascent development of a new conception of the human: “Chacun sent 
confusément…qu’un autre homme est en train de naître depuis déjà le début de ce 
siècle, fait de fragments mobiles et dépareillés – pulsions, représentations 
imaginaires, stéréotypes culturels, détails brisés de l’homme ancien et de l’ancien 
monde” (Robbe-Grillet “Nathalie Sarraute” loc.777). While he is thoroughly familiar 
with structuralist and poststructuralist theory, it is worth nothing that he continually 
resisted these approaches to his work; in this way he is different from writers like 
Ricardou, who embraced this tradition. And while Robbe-Grillet acknowledges the 
role of anti-humanist thinkers like Foucault, and their productive influence on the 
development of literature and theory in the postwar moment, he indicates at the same 
time that it is not sufficient to understand his work. He seems to accept their 
problematics but wants something in addition to those theories, in the way 
posthumanist scholars such as Bradiotti and Paul Rekret do:  
It is worth noting that on a theoretical level posthumanism 




respond to the new state of hybridity by an earlier ‘linguistic turn’ 
associated with Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and more 
recently, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, amongst others. 
Needless to say, the poststructuralist critique of the subject holds an 
important place in theories of the posthuman, but its emphasis upon 
language or discourse is nevertheless regarded as inadequate for 
reflecting upon the digital mediations by which thinking is 
increasingly conditioned” (Rekret 82). 
 
He also seems to suggest that the answer to this lack lies in the use of scientific theory 
as a framework. Trained and employed as an agronomist and engineer, and raised in a 
family of engineers and scientists, Robbe-Grillet was well placed to observe and 
comprehend contemporary developments in scientific theory, as Roch Smith points 
out:  
It might be expected that, as an applied scientist, Robbe-Grillet would 
be certain that things could be made to make sense. But this is also the 
century of Albert Einstein’s relativity and Werner Karl Heisenberg’s 
principle of uncertainty, both of which challenged accepted views of 
physical reality and knowledge. Robbe-Grillet is perhaps better placed 
than most twentieth-century novelists to understand the ambiguities 
and uncertainties inherent in modern science (21).  
 
Indeed, in his critical commentaries he often discusses recent developments in such 
scientific theories and lauds them, saying, “On devrait être plus attentifs à la façon 
dont la science moderne a changé nos rapports au concept de raison. La physique 
quantique, par exemple, a bouleversé le principe de causalité. Comment l’humanisme 
peut-il rester ainsi enlisé alors que la science fait de tels bonds?” (Dufour loc. 8644). 
In fact, he directly states that he is familiar with current scientific developments of his 
time: “Vous savez que d’une façon generale je me suis beaucoup interessé aux 
théories, pas seulement aux théories sur le roman, mais également aux théories 




critical frameworks in his own field of art and literature, explicitly naming 
“connaissances scientifiques, qu’il s’agisse de sciences de la matière ou de sciences 
de l’homme” as a major agent of epistemological change (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 137). 
In the 1972 Colloque at Cerisy, he cites sociology and recent sociological 
developments as having particular potential for use in literature and the arts, a 
comment that runs historically concurrent to the development of such sociological 
theory by Niklas Luhmann in the 1970s and 1980s – a major component of 
posthumanist theory (Leenhardt 172-173). In fact, he made similar observations 
regarding sociology as early as 1957, but, interestingly, situates their development in 
the future: “Plus tard, sans doute, les sociologues découvriront dans les solutions de 
nouvelles similitudes” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 35). In another 1977 interview he 
expounds in depth bout the vast potential of interpretive frameworks in the domain of 
information theory, in regards to the notion of order and disorder (Morrissette “Order 
and Disorder”). And again at Cerisy, he even posits a total crossover of “the science 
of literature” in a comment strikingly prescient of the future development of 
posthumanist theory:  
L’idée d’une science, ou de plusieurs sciences de la littérature qui se 
récupéreraient, fascine…nous sommes peut-être en train d’assister à la 
naissance des sciences de la littérature, et, dans la mesure où je crois 
cette naissance possible, non sans doute immédiatement mais dans 
plusieurs années sinon plusieurs décennies (Hoek 322-323). 
 
Robbe-Grillet thus is not only familiar with the literary and philosophical 
French theories of his day, but he is also cognizant of their relation to 





And he not only recognizes the potential utility of scientific theory for 
evaluation of his work (and art in general) but he also seems cognizant of the 
actualization of a movement within the sciences, characterized by developments such 
as the Macy Conferences, to question the notion of man and to develop new 
hermeneutical frameworks in response to that particular question. He, like 
posthumanist scholars, sees this movement as being motivated by a general 
interrogation of what it means to be human; in fact, this destabilization in regards to 
the human is understood by both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars to 
constitute a “crisis” of humanism, an idea that I will explore further in the following 
section. In any case, concurrently to the development of the scientific theories 
described above, Robbe-Grillet recognizes that there is a notable impulse among 
scientists to develop theory to respond to this problem in precisely the way he 
envisions; for example, he contests that while certain scientific disciplines may have 
once been under the grip of humanism, they are laudable for having since moved 
towards a new framework for understanding:  
Pendant très longtemps [la science] a cru [découvrir des lois dans la 
nature]. Ce qui est intéressant dans la science, c’est que plus elle a 
étendu son pouvoir sur le monde, plus elle a renoncé à postuler une 
nature commune entre le monde et l’homme. Il y a cent ans, le 
mathématicien, le physicien croyaient que l’équation était identique au 
mouvement de l’astre; plus aujourd’hui. L’homme de science actuel a 
renoncé à la naturalité de la science (“Discussion: Sur le choix des 
générateurs”163). 
 
He praises “le physicien moderne [qui] ne pense plus que les équations mettent au 
jour des vérités cachées appartenant au monde” that he attributes to the “tyrannie de 




générateurs” 163; PUNR 20). And he implicates himself and his literary project as 
being part of that movement; speaking about certain contemporary critics and authors, 
including Foucault, whose projects seem to be in line with that of the Nouveau 
Roman, he says, “Nous étions comme en train de créer une nouvelle philosophie que 
nous ignorions nous-mêmes, non seulement en tant que philosophie cohérente, mais 
en tant que formulation conceptuelle de quoi que ce soit” (Barilli 128). In this way, 
one can say that Robbe-Grillet perceived a proto-posthumanist movement: He 
realized the potential for the use of both French theory and scientific theory in a 
framework that would address the “crisis” of humanism and witnessed and 
recognized the stirrings in those same fields that eventually became the development 
of posthuamnism as critical theory. Now I will examine that crisis as it is envisioned 
by Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars. 
1.4 Alain Robbe-Grillet and Critical Posthumanism: Parallel Visions of Crisis 
As illustrated in the first section of this chapter, both Robbe-Grillet and 
posthumanist scholars focus on a criticism of humanism as the starting point for their 
respective projects. They consider that the actual state of the contemporary material 
world has revealed humanism to be, at best, no longer sufficient as an epistemological 
and ontological framework, and at worst, a fraudulent and faulty paradigm that has 
deceived and misled. For Robbe-Grillet and for many posthumanist scholars, this 
exposure constitutes a “crisis” of humanism that marks our current sociohistorical 
moment. For Robbe-Grillet this crisis situates itself mostly in the context of literature 
and the critical literary establishment, while for posthumanist scholars it it situated in 




“crisis” in the exact same place, both contend that it is a problem for the world at 
large, and both have similar visions of the events and developments within general 
culture that led to its development.  
Robbe-Grillet invokes the epistemological uncertainty of his time thusly: “La 
connaissance que nous avons de ce qui est en nous et de ce qui nous entoure…a subi 
de façon parallèle des bouleversements extraordinaires” (PUNR 137). If this 
disruption was at least partially engendered by Freud’s work in the subconscious, it is 
perhaps most epitomized by Foucault’s “death of man,” which both Robbe-Grillet 
and posthumanist scholars invoke as indicative of this crisis. Braidotti states, “The 
‘death of Man’ announced by Foucault formalized an epistemological and moral 
crisis that resulted in insubordination from received humanist ideals,” while Robbe-
Grillet, for his part, says, “C’est vrai que l’apport de Michel Foucault a joué son rôle, 
que la pensée collective à ce moment-là…a changé” (Braidotti “Posthuman Critical 
Theory” 14; Barilli 123). Even those posthumanist scholars, like N. Katherine Hayles, 
who choose to avoid the term “crisis,” claim that “What is new is that there is a 
change or a transformation in our human condition to which the humanities need to 
respond” (Van Puymbroeck and Hayles 25). Like the posthumanists cited in the 
previous section, who focus on technoscientific development as a major catalyst for 
this exposure, Robbe-Grillet posits himself and his artistic peers as being in a 
“modern” world vastly changed from precedent history,19 one that is characterized by 
rapidly developing technology and that causes our previously rooted humanist notions 
to be put into question. 
                                                
19 Robbe-Grillet tends to use the term not in any technical sense, but to describe his vision of “a 




According to both, this major shift in worldview was at least in part 
engendered by the production of psychoanalytical theory (“nous sommes dans une 
période post-freudienne”), albeit less by virtue of the theory itself than for that which 
it belied (Robbe-Grillet “Discussion: Sur le choix des générateurs” 169). Broadly 
speaking, for Robbe-Grillet, Freud’s psychoanalytical discoveries about the human 
subconscious had the perhaps unwanted effect of revealing that the world contains no 
particular significance, or meaning, for man, and that man himself is less important in 
the world that he had previously thought. “Il faut bien voir qu’à partir du moment où 
la psychanalyse a démonté ce qu’il y avait dans la profondeur de l’homme, cette 
profondeur a disparu,” (Morrissette “Discussion: Robbe-Grillet No. 1, 2…X” 141-
142). From a posthumanist perspective, Neil Badmington also points to Freud as an 
impetus for this crisis, by way of exposing through his theories of the subconcious 
that man himelf is not under man’s control, thus removing him from the humanist 
narrative of domination, power, and control: “Psychoanalysis took the challenge to 
humanism one step further. In proposing that human activity is governed in part by 
unconscious motives, Freud further problematized the Cartesian model, in which the 
critical determinant of being is rational, fully-conscious thought” (Introduction 5). 
Thus do Robbe-Grillet and scholars like Badmington maintain that this 
“profondeur de l’homme,” as Robbe-Grillet terms it, once widely accepted as truth, 
has been revealed as invalid and the collective belief in it exposed as misplaced. For 
Robbe-Grillet it is this revelation – that the “profondeur de l’homme” is no longer 
relevant as an interpretive framework for the world - that most drastically marks the 





Quelque chose [est] en train de changer – et même d’une façon totale, 
sans doute définitive – dans les rapports que nous entretenons avec 
l’univers…”Pourquoi maintenant?” Il y a aujourd’hui, en effet, un 
élément nouveau, qui nous sépare cette fois radicalement de Balzac, 
comme de Gide ou de madame de La Fayette: c’est la destitution des 
vieux mythes de la “profondeur”…la révolution qui s’est accomplie 
est de taille (PUNR 22). 
 
 
Or, more simply: “nous ne croyons plus à cette profondeur” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 
22). Robbe-Grilletian critics agree that his particular historical moment is 
characterized by a loss of the trust that was once placed in humanism; for his part, 
Jean Alter states, “Plus spécifiquement, l’époque actuelle serait marquée par un 
affaiblissement de l’emprise que l’individu avait semblé exercer sur le milieu ambiant 
durant les siècles passés” (“Humanisme” 210). In this context it is inevitable and 
necessary that the idea of the human subject, as well as the epistemological legacies 
of humanism, need to be questioned. We can see just how well this lines up with 
posthumanist explanations. In their explanation of posthumanist in The Postmodern 
Adventure, the scholars Steven Best and Douglas Kellner state:  
While posthumanism is a vague term used in various ways, it is a 
marker for a number of critical mutations unfolding in the Third 
Millenium. If the time before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
was our prehumanist history…and the Renaissance and Enlightenment 
were the classical period of humanistic values that had roots in Greco-
Roman culture, then the period since 1945 can be considered the 
beginning of a transition to a posthuman epoch. From this perspective, 
humanity is now in a liminal zone where individuals are forced to 
confront the meaning and the future of the human (195). 
 
As noted in the previous sections, posthumanist scholars consider material 
advancements in science and technology to be the major catalysts of the theoretical 




them, although the notion of the in- or non-human is certainly not new, and 
humanism has been questioned since its inception and throughout its existence, this 
glut of technoscientific innovations, and their adoption by the general public, taking 
place in the 1980s and 1990s, made confronting the posthuman unavoidable:  
Posthumanism names a historical moment in which the decentering of 
the human by its imbrication in technical, medical, informatics, and 
economic networks is increasingly impossible to ignore, a historical 
development … that comes after the cultural repressions and fantasies, 
the philosophical protocls and evasions, of humanism as a historically 
specific phenomenon (Wolfe What Is Posthumanism? loc. 104).  
 
Herbrechter also claims that the crisis is driven by technological development, 
especially in the public sphere, and that confronting humanism is no longer a choice:  
[It is] predominantly driven by technology. It also seems to 
increasingly correspond to the public face of a ‘popular’ 
posthumanism, a more or less sensationalist mixture of the arts and 
culture sections in newspapers, popular science magazines, 
futurologists, the wider intelligentsia, marketing gurus, and other 
lobbyists, everything, in short, that might be termed ‘third culture,’ as 
Slavoj Zizek maintains (Analysis 16-17).  
 
These advancements are characterized by constant and rapid change (Herbrechter 
cites a “context of radical changes affecting the material economic base” that 
“constitutes a radical transformation”) and engender a general feeling of uncertainty 
and instability, an idea echoed by critics of Robbe-Grillet, like Alter, whose project 
consists on understanding his world vision: “Le développement de la science, loin de 
raffermir la croyance en un ordre universel, a miné les certitudes qu’on croyait avoir: 
l’univers parait incertain, flou, et indiffèrent à la nature humaine” (Analysis viii; 




Indeed, Robbe-Grillet can be said to have much the same viewpoint as 
posthumanists regarding the material motivations behind the crisis of humanism. As 
Robbe-Grillet sees it, this shift in worldview is not limited to a literary or even 
humanities perspective; he sees “modernity” as a time of change generally, remarking 
that a parallel shift can be observed in the intellectual milieu across various 
disciplines: “La pensée abandonnait ses fondements essentialistes, la phénoménologie 
occupait progressivement tout le champ des recherches philosophiques, les sciences 
physiques découvraient le règne du discontinu, la psychologie elle-même subissait de 
façon parallèle une transformation aussi totale” (PUNR 120). Indeed, for Robbe-
Grillet, in agreement with the posthumanists who see a transformation in the material 
world and popular culture generally, change in the modern moment has come not just 
to the intellectual realm. The world as a whole is also vastly changed, (albeit in rather 
vague terms) than that which came before: 
 
Le monde change, lui aussi. D’une part, il n’est plus objectivement le 
même, sur de nombreux points, qu’il y a cent ans, par exemple; la vie 
matérielle, la vie intellectuelle, la vie politique se sont modifiées 
considérablement, ainsi que l’aspect physique de nos villes, de nos 
villages, de nos routes, etc. (PUNR 136-137). 
 
 
And if literature has changed, “ne constitue-t-elle qu’un des aspects du changement 
général des relations que l’homme entretient avec le monde dans lequel il vit” 
(Robbe-Grillet PUNR 31). It is important to note that he also considers the change is 
constant and in the process of occurring; it is not a break with a static “before” and a 
static “after,” but a point in a process of continual transformation; Robbe-Grillet 




in agreement with posthumanist scholars about the transforming and transformative 
nature of this particular crisis, this has particular ramifications for his adoption of the 
notion of emergence, which I will elaborate upon in the following chapter. 
Technological development also plays a role in Robbe-Grillet’s vision. Although 
Robbe-Grillet himself concentrates mostly on the notion of change in art production, 
his earlier critics have highlighted the role of technological development in this 
changing worldview; Jean Alter discussing his work at the Colloque de Cerisy notes 
“l’influence de la civilisation électronique;” Olga Bernal cites the “vie technologique 
moderne” as major influences on Robbe-Grillet’s project (Barilli 126; Bernal 243).  
Like many of his contemporaries, Robbe-Grillet observes that feelings of 
destabilization, alienation, and uncertainty prevail in his time period. Alter has 
highlighted this aspect of Robbe-Grillet’s work, stating, “Il n’y guère encore, 
l’homme traitait le monde en conquérant, l’interprétant en fonction de ses idées, 
sentiments ou désirs. Tout était clair, raisonnable, ordonné. De nos jours ce lien s’est 
brisé. A l’anthropocentrisme a succedé le sentiment d’aliénation” (“Humanisme” 
210). As late as 2000, Robbe-Grillet considered this uncertainty to be characteristic of 
the historical moment: “Aujourd’hui, de toute façon, on constate la même chose dans 
le monde entier, pas seulement en France: la conviction fait défaut” (Ferrand loc. 
9370). Robbe-Grillet uses the word “reassure” often to describe the purpose of 
humanist discourse; for example, before, the humanist descriptions in “le grand 
roman français du XIXe siècle en particulier…constituait un univers stable et sûr” in 
which “les objets balzaciens étaient si rassurants” (PUNR 125, 119). This is because 




says, tends to posit itself as natural, that is, give the impression that its organization is 
due to an innately occurring distribution of power, or “natural” order, rather than a 
historically contingent belief system. Indeed, much of humanism’s power comes from 
its premise that its precepts follow immutable transcendental laws: “l’idéologie ne 
s’impose que sous le masque du naturel” (“Cinéma et idéologie” loc. 2176).  
In the absence left by the disappearance of this comforting myth and its 
attendant reassurance, there is uncertainty and destabilization: “Notre monde, 
aujourd’hui, est moins sûr de lui-même” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 28). The 
disappearance of “profondeur” has left a void: “La disparition des vieux mythes de 
profondeur avait créé un vide determinant” (Barilli 127). In the wake of the abrupt 
disappearance of the reassuring objects of humanism, there is shock; we are reeling 
from “le choc de cette réalité têtue” after “la belle construction s’écroule” (Robbe-
Grillet PUNR 18). This feeling of uncertainty and alienation is felt both in popular 
culture and in art production, and Robbe-Grillet speaks about them in the same 
breath:  
C’est…ce qu’il faut bien appeler l’aliénation de la littérature dans le 
monde moderne. Cette aliénation…est entretenue par la quasi-totalité 
de la critique, à commencer par celle d’une extrême gauche qui 
prétend, dans tous les autres domaines, lutter contre la condition 
aliénée de l’homme…Comme toute aliénation, celle-ci opère bien 
entendu une inversion générale des valeurs comme du vocabulaire 
(PUNR 43).  
 
 
The feeling of alienation is then, in Robbe-Grilletian terms, due not only to social 
changes, but also to epistemological ones, as with the technoscientific advancements 
and new scientific theories cited by posthumanists. Hayles observes a similar reaction 




literature after absorbing the changes entailed by recent scientific theory: “When I 
made the transition from science to literature, it was a huge shock; it was a shock to 
the system. I discovered that everything I thought I knew was wrong and had to be re-
learned in this new context. What counts as evidence? What counts as learning? What 
counts as argument? And so forth” (Hayles “Ten Years On” 319). 
Finally, like posthumanist scholars, Robbe-Grillet notes that this changing 
world is also characterized by speed; and the rate of change is accelerating: “Et 
depuis vingt ans, sans doute, les choses s’accélèrent” (PUNR 116). We find ourselves 
“dans une société ou tout va très vite; tout va de plus en plus vite” (“Le Nouveau 
Lecteur” 7:53-7:56). It is easy to see how this is sentiment is echoed by scholars like 
Herbrechter: “That technological development at the end of the twentieth and at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century has been accelerating and intensifying – at least 
in most parts of the Western world and its sphere of influence – seems undeniable” 
(Analysis 19). The effect of this speed is disorienting: The average reader “se perd 
quelquefois dans le monde même où il vit, lorsque tout cède autour de lui des vieilles 
constructions et des vieilles normes” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 116). The result of all this 
is that, in general terms, “les relations subjectives que nous entretenons avec le 
monde ont changé du tout au tout” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 137).  
In other words, we are forced to confront the notion that humanism is no 
longer a valid framework for understanding – and has perhaps never been. That the 
historical moment in which Robbe-Grillet was most active was a key moment in the 
development of posthuman critical theory is reinforced by scholars like Best and 




posthumanism” and like Herbrechter, who says, “the crisis of humanism and the 
Enlightenment intensified during and after the two world wars, in the first half of the 
twentieth century” (Analysis 52).  
Both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars note that while they see this 
crisis as being characteristic of their particular sociohistorical moment, it is not new 
or unique. It is simply the latest and logical permutation of a problematic that has 
consistently existed and evolved. Andy Mousley notes that “the posthuman is an old 
term for a new problem, one that haunts the humanist tradition from whenever or 
wherever we think that tradition began” (99). Neither is the idea of the crisis of 
(human) subjectivity new, for, as Jonathan Dollimore notes,  
The crisis of subjectivity was there at the inception of individualism in 
early Christianity...neurosis, anxiety and alienation of the subject-in-
crisis are not so much the consequence of its recent breakdown, but the 
very stuff of its creation, and of the culture…from which it is 
inseparable…what we are living through now is not some postmodern 
collapse of Western subjectivity but another mutation in its enduring 
dynamic (“Shakespeare and Theory” 271). 
 
And however importantly the primary characteristics of his lived historical moment – 
a major epistemological shift, a general feeling of destabilization and alienation, a 
crisis of interpretation, an art world that attempts to move forward in the light of both 
-- may strike him, Robbe-Grillet does not consider them to be unparalleled. If his 
lived historical moment is distinct, it is not exceptional. It may be unlike any other 
but it is just one in a series of moments that are also unlike any other. The exposure of 
the “myth of profondeur” and the social and artistic changes that follow are for 
Robbe-Grillet a normal part of the flux of social and literary change over time, rather 




change sans cesse” and we live in “ce present perpetual” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 144, 
128). Art, like the material world, is in a continual process of transformation in which 
no particular permutation or outcome is more or less probable or important than any 
other: “Les formes romanesques doivent évaluer pour rester vivantes …les héros de 
Kafka n’ont que peu de rapport avec les personnages balzaciens…le réalisme-
socialiste ou l’engagement sartrien sont difficilement conciliables avec l’exercice 
problématique de la littérature, comme avec celui de n’importe quel art” (Robbe-
Grillet PUNR 8). We can see in Robbe-Grillet’s treatment of history a parallel with 
the posthumanist conception of human development: “[The] approach only becomes 
posthumanist when the human is no longer seen as the sole hero of a history of 
emancipation, but as a (rather improbable but important) stage within the evolution of 
complex life forms” (Herbrechter Analysis 9). 
Although it may not be singular or unique, both posthumanists and Robbe-
Grillet agree that such a crisis is indeed happening, and it can be perceived across 
disciplines. Robbe-Grillet speaks of “[le] moment où l’art et la société, parés des 
épanouissements comparables, semblent traverser des crises parallèles,” while 
Badmington states, “The crisis in humanism is happening everywhere. Although it 
continues to be debated by critical theorists, the reign of Man is simultaneously being 
called into question by literature, politics, cinema, anthropology, feminism, and 
technology. These attacks are connected, part of the circuit of posthumanism” (PUNR 
35; Introduction 9). 
This crisis of humanism can summarized as a sort of cognitive dissonance 




evaluate it; the section of Braidotti’s book that deals with “the identity crisis of the 
contemporary Humanities” opens in fact with the title “Institutional Patterns of 
Dissonance” (The Posthuman 153, 150). Posthumanists maintain that with humanist 
assumptions about the human being upended by scientific developments and 
transformation -- whether theoretical or material – a new framework for 
understanding is needed. But the cultural and historical domination of humanism is 
such that it remains the primary basis on which such institutions as universities are 
founded. Posthumanism is being developed as a critical theory, but it is far from 
having the type of influence or coherence that humanism provided for the 
organization and operations of such institutions. One only has to consider the label 
“humanities” to understand to what extent liberal arts studies are built around 
humanism. The problem then, for critical posthumanists, is that they remain stuck in 
an outmoded paradigm that no longer corresponds to the objects of its study, but 
cannot seem to find their way out of it, due to its outsize influence and the lack of a 
more feasible alternative. Herbrechter says,  
While popular ideas of posthuman humanity augmented by technology 
often continue to be influenced by ideologically naïve humanist 
values, traditional approaches in cultural theory and in the humanities 
usually remain too anthropocentric in their defense of a notion of the 
‘human’ that is not sufficiently historicized or grounded in a quasi-
mystical notion of ‘human nature’ (Analysis 7). 
 
He calls for a “transformation of what is arguably the most humanist of institutions, 
namely the university” (Herbrechter Analysis 14). Herbrechter, like other 
posthumanists, sees this crisis mainly as playing itself out within the academic 
humanities, which have reached a “point of no return,” a moment in which they must 




After several decades of heated ideological debates, theory, canon and 
culture wars, if not settles have petered out in the general crisis and 
decline of the humanities…the uncertainty this time, however seems 
more profound – too pressing are the ‘future of the humanities’ and the 
‘role of literature’ questions to allow for a simple return to business as 
usual in the post-theoretical English department (Introduction 4). 
 
While perhaps a bit exaggerated, it is clear that the problem is there, and is due to a 
gap between that which has been exposed and the lack of something new to evaluate 
it. 
Robbe-Grillet examines this dissonance mostly in the realm of literature and 
literary criticism, but the problem he poses is the same as that of the posthumanists. 
Much has been made of Robbe-Grillet’s targeting of Balzac and 19th century 
“bourgeois” literature. Robbe-Grillet’s insistence on Balzac is not – or at least not 
only – oversimplistic obsession but instead is tied to what Robbe-Grillet considers to 
be the greatest critical problem of his day, this interpretive crisis. He sees it as 
stemming from the outsize prestige humanism gained in the 19th century in particular, 
which in turn has given rise to a cognitive dissonance within contemporary criticism, 
due to humanism’s continued use as a critical framework: “Si la société s’est 
transformée peu à peu, si les techniques industrielles ont fait des progrès 
considérable, notre civilisation mentale, elle, est bien restée la même” (Robbe-Grillet 
PUNR 16). He sees humanism as having reached the apex of its ascendance in the 
19th century, and its widespread adoption as “common sense” being due to its 
insistence on the innateness of its own principles. 
Robbe-Grillet traces the historical genesis of the version of humanism he 
critiques to the seventeenth century, claiming Mme de Lafayette’s La Princesse de 




according to Robbe-Grillet, the humanist point of view eventually came to dominate 
the Western European mindset, reaching a peak the 19th century. From roughly the 
eighteenth century until Freud’s psychoanalytical work in the 20th, despite the 
differences among artistic movements, Robbe-Grillet considers the majority of 
Western artistic production to have been subordinated to the “predominance” of this 
mindset: “What we could call bourgeois art…This middle-class order shaped itself 
slowly and had a century of predominance, the end of the eighteenth and the first half 
of the nineteenth…also the end of the nineteenth if we think of writers like Zola” 
(Hayman 275).  
He sees not just literary production but the entire engine of bourgeois society 
of that time period as having organized itself around the myth of humanism and 
having drawn its power from it: “le mythe de naturalité a servi, comme vous savez, à 
tout un ordre social, moral, politique, pour s’établir et se prolonger” (Robbe-Grillet 
“Sur le choix des générateurs” 159). Its power and its continuing legacy come from 
the supremacy it acquired during the 19th century, not just in literature but in society, 
epistemology and every aspect of life. This is due to humanism’s insistence on 
“natural” order:  “Cet ordre, que l’on peut en effet qualifier de naturel, est lié à tout 
un système, rationaliste et organisateur, dont l’épanouissement correspond à la prise 
du pouvoir par la classe bourgeoise. [Cette] première moitié du XIXe siècle [en] vit 
l’apogée” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 31). According to Robbe-Grillet, this led to a cultural 
and literary production that privileges humanism to the point that many people see it 
as being innate, something inherently human, rather than the sociocultural 




Rather than innate, however, Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars both 
insist on recognizing the sociohistorical contingency of humanism: “There can be no 
talk of purity. Everything we know (scientifically, theoretically) and say 
(linguistically or in other forms of semiotic notiation)…takes place within some 
contingent, radically non-natural (that is, constructed and technical) schema of 
knowledge,” says Cary Wolfe (Wolfe What Is Posthumanism? loc. 228). Robbe-
Grillet says, “Le système balzacien est un système récent, et c’est un système…qui 
n’est pas plus naturel qu’un autre…Nous savons bien que c’est une supercherie. Il n’a 
rien de plus naturel que le nôtre, simplement il a été instauré comme nature par une 
société qui en faisait le bien absolu et définitive, dans l’ordre du récit. C’était le code 
au pouvoir…etc.” (“Ordre et Desordre” loc. 2307).  Both Robbe-Grillet and 
posthumanist scholars point to Foucault as a major point of general recognition of the 
constructed nature of humanism:  
It is important to acknowledge the productive contribution that post-
structuralism and other critical theories have made…Foucault argued 
back in the 1970s that the Humanities as we have come to know them 
are structured by an implicit set of humanist assumptions about ‘Man’ 
which are historically framed and contextually defined, in spite of their 
universalistic pretentions (Braidotti The Posthuman 151).  
 
Robbe-Grillet recognizes this contribution, citing “sociologists”: “Les sociologues ont 
identifié de bonne heure cet ordre narratif à l’ordre politique et moral de la société qui 
l’a mené à son apogée, c’est-à-dire cette bourgeoisie sûre de ses pouvoirs, qui les 
croyait de bonne foi naturels, éternels et justes. On sait ce qu’il en reste aujourd’hui” 




So for Robbe-Grillet humans are not a given but are intrinsically embedded 
within their particular sociohistorical context, and the very concept of human is but a 
contingent historical construct that can be traced to the 17th century. In this he is in 
agreement with scholars like Herbrechter, who says, “Humans and their humanity are 
historical and cultural constructs rather than transcendental concepts free from 
ideology” (Analysis, 9). Herbrechter illustrates well this posthuman moment, 
reminding us simultaneously of humanism’s contingent nature and yet how strongly 
we still cling to this “grand narrative”: “[the] venerable tradition of humanism is at 
stake, and with it, that which is held to be the essence of our species, namely ‘our’ 
humanity. There is no question, however, that the notion of humanity itself has a 
concrete history and that, in fact, it is the effect of a combination of humanism as an 
ideological discourse and modernity as a socio-historical formation” (Lyotard 
Condition 37; Analysis 16). Thus did humanism, for Robbe-Grillet and 
posthumanists, allow itself to be established and remained in power due to its 
insistence on the innateness of its own precepts. 
For Robbe-Grillet, with humanist ideology being the reigning force of 
organization in all aspects of bourgeois society, it became the dominant engine 
behind art production along with the rest. Under the domination of the humanist 
mindset, much of 19th century artistic production was highly reliant on and reflective 
of what Robbe-Grillet considers to be its core ideas, which will be examined in the 
next chapter. For Robbe-Grillet, the principal manifestation of this humanistic 
dominance in literature is the genre of realism, of which Robbe-Grillet holds up 




Interestingly, posthumanist scholars also single out realism as the most typical 
expression of humanist artistic representation: “The regime of knowledge which 
accompanies the rise of the humanist paradigm (or ‘episteme’) within modernity is 
called ‘realism,’” says Herbrechter (Analysis 10). Posthumanist scholars agree with 
Robbe-Grillet that starting in the 19th century in particular, realism dominated artistic 
production: “This humanism of common sense transposed onto art, literature and 
aesthetics and ultimately onto all forms of cultural production represents the basis for 
realism’s hegemony as far as reading is concerned” (Herbrechter Analysis 11-12). 
Furthermore, Robbe-Grillet’s definition of bourgeois culture and humanist narrative 
code as striving to simplify complexity falls precisely in line with Gary Morson’s 
definition of culture:  
The first principle of prosaics is: the fundamental state of the world is 
a mess. Thus, to satisfy our need to feel in control we must overcome 
the very nature of things. We must impose order on contingency, 
minimize the unforeseeable, and ensure the triumph of mind over raw 
experience. That, perhaps, is the fundamental purpose of culture (223).  
 
For Robbe-Grillet, then, the major critical problem of his day – and one of the 
primary reasons for which he considers himself to be misunderstood by critics – is 
that the humanist model persists, in spite of its debunking, in literature, and especially 
in literary criticism. “On constate que les mythes du XIXe siècle conservent toute leur 
puissance,” he laments in his essay on criticism, “A Quoi Servent les Theories” 
(PUNR 10). He even chides contemporary critics in person at the Colloque de Cerisy, 
for example, when correcting their interpretations of his work, maintaining that 
because they remain suck in an outdated framework for interpretation, they will never 




critique] qui tient…à montrer l’écrivain comme prisonnier de l’humanisme 
universel.” (Alter “Discussion: Perspectives” 66). The “difficulties” that some critics 
signal in the reading of his work are due to the fact that such readers insist on 
applying outdated codes to a modern book: “Ce qui est difficile est la lecture d’un 
livre où on essaie -- de force -- d’introduire une catégorie qui ne lui appartient pas” 
(“Poésie” 3:52-4:00). For Robbe-Grillet, a reader who is “conditioned” by the 
outdated models of the 19th century and who picks up a book by himself or Claude 
Simon and who expects to read something like Balzac “aura essayé de retrouver le 
code de la société passée dans un livre présent. Et par conséquent, il aura atteint la 
difficulté maximum” (“Poésie” 4:13-4:23). 
He insists that eventually artists will be able to open critics’ eyes to the 
retrograde platform from which they evaluate art: “On va arriver à vous faire 
avouer…que la civilisation dans laquelle vous vous placez intellectuellement est 
justement la civilisation humaniste de la profondeur tragique” (Mansuy 98). 
Subsequently, the public is subject to the continued domination of the humanist 
mindset, which leaves them feeling unsettlingly at odds with the world in which they 
find themselves; they are at once “un public qui est toujours très conditionné par les 
mythes du 19e siècle” and also find themselves perplexed by “le caractère inhabituel 
du monde qui nous entoure: inhabituel, lui, aussi, dans la mesure où il refuse de se 
plier à nos habitudes d’apprehension et à notre ordre” (“Chemins” 6:59-7:04; Robbe-
Grillet PUNR 20). 
Those posthumanist critics who have considered the relationship of the crisis 




in 2013, Herbrechter complains that “the conviction that art, literature and culture 
function as a humanizing force is (still) the foundation of the cultural industries as 
well as all educational institutions” (Analysis 59). Johnathan Dollimore says, “Far 
from being liberating, the humanist aesthetic has become a way of standing still 
amidst the obsolete, complacent and self-serving clichés of the heritage culture 
industry, the Arts establishment, and a market-driven humanities education system. 
The aesthetic has become anaesthetic” (Radical xxvi). 
And so, according to Robbe-Grillet, in the 20th century, following the 
revelation of humanism as a flawed framework, some of the general public and many 
artists have come to accept the falsity of humanism and, among artists in particular, 
moved on to new modes of production. While some authors continue to operate 
within a humanist framework (he sees those that do as being those who tend to be 
praised by critics),20 writers like himself and many of the authors he cites as 
contemporaries and influences (such as Kafka, Beckett, Butor, and Sarraute) attempt 
to move beyond it to create something new located outside it – this constitutes his 
literary project.  
Thus for both posthumanists and Robbe-Grillet the problem is that there is a 
startling dichotomy between the “actual” state of the world and the values by which 
much of the public and critics continue to judge the significance, importance, and 
meaning of art. Although he does not concentrate on it as much as posthumanist 
critics do, Robbe-Grillet does note that the institution of the university is subject to 
                                                
20 “Ce qui me surprenait le plus, dans les reproches comme dans les eloges, c’etait de rencontrer 
presque partout une reference implicite – ou meme explicite – aux grands romans du passé, qui 
toujours etaient poses comme le modele sur quoi le jeune ecrivain devait garder les yeux fixes.” 




the very same crisis; in fact, he claims that the role of a university is to uphold and 
prolong the dominant ideology (that is to say, humanism): “L’université est un de ces 
organismes reproducteurs idéologiques, c’est-à-dire que toute société sécrète des 
organismes qui sont faits pour la réproduire…il est tout à fait normal qu’une 
université fonctionne comme ça” (“Réactionnaires” 19:02-19:18). Academic critics 
are especially to blame for this persistence of humanist critical theory: “Ce que [Jean 
Alter] dit de moi c’est exactement l’opposé de ce pour quoi j’ai pris la parole…la 
récupération universitaire, pour moi c’est ça, c’est le carcan qui nous empêche de 
bouger” (Alter “Discussion: Perspectives” 64).  
Interestingly, Robbe-Grillet does not fault the critical establishment for the 
persistence of humanist interpretation, acknowledging that, as a general rule, criticism 
does not move as quickly as art does, and it must constantly lag behind it somewhat. 
“La critique fait un métier difficile, elle doit juger les oeuvres nouvelles et bien 
evidemment elle ne peut se servir que des critères du passé…il est plus facile pour un 
spectateur d’aimer un film ou de ne pas l’aimer que pour un critique d’expliquer à ses 
lecteurs pourquoi il l’aime ou pourquoi il ne l’aime pas” (“Imortelle” 3:52-4:17). This 
is why he insists on the importance of his literary project more than his critical one – 
although it simultaneously constitutes his attempt at producing new criticism -- and 
one reason why, for him, this search for new paradigms must ultimately take place in 
literature. He calls for a new system of understanding that would go beyond “toute 
theorie explicative qui tenterait de les enfermer dans un quelconque système de 
référence, sentimental, sociologique, freudien, metaphysique, ou autre” (Robbe-




the need for new modes of interpretation, and both have similar visions for what these 
new modes might entail. 
1.5 Alain Robbe-Grillet and Critical Posthumanism: Parallel Visions of the Solution 
– Reconceptualization of the Human through Narrative 
As I have demonstrated, both Robbe-Grillet and critical posthumanists are 
concerned with the question of the human but claim to be witnessing a crisis of 
humanism. In response to this crisis they propose projects that seek to invent a new 
conception of the human that would accurately reflect his current position in a 
technologically mediated modern world. Both envision this new framework as being 
interdisciplinary and affirmative, and both look to literature and narrative as a major 
medium for development of such a project.  
Robbe-Grillet sees humanism as having imposed a particular narrative code, 
one that has infiltrated all aspects of bourgeois life and its systems (like universities 
and literary criticism). His literary project consists of subverting this code: “Dans un 
roman, il y a deux codes: il y a le code de la langue et le code de la narration. Dans 
mes livres, seul le code de la narration est subverti” (“Réactionnaires” 37:43-37:50). 
By actively subversing this code he will achieve two goals: Firstly, he exposes it for 
the social construct it is: “He can protest the ideological codification of reality, which 
promotes one social group’s domination of another, by deforming bourgeois myths 
and thereby displaying the arbitrary nature of their formation” (Bogue 35). Secondly, 
through the invention of new codes he seeks to invent or create new visions of the 
human, while at the same time continuing this project of deconstruction and exposure 




in such a way that the world must recognize the nature and workings of its ideological 
structures” (Bogue 44). Only then can a truly new conceptualization of the human 
take place; he works at “la destruction des règles, pour laisser le champ libre à 
l’homme libre qui viendra encore après” (Barilli 128). Posthumanists like Herbrechter 
also see humanist narrative code as constituting the ideology by which we live, and 
express concern about its power in propagating humanist tendencies: “[posthumanist 
critical theory] demands probity when dealing with events in order that their 
singularity is not lost in the haste to comprehend them according to the well-known 
narratives of our habitual sense-making practices” (Analysis 56). 
That the creation of a new vision of the human subject is at the heart of the 
posthumanist project, like Robbe-Grillet’s project, is pointed out by Pramod K. 
Nayar: “‘Posthumanism’…especially in its critical avatar, is also a new 
conceptualization of the human” (3). The role of literature, then, is to reinvent the 
human, to provide new visions of him, much as Braidotti claims that the development 
of a critical posthumanist theory “works…toward elaborating alternative ways of 
conceptualizing the human subject” (The Posthuman 37). By generating this 
literature, deconstructing humanist narrative, and constructing new codes, Robbe-
Grillet does indeed seek to invent a new conceptualization of man. Modern literature, 
that which shies away from the expectations of the critical establishment, is “à la 
recherche d’un home nouveau;” this generative aspect of literature is further 
reinforced with the title of his essay “Nouveau roman, homme nouveau” (Saint-




preconceived notions of humanism is the proper goal of literature; Robbe-Grillet 
states that he is against the idea of a humanist conception of a human subject,  
C’est-à-dire qu’il existe un homme fait d’avance, un homme avec un 
grand H auquel on ne peut que se conformer. Si, au contraire, il s’agit 
d’un homme qui n’existe pas encore et qui est à faire, en particulier à 
faire par l’oeuvre. A ce moment-là je peux dire comme tout le monde 
que  je m’intéresse à l’homme. Seulement c’est un homme que je ne 
connais pas, qui n’est pas encore là…qu’il s’agit de faire (“Le 
Nouveau Lecteur” 3:20-3:49). 
 
This is possible because literature serves a particular purpose in that it is through 
literature and narrative that new concepts are generated. Literature’s function is “à 
inventer, à faire, à former” (Saint-Jacques 146). Literature is constitutive of the world 
at large; the changes and inventions that take place in literature are ultimately 
transposed to the material world; Robbe-Grillet says, “Pour moi je ne vois pas bien 
comment le monde pourrait être “au-delà” de la littérature” and “Il y a eu un 
changement dans le monde qui a été aussi un changement dans le Nouveau Roman” 
(Mansuy 96; Barilli 123). Real-world transformation and invention are the goals of 
literary innovation: “Notre parole ludique n’est pas fait pour nous protéger, pour nous 
mettre à l’abri du monde, mais au contraire pour nous mettre en question nous-mêmes 
et ce monde, et par conséquent le transformer, au moyen de ce que vous pouvez 
appeler imagination” and artists are “en train d’inventer un nouveau monde” (Mansuy 
97, Robbe-Grillet PUNR 124). And for Robbe-Grillet, this new literature would not 
only be constitutive but also be reflective of the “true” complex state of the world; in 
this way he participates in the posthumanist “disidentification from established 




for the complexities of the real-life world we are living in” (Braidotti “Critical 
Theory” 16). 
Posthumanists are in agreement with Robbe-Grillet about the potential for 
narrative and literature as a space to effect-real world change: “Informed by recent 
work in biogenetic anthropology, information theory, and the science of chaos, this 
theory will attempt to rehabilitate narrative by suggesting that it can be a principal 
agent of cultural change” (Argyros 659). They agree also on the generative nature of 
literature; narrative and literature are singled out by posthumanist scholars, who see 
in textual studies great potential for the development of critical posthumanist theory. 
“Literature – this humanist invention – might be seen as a privileged cultural practice 
that engages in this representational negotiation between the human and the inhuman. 
Where else therefore should one seek out the human/inhuman nexus than at the heart 
of the literary canon?” (Herbrechter Analysis 57). Hayles says, “Literature imagines 
new roles and uses the powerful tool of narrative. Recent research in neurology 
suggests that our brain architectures are uniquely adapted to narrative, and literary 
narratives can often reinforce or ignite social movements by vivid depictions of 
alternative futures” (Van Puymbroeck and Hayles 25). 
Robbe-Grillet’s literature therefore constitutes his attempt at breaking the 
code and dismantling what he conceives of as the main tenents of humanism and the 
humanist human subject. However, although he hoped to question humanism and 
invent “away” from it, Robbe-Grillet realized that a full departure from humanism 
would be impossible. Rather he seeks to deconstruct and question it from the inside, 




through” (Herbrechter Introduction 3). Badmington says, “ If we cannot simply step 
outside tradition – one foot forever drags in the past – ‘we’ can, nonetheless, expose 
the incoherence of humanism from within, a strategy which Derrida calls, in another 
context, ‘the necessity of lodging oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to 
destroy it” (“(Com)promises” 86). Indeed, Robbe-Grillet refers to his dismantling of 
humanism through narrative code as the “deconstructing” and “destructur[ing]” of 
“realist illusion” through his films, and through this, “established order [is] 
destroyed” (Hayman 281-282). In this way Robbe-Grillet’s project corresponds to 
Badmington’s project of destruction as well as the Herbrechter’s “understanding of 
posthumanism as humanism’s ongoing deconstruction” (Analysis 45). 
Like Robbe-Grillet, posthumanist scholars maintain that a complete escape 
from humanism is not possible, such is its influence, so there must be an attempt from 
within the current paradigm to dismantle and expose it.  
The familiar, easy announcements of a complete change of terrain, a 
pure outside, need to be complemented by work that speaks to human- 
ism's ghost, to the reappearance of the inside within the outside…[the 
version of posthumanism that I am trying to develop here] does so in a 
certain way and with a view to the deconstruction of anthropocentric 
thought. If the pure outside is a myth, it is nonetheless possible to 
"lodg[e] oneself within traditional conceptuality in order to destroy it" 
(Derrida 1978, "Vio- lence," 111), to reveal the internal instabilities, 
the fatal contradictions (Badmington “Theorizing” 15). 
 
Robbe-Grillet seems to have this in mind when he tells Katherine Passias, “The New 
New Novel still operates around fictional elements. We have maintained fragments of 
the novel and have remained within the bourgeois ideology in order to criticize it,” 
situating himself in opposition to the writers of Tel Quel, who attempt to “[place 




accomplished” (Passias 133). The challenge for modern literature, as Robbe-Grillet 
sees it, is to accurately reflect the complex state of the world while not falling prey to 
the principles of humanism, to which attachment remains strong despite its flaws, a 
concern shared by posthumanists. “Apocalyptic accounts of the end of “Man,” it 
seems to me, ignore humanism’s capacity for regeneration and, quite literally, 
recapitulation. In the approach to posthumanism on which I want to insist, the 
glorious moment of Herculean victory cannot yet come, for humanism continues to 
raise its head(s),” says Badmington in his article on how critical posthumanist theory 
might be theorized (“Theorizing” 11).  
In this, critical theory has a role to play. For Robbe-Grillet, literature and 
critical theory are inseparable; one leads inevitably to the other; and both must remain 
in a constant dialogue. For him, theory and fiction work together to effect change and 
innovation: “ Il doit y avoir dialogue entre l’auteur et le critique” (Morrissette 
“Discussion: Robbe-Grillet No. 1, 2…X” 139). This sentiment reflects the 
posthumanist vision of literature and critical theory working together to produce new 
conceptual alternatives to humanism and the human subject.  
For both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars, this collaboration would be 
characterized by interdisciplinarity, because in the wake of a lack of essentialism 
(which I will elaborate in the next chapter) “the posthuman thus offers a style of 
theorizing or weapon invention in which disciplinary boundaries become sites of 
connection rather than enclosures of autonomous interiorities” (Muckelbauer and 
Hawhee 770). Herbrechter says, “A more serious and intensified form of 




thus forms a major imperative for the future posthumanities – or whatever name will 
be given to the institutional framework in which the new forms of critical knowledge 
production…will take place” (Analysis 20). In this search for new epistemological 
frameworks the connection between art and science becomes paramount: “The 
current stage of human logos demands that new connections between art and science 
become possible, especially as far as ‘performance’ or the aesthetic ‘experiment’ or 
installation is concerned” (Herbrechter Analysis 34). Wolfe, for his part, citing the 
“epistemological problems vigorously engaged by systems theory across disciplinary 
lines” and their counterparts in the humanities that are “typically posed as problems 
of language or textuality” advocates “encounters with the “outside” of theory in areas 
like cognitive science [which] might prove useful in confronting the human sciences 
with a disciplinary “outside” that might ehp reveal some of the humanities’ 
underexamined assumptions and procedures” (Wolfe Critical Environments loc. 143).  
Robbe-Grillet has consistently invoked various mathematical and scientific 
theories in regards to his literary work, as noted in the previous section. In addition to 
sociology and information theory, he has invoked chaos theory, topology, Klein 
worms, and systems, among others. He also refers to the creative textual space of 
literary production as a “laboratoire” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 38). And in an interview 
in “Art Press,” he says, “Pourquoi ne pas imaginer que la science moderne pourrait 
aider à fonder un nouvel humanisme….eh bien, le rôle de l’art, je le crois comparable 
à celui joué par la science la plus moderne” (Dufour loc. 8644). Thus, the vision of 
the response to the crisis of humanism of Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars 




dialogue between literature and literary criticism will constitute the space for 
development of new modes of understanding in the wake of the upheaval of 
humanism, and serve to invent new conceptualizations of the human. This project will 








Chapter 2: Taking on Humanism – Posthumanist and Robbe-
Grilletian Approaches 
 
2.1 Criticisms of the Humanist Paradigm 
So what constitutes the humanism or the “mythe de profondeur” whose 
rejection marks the point of departure for Robbe-Grillet and critical posthumanist 
theory? The vision of humanism being targeted does not lend itself to an easy, 
singular definition, a fact recognized by posthumanist scholars. “This humanism 
because of its own plurality and slipperiness cannot just be classified without 
remainders and repressions but needs to be ‘worked through’ in a critical 
deconstructive sense,” says Stephen Herbrechter (Analysis 16). Badmington 
summarizes more succinctly: “Humanism can be a wonderfully vague subject” 
(Introduction 2). A brief survey of some of the most prominent posthumanist 
scholars, however, gives a general sense of the image of the humanist human they 
wish to put into question. Braidotti gives a rather thorough explanation of what she 
conceives of as the classical humanist model: “the classical idea of ‘Man,’ formulated 
first by Protagoras as ‘the measure of all things, later renewed in the Italian 
Renaissance as a universal model and represented in Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian 
Man…” and includes the notions of a “boundless capacity of humans” to pursue 
“individual and collective perfectibility,” and “faith in the intrinsically moral powers 
of human reason” (The Posthuman 13). Nayar defines the human as “a 
subject…marked by rational thinking/intelligence, who is able to plot his/her own 




pursue his choice” (5). He lists some of the main characteristics of “the human:” “as a 
set of features or conditions: rationality, authority, autonomy, and agency” (Nayar, 5). 
For Cary Wolfe, the ‘human’ is “The Cartesian subject of the cogito, the Kantian 
“community of reasonable beings,” or in more sociological terms, the subject as 
citizen, rights-holder, property-owner, and so on” (Braidotti The Posthuman 1). Andy 
Mousley cites “individualism…sovereignty, unbridled freedom, and a magnified 
image of humanity,” and “a transcendent human nature” (Herbrechter Introduction 
10).  
For his part, Robbe-Grillet’s spontaneous and meandering writing style –  
“coutumier de l’esquive et des revirements inattendus” that he is -- does not make 
extracting a coherent vision of humanism an easy task (Allemand and Milat 1). Also 
problematic are his choices of terminology, as he frequently favors stylistic flow over 
linguistic precision. His use of terms such as “profondeur,” “naturel,” “séparation,” 
“tradition” and so forth have been cause for confusion among many critics who have 
attempted to analyze Robbe-Grillet. To take one example, that of “objectivity,” 
 Robbe-Grillet explains how his own use of the word is misunderstood by critics who 
approached it in its generally accepted critical sense:  
Cette objectivité est une chose que me prête la critique. J’ai moi-même 
très peu employé ce mot dans mes essais théoriques. S’il m’est arrivé 
de le faire, c’était toujours en précisant dans quel sens particulier: le 
sens de “tourner vers l’objet,” c’est-à-dire vers le monde matériel 
extérieur. La critique prétend que je cherche à faire des descriptions 
impartiales, neutres, comme celles que ferait un appareil 
photographique idéal. C’est absurde! (Montalbetti loc. 4942).   
 
In fact, in comparison to many other theoreticians, Robbe-Grillet refers relatively 




comment on how they may or may not be useful as a paradigm, rather than applying 
them hermeneutically to his own or other texts. In order to really understand what 
these words mean for his vision, they must be taken in the context of his oeuvre as a 
whole and their association to “outside” theoretical terminology resisted unless 
explicitly acknowledged by Robbe-Grillet. However if one has the patience to 
accomplish this, a clear picture emerges. 
Robbe-Grillet accedes that humanism is a slippery concept, can be conceived 
in the plural, and resists definition, but a survey of his theoretical commentary 
spanning the period from the late 1950s to the early 2000s shows that,21 with 
surprising consistency over the years, he sees humanism -- as a worldview, and as a 
vehicle for literary creation and interpretation -- as espousing the following key 
tenets: universality, unity, essentialism, and transcendence; the imposition of 
boundaries and categories on an irreducibly complex world; a world full of meaning, 
specifically for man; and an overvaluation of man’s place and/or importance in the 
world. He opposes these ideas and provides his own alternatives. A close examination 
of his approach to these ideas and the counter-ideas he proposes provides a cohesive 
worldview that in many ways can be considered posthumanist.  
Firstly, Robbe-Grillet sees humanism as presuming essentialism, the idea that 
man and his world contain inherent qualities by which they can be defined and 
understood. Diana Fuss offers a precise definition of the type of essentialism 
criticized by Robbe-Grillet and by posthumanist theorists: “a belief in the real, true 
essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the ‘whatness’ of a 
                                                





given entity” (Fuss xi).  Robbe-Grillet questions precisely this notion of a fixed 
essence, whose existence precedes perception and cognition by a consciousness: “[les 
critiques qui] reprochaient à mes romans d’être phénoménologiques avaient l’air de 
considérer que le phénomène était une chose en soi en dehors de toute conscience 
humaine!” (“L’Exercice problématique de la littérature” loc. 3915). Any idea of an 
essentialist nature is faulty: “Dans tout ce que dit Baudelaire, il y a quelque chose qui 
nous gène terriblement, parce que son idée de symbole renvoie à une nature, à une 
essence divine qui serait par-derrière” (C. Simon 104). Such a criticism of the idea of 
universal human nature is also at the heart of the critical posthumanist project, and for 
many of the same reasons. Posthumanist scholars tend to pinpoint essentialism as a 
key feature of the humanist approaches they put into question, and it is easy to see 
how well definitions of “nature” like Badmington’s line up with Robbe-Grillet’s: 
“Humanism…appeals (positively) to the notion of a core humanity or common 
essential feature in terms of which human beings can be defined and understood” 
(Introduction 2).  
For Robbe-Grillet, an external material world does exist beyond the text and 
the observer, but it does not contain any essential nature/s through which it can be 
objectively known or even objectively observed (despite the attempt by some early 
critics to establish him as a zealously “objective” writer). Rather, any individual 
entity can know only what he observes, and then interpret those observations, 
interpretations that are influenced within his individual cognition by his own previous 
experience, knowledge base, memories, and imagination: “[les Nouveaux 




transformée, métamorphosée par l’esprit qui se souvient ou qui imagine. Au XIXe 
siècle, au contraire, les romanciers conçoivent leurs oeuvres en se référant à une 
réalité qui existe en dehors de l’esprit humain” (Piatier loc. 5083). I will expound on 
these ideas in the next chapter, but in brief, inherent natures have no place in this 
constructivist and subjective conception of reality/ies. Robbe-Grillet states that it is 
tempting to pretend that there is, because this idea is “reassuring.” Robbe-Grillet 
therefore reproaches humanist essentialism its promise that man and his material 
world can be known, discovered, or defined by their possession of such qualities: 
”C’est bien à une essence commune pour toute la “création” que nous somme convies 
à croire,” he says (PUNR 51). The notion of essence lies at the very heart of the 
vision of humanism he targets: “La croyance en une nature se révèle ainsi come la 
source de tout humanisme, au sens habituel du mot” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 51).  
Subsequently, Robbe-Grillet also takes issue with the related notions of 
universality and eternity, namely that these essential qualities would apply to all 
entities, in all situations, across time and regardless of the particular context in which 
they are discovered or defined; in other words, essence as “transhistorical, eternal, 
immutable” (Fuss xi). One of his most famous attacks on the “traditional” character in 
a Balzac style novel references the universality implied therein: “il lui faut assez de 
particularité pour demeurer irremplaçable, et assez de généralité pour devenir 
universel” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 27). If he takes issue with the idea of man having a 
privileged rapport with the world around him, it is in part because this connection is 
considered to exist “pour l’éternité;” if he takes issue with the use of 19th century 




establishment as advocating its validity “pour toujours” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 50; 
“Réactionnaires” 56:55). He mockingly derides “le “coeur” humain qui – c’est bien 
connu – est eternel” and a facile 19th-century “logique des choses juste et universelle” 
(Robbe-Grillet PUNR 16, 31). This is not the case, Robbe-Grillet argues; no unitary 
“essences” exist, whether in man or objects. There is no “unité cachée” nor 
”profondeur indivise” (PUNR 50, 52) unifying the material world or establishing a 
privileged bond between man and his universe.  
Like Robbe-Grillet, posthumanist scholars resist the notion that the human 
may be defined by any universal or essential quality: “Critical posthumanism rejects 
the very idea of anything innate to the human,” states Nayar unequivocally (11). This 
is true in part because of the human’s entanglement with his material surroundings. 
Echoing Robbe-Grillet’s valorization of the notion of individual subjectivity over an 
objectively knowable material world, from a posthumanist standpoint, humanity has 
no access to an extradiegetic or omniscient point of view that would allow for the 
objectivity or remove necessary to perceive such a nature: “There are no essential 
features of the human subject because ‘human nature’ is socially constructed and 
enmeshed in the very systems of observation that characterize it as ‘human’” (Nayar 
12). Posthumanist critical theory’s criticism of universality and eternity is principally 
inherited from its progenitors, postmodern and poststructuralist antihumanist theory: 
it is precisely this idea [universality] which has been attacked by 
postmodernism and poststructuralism in their respective critiques of 
humanism…this humanism is termed “liberal” in the sense that it 
presupposes a bourgeois capitalist subject who promotes ‘tolerance’ in 
the face of seemingly ‘superficial’ difference (like gender, race, 
culture, location, history) in the name of the universal principle of 





Notably, contemporary posthumanist scholars arrived at this particular current of 
antihumanist thought in large part via gender studies, of which one of the most 
prominent manifestations is Donna Haraway’s vision of a postgender world in A 
Cyborg Manifesto, which, as noted in Chapter 1, is considered a key foundational 
posthumanist text. Nayar observes that in this essay as well as in her later work 
“Haraway accepts the feminist position in which ‘essential’ identities – the man, the 
woman – are destroyed…Haraway concedes that essentialisms cannot be relevant any 
more” (Nayar 22). Interestingly, fifteen years before publication of A Cyborg 
Manifesto, Robbe-Grillet makes essentially the same point on the topic of biological 
sexual and socially gendered difference in an interview in Diacritics:  
First of all, I don’t believe much in the difference between the sexes. 
That is to say, as a result of my entire biological background…I know 
the sexes are not separate. There aren’t Men and Women. It is known 
today that we have male and female hormones whether we are men or 
women…If you take my physiognomy, this is a male trait: a beard. 
This is a female trait: hair. At age fifty-five, I have a lot of hair, 
something which is completely abnormal…So it is already a false 
problem…let us suppose that [women] has been set apart by a kind of 
oppression. Very well, society has classified women, etc. But it is a 
social classification. It does not exist in reality (Mistacco 42). 
 
Thus, Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars reject what they see as humanist 
essentialism. 
Consequently, Robbe-Grillet also criticizes a humanist notion of unity. For 
him, humanist essentialism and universality imply an overarching unity of the world, 
both in its character as a singular, distinct, and definable entity, and as an inherent 
complicity uniting man and his material world. For him this is but a myth and does 




and fragmented: “La cohésion organique et dynamique du monde bourgeois s’est 
désagrégée” in Robbe-Grillet’s work, observes Jean Alter (“Humanisme” 211). 
Robbe-Grillet similarly denounces the corollary notion of unitary integrality: that man 
and the elements composing his exterior world exist as whole, singular, integral units, 
distinct from each other and from anything else by their essential and universal 
qualities. If, as Robbe-Grillet says humanist thought supposes, an essential quality 
permits a particular entity to be defined, it also sets it apart from others in its totality, 
its singularity and its wholeness. He disagrees with this idea, stating,  
The traditional novel…presented human beings in their separate 
existences and the whole world surrounding them, as coherent and 
perfect totalities. For example, a person was defined by his 
“character,” fixed once and for all, and this guaranteed, in any 
situation the intelligibility of his thoughts, his words, and his 
deeds…well, such a solidification of character and existence was long 
ago renounced by experts in the workings of the psyche (Otten 264).  
 
If he agrees his project has any overlap with that of Nathalie Sarraute’s, it is by dint 
of her relentless attack “à la notion humaniste de… tout individu vivant que l’on 
prétend rassembler dans une totalité cohérente, stable” (Robbe-Grillet “Nathalie 
Sarraute” loc. 777). Rather than unity and integrality, the works of Robbe-Grillet 
reflect an “esthetic disunity” and “discontinuity” (Morrissette “Oedipus” 69; Stoltzfus 
Body 13). 
Finally, Robbe-Grillet takes particular issue with the humanist notion of 
transcendence, an “out there” agent of order; a God or a set of natural laws that 
organize and order the universe, whose existence precedes perception and the 
discovery of which will lead to understanding: “la récuperation des éléments négatif 




aurait sa place…une sorte d’opération magique” (Montalbetti loc. 4988). He often 
employs the term métaphysique to refer to this idea of a single explanation that would 
recuperate the world and its rules of existence in its totality. The essentialism he 
critiques inevitably leads to transcendance: “l’idée d’une nature mène infailliblement 
à celle d’une nature commune à toutes choses, cest-à-dire supérieure. L’idée d’une 
intériorité conduit toujours à celle d’un dépassement” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 52). For 
Robbe-Grillet, humanist transcendence is dangerous because it allows belief in an 
underlying eternal order that is reassuring but this is a false promise; it does not at all 
reflect the true state of the world and keeps the passive reader from accepting the true, 
chaotic state of the world. 
Transcendence for Robbe-Grillet equates to any type of order perceived as 
natural and timeless, which can include but is not limited to, a notion of God. In his 
full-length study on Robbe-Grillet, Alter devotes an entire chapter to the absence of 
God in Robbe-Grillet’s novels, signaling the absence of churches in his villages. This 
was brushed aside by some critics as being superfluous, as religion was never a 
central question in serious critical evaluations of Robbe-Grillet, and as humanism is 
often associated with secularism, but here Alter is right to call attention to the absence 
of God in Robbe-Grillet’s oeuvre, because God is a representative of transcendental 
order; his absence stands in for the lack of a humanist transcendence: “L’isolement 
[de l’individu]” that occurs in the wake of the collapse of humanism as a valid 
framework “se complète par la négation de toute transcendance, de tout dépassement 
de l’homme, ce qui inclut, sans que Robbe-Grillet le déclare spécifiquement, le 




not simply religious in nature, but lead back to the perceived invalidity of humanism 
at the core of his project. Braidotti highlights the extent to which posthuman critical 
theory’s forbearer antihumanist thinkers have also already questioned the idea of 
humanist transcendence: “Anti-humanists over the last thirty years questioned both 
the self-representation and the image of thought implied in the Humanist definition of 
the Human, especially the ideas of transcendental reason and the notion that the 
subject coincides with rational consciousness” (The Posthuman 141). Posthumanist 
scholars have taken up this criticism established by antihumanist predecessors, and 
extrapolated it for their own use. As Braidotti sums up, “‘post-anthropocentric 
posthumanism’…involves a radical estrangement from notions like moral rationality, 
unitary identity, transcendent consciousness, or innate universal and moral values. 
The focus is entirely on the normatively neutral relational structures…of subject 
formation” (The Posthuman 92). However, the project of critical posthumanism and 
Robbe-Grillet is not one limited to negation (in fact, Braidotti claims that the 
concentration of antihumanist theories on negation, rather than affirmation, is one 
reason that antihumanist theory is not sufficient to address its own problematics and 
that posthumanism is needed). For the most part, both critical posthumanists and 
Robbe-Grillet posit affirmative alternatives to the aspects of humanism that they 
criticize. I will now examine the alternatives Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars 
propose in place of the tenets of humanism they criticize. 
2.2 Posthuman Alternatives 
To the idea of transcendent meaning, Robbe-Grillet posits absence thereof. 




“s’il n’y a pas de Dieu la réalité est vide” (Montalbetti loc. 4932). The complexity of 
the world has no hidden all-encompassing significance or meaning; there is no 
“behind the curtain:” “Or le monde n’est ni significant, ni absurd. Il est, tout 
simplement” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 18). The state of the world as Robbe-Grillet sees 
is not due to an underlying intent, organization, or deeper meaning; things can 
therefore only be what they are through their presence in the moment. Entities in the 
world are above all characterized by their presence rather than essential identity, and 
this only in the current moment; all there can be is presence in the present. Things in 
the world “enfin…pourraient être…ce qu’ils sont. La réalité ne serait plus sans cesse 
située ailleurs mais ici et maintenant” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 37). In fact, he states 
directly that at least part of his literary project amounts to dismantling humanist 
essentialism: “Le travail que nous opérons n’est-il pas ainsi la déconstruction 
permanente d’une nature qui cherche sans cesse à avoir le dernier mot?” (Leenhardt 
172). 
The notion of lack or absence at the heart of Robbe-Grillet’s antihumanist 
project has been well established; in fact it is prominent enough that Olga Bernal 
produced an entire full-length study of Robbe-Grillet dedicated to this theme. As with 
the absence of God highlighted by Alter, Robbe-Grillet insists here on the parallel 
between absence of meaning in his works and in the material world. This lack of 
transcendent order, in fact, is perhaps the only thing that is sure in a world 
characterized by uncertainty: “[du] monde sa qualite la plus sûre: le simple fait qu’il 




character of the mad king in La Maison de Rendez-Vous, Robbe-Grillet postulates 
that perhaps it is the opposite:  
Il n’y a pas dans La Maison de Rendez-Vous de personnage 
symbolique…ce n’est pas allégorique. Il serait trop facile de dire, le 
roi c’est Dieu dans un monde sans Dieu…c’est-à-dire ce serait cette 
présence omniprésente, omnisciente, mais dans un monde qui aurait 
renonce à cette toute-puissance d’un jugement supérieur (“Lindon” 
13:47-14:13).  
 
And in an interview in L’Express, he reinforces this idea of absence by agreeing with 
the interview that instead of writing Racine-like “interpretable” works, his works 
begin and end with an emptiness, “comme l’est probablement la réalité même” 
(Montalbetti loc. 4919).  
This transformation of essence into absence is echoed in the critical 
posthumanist project. Previously, humanism postulated the inherent essence of man, 
which separated him from his others. But the proliferation of the non-human and the 
inhuman, along with their implication with that which had previously been considered 
“human” have made absence rather than presence of any particular defining 
characteristic the reigning standard. In fact, absence is the true “essence” of the 
human; Lyotard states, “In short, our contemporaries find it adequate to remind us 
that what is proper to humankind is its absence of defining property, its nothingness, 
or its transcendence, to display the sign ‘no vacancy’” (Lyotard Inhuman 4). The 
increasing inability in a technologically advanced (and advancing) era to distinguish 
the “human” from its others has left a void.  
This lack of essence does not equate to absurdity, however, which for Robbe-




attempt at oversimplification of the irreducibly complex: “S’agit-il là de ce qu’on 
nomme l’absurde? Certainement pas…avec le soupçon d’absurdité revient le danger 
métaphysique. Le non-sens, l’a-casualité, le vide attirent irrésistiblement les arrière-
mondes et les sur-natures” (PUNR 18, 37, 140-141). Absurdity is but another return 
to a type of absolutism and transcendence: “en-deçà de la signification immédiate on 
trouve l’absurde, qui est théoriquement la signification nulle, mais qui en fait mène 
aussitôt, par une récuperation métaphysique bien connue, à une nouvelle 
transcendence; et la fragmentation infinite du sens fondé ainsi d’une nouvelle totalité, 
tout aussi dangereuse, tout aussi vaine” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 142-143). Robbe-
Grillet sees the binary of sense-making/nonsense as too reductive, locating the state 
of things “entre le non-sens absolu et le sens épuisé” (PUNR 70). Neither absurdity 
nor transcendant humanism leaves space within that oversimplication for that which 
would contradict it or put it into question. A more complex model, or a model that 
allows for more complexity is needed to understand Robbe-Grillet’s rejection of 
transcendence; as Ronald Bogue states, examining Robbe-Grillet from the standpoint 
of language (and criticizing Morrissette’s analysis), “to argue that language either 
refers directly to reality or does not refer to reality at all is to accept a false 
formulation of the problem” (35). 
Indeed, the world cannot be reduced to a simple set of rules, however 
reassuring that might be. Rather, it is full of irreducible complexity: “La réalité 
est…déroutante…ambiguë;” “le réel est sans cesse troué et le sens passé à travers les 
trous” and contains “[des] rapports flous, mouvants et incertains.” (Robbe-Grillet 




certainty, which for Robbe-Grillet do not at all correspond to the actual state of the 
world. Rather than seeking to uncover universal and eternal laws, the New Novel 
“reflects what we know of the world today,” which is “discontinuous” and 
fragmented, the humanist promise of the discovery of transcendental meaning 
“misleading” (Otten 264). For in the face of complexity the promise of certainty and 
simplification is untenable, even dishonest. One of Robbe-Grillet’s main criticisms of 
humanism is that it simplifies too much; it attempts to simplify complexity that is 
irreducible. “Le propre de l’humanisme, chrétien ou non, est precisement de tout 
récuperer, y compris ce qui tente de lui tracer des limites, voire de le récuser dans son 
ensemble,” but this is but a “simplification illusoire” (PUNR 46, 21). New literature 
feels disturbing to readers familiar with the humanist paradigm because it does not 
offer this reassurance, which results from the oversimplification of complexity: “The 
vague and slippery image that emerges out of the whole situation is located exactly 
opposite the world of Balzac, where people, plots, and settings convince the reader 
with their enormous, persistent, and reassuring qualities” (Otten 264). The effect of 
the world on a subject and therefore of literature on a reader should not be reassuring 
but unsettling.  
This mirrors the stance of thinkers like Morson, and posthumanist theorists 
like Cary Wolfe, who draw on theories of irreducible complexity in systems and 
information theory as representative of what they see as being the actual state of the 
material world, which is one of “overwhelming environmental complexity,” says 
Wolfe; Maturana and Varela for their part discuss the “multiplicity, complexity, and 




Robbe-Grillet’s idea of the tentative of “reassurance” of humanism parallels the 
persistence of what Morson calls an outdated “Newtonian” scientific approach in the 
face of the actual, complex state of the world:  
Thinkers imagine that if the vast diversity of social phenomena were 
traced back cause by antecedent cause, they would gradually converge 
on a few simple laws. It seems indubitable that order, not mess, 
defines the fundamental nature of things. But why make such an 
assumption? Could the world…not be governed by a principle 
analogous to entropy, the maximization of disorder? (Morson 224). 
 
For Robbe-Grillet, in attempting to force a false simplification of his world, man is 
voluntarily turning a blind eye to the “chaos” that is the true nature of the world, 
which is “complexe and doué d’une existence sensible” (PUNR 37, 90). Paradoxes 
and contradictions, such as an incongruous sound accompanying an image in a film 
scene should be accepted by an audience for a novel or film precisely because “le 
monde où nous vivons est un monde de contradictions” (“Chemins” 11:25). For 
Robbe-Grillet, contemporary art in general should reflect this complex and 
unsimplified state of the world; humanist art is problematic precisely because its 
desire for simplification resists acceptance of this complexity. Modern literature 
should try instead to accommodate it. Indeed, rather than peeling back layers of 
complexity to arrive at a central nexus of laws of order – Morson’s “Newtonian” 
approach – an approach is needed that accepts the notion of irreducible complexity. 
Posthumanist critics like Cary Wolfe agree with Robbe-Grillet that humanist 
attempts at reduction are futile: “[a useful philosophy] must avoid at all costs the 
quintessentially modernist and Enlightenment strategy of reducing complexity in the 




not turn away from the complexities and paradoxes” (Critical Environments loc. 137; 
What Is Posthumanism? loc. 179). For Wolfe this way of thinking is precisely what 
posthumanist critical theory aspires to be and one of the reasons for which it is 
advantageous as an approach. This turn towards scientific notions of complexity as a 
starting point also corresponds to the more recent critical works on Robbe-Grillet by 
critics such as Raylene Ramsay and Ben Stoltzfus, who have used chaos theory and 
systems theory, respectively, for some of their most recent evaluations of Robbe-
Grillet’s work.22 
In Robbe-Grillet’s world (both literary and material), complexity is often 
addressed through the notion of the construction (and destruction) of order. Robbe-
Grillet mentions the notion of order and disorder often in his critical commentary, and 
many critics rightly focus on the question. But rather than leaning towards one or the 
other, the most important thing, as Robbe-Grillet says, is to recognize the space 
between the two. In his works, like in his reality, order is never fully realized but it is 
attempted constantly in a Sisyphean effort to introduce it. In his criticism, Robbe-
Grillet critic John John Sturrock has signaled this desire for order in a chaotic world 
as it appears in Robbe-Grillet’s fiction: “This everyday or contingent world appears to 
[the imagination] a chaos, because it does not display the order the imagination would 
like it to display” (Sturrock 227).  Much of the plot action as well as the narration in 
his fictional texts focus on an agent who attempts to introduce order in a complex 
world that resists it. Robbe-Grillet cites the character of Garinati of Les Gommes, who 
constantly rearranges objects on a mantel in search of the best order but never finds it. 
                                                




Sturrock observes this tension in Robbe-Grillet, stating, “Underlying all his books 
there is a dynamic conflict, analgous to Simon and Butor, between the forces of order 
and the forces of chaos” (Sturrock 181). 
But order is not always successfully created and when it is, it is 
simultaneously self-destructive. When an agent does succeed in creating an order, the 
order is context-dependent and provisory rather than timeless and enduring; it does 
not last; it is not universal; it is unique to its particular context, and it collapses at the 
same time it is created; in the Garinati example, none of his arrangements is ever 
satisfactory, and he keeps starting over; the best order is elusive; it is never achieved. 
In short, order is continually attempted but never realized. For Robbe-Grillet this is 
typical of the actual state of the material world, where “order itself is not 
endurable…order and disorder never cease to interact, to contaminate each other, to 
practice a sort of mutual recuperation” (Morrissette “Order and Disorder” 3, 11). 
Overall, this effort at creating order is characterized by movement that results in 
prolonged and fluctuating tension rather than arrival at a definitive conclusion.  
On yet another level, Robbe-Grillet maintains that this attempt at order is also 
the primary act of the author, a primary component of the act of writing. The text 
does not constitute the “discovery” of a preexisting order revealed by the author 
through his writing; rather, it is the product of writing as a means to create an order, 
actively and intentionally, even laboriously: “The role of a writer – or of any other 
artist – is to be a creator of forms, an organizer of forms” (Morrissette “Order and 
Disorder” 3). This order is created as praxis, as a performance or act of tension 




writer does not expect to definitively impose order on complexity. Compared to 
writers writing as critics would like them to, that is, conforming to a pre-established 
order, the goal of the writer as Robbe-Grillet conceives it is to create a new order, 
even temporarily. Even though that order can never achieve any permanence or fixity, 
it remains the goal: “Here then are two conceptions of order which are fundamentally 
opposed: One is established order, the other is created order” (Morrissette “Order and 
Disorder” 3). 
One can see how closely this reflects the posthumanist standpoint brought 
about through cybernetics theory. “Experience teaches us that left to themselves, 
things tend to become a ‘muddle,’” as Gregory Bateson observed. “If one takes no 
special effort, neat things get messy, but messy things never get neat. That is why 
order requires work” (Morson 224). Morson’s “work” describes precisely the effort 
that Robbe-Grillet describes as the act of writing, and that which many of his 
characters, like Garinati, carry out in in his books – in fact he and Morson even use 
the same word, “work,” to describe the action: Robbe-Grillet citing “the very work of 
the writer” (Morrissette “Order and Disorder” 3). This same attempt at order also 
takes place at the extradiagetic level (if one can use such a term for Robbe-Grilletian 
narration, which constantly fluctuates between the frontiers of “inside” and “outside” 
the story being recounted). The raison d’etre of the narration in La Maison des 
Rendez-Vous constitutes precisely this attempt at establishing order regarding the 
events that occurred (or not) during an evening at the maison, at attempt that 




essaie constamment de donner une cohérence à toute cette soirée. Et évidamment, il 
n’arrive pas” (“Lindon” 12:55-13:17).  
The notion of disorder and order is one to which many scholars have returned 
in evaluations of Robbe-Grillet’s work. They are right to do so, as he states himself 
that the question of order and disorder has nearly always been a primary 
preoccupation for him (Morrissette “Order and Disorder” 1). But where critical 
evaluations of his work along this thematic go awry is that they often attempt to 
conclusively place him on one side or the other of this binary, which effectively 
ignores where he himself places the problematic: squarely in the tension between the 
two. For Robbe-Grillet, it is a state of complex tension that is the most accurate and 
reducible unit at the heart of the question. “It is that which interests me…these 
unresolved tensions between two poles…such unresolved contradictions maintain in 
the book or in the film lines of force and I think that if there is a possible reading it’s 
thanks to this quality” (Hayman 284). 
This is equally true of Robbe-Grillet’s approach to other binaries, and this is 
one of the reasons that make Robbe-Grillet so frustratingly insaissable by critics 
attempting to use binary thematics to evaluate him. Several critics, including Barthes, 
made a considerable effort to categorize him in the subjectivity/objectivity debate, for 
example, when in fact the very question becomes moot when viewed through Robbe-
Grillet’s valuation of complexity and tension: “ce qui intéresse notre auteur, c’est 
seulement de créer une littérature conflictuelle, c’est-à-dire une littérature de tensions 
non resolues” (“Un écrivain non reconcilié” loc. 1655). For this reason too, absurdity 




world to the binary of “sense-making”/”total absence of sense.” Bruce Morrissette’s 
early evaluation of Robbe-Grillet using the binary of surface/profondeur is a good 
example of how both Robbe-Grillet’s terminology and his rejection of binaries can 
prove problematic for critical evaluation that does not acknowledge his refusal of 
binaries. In his 1958 article “Surfaces et structures dans les romans de Robbe-Grillet,” 
Morrissette argues that if objects have a “surface” there must also exist a 
“profondeur” (366). However, when Robbe-Grillet says “surface” what he refers to is 
the state of an object that we can know only through the limits of one’s observation 
and which does not contain any essential transcendent truth (i.e. “profondeur”); he is 
not using the words “surface” and “profondeur” in any traditional sense, nor is he 
setting them up in an oppositionary duality. Thus the surface/profondeur binary is not 
a binary at all, nor about “surface” or “profondeur” in a straightforward sense. No 
binary surface/profondeur can be possible, precisely because there is no profondeur. 
The “surface” is the nature of the object, and any misunderstandings that may arise 
can be said to be due to its forced positioning into a false duality: “Tant qu’on 
valorise comme Michel Mansuy une profondeur, une âme cachée de l’homme et des 
choses, un Dieu, il est evident que cette supérficie ne pourra paraître qu’insuffisance 
et perte de densité” (Mansuy 98-99). Robbe-Grillet, pretending to be a third party, 
explicitly denounces this interpretation in an essay in Obliques (originally the preface 
to La Maison de rendez-vous): 
Dans ses essais théoriques, Robbe-Grillet a souvent employé lui-même 
ce terme de “surface”, ou ses dérivés. Mais que faut-il au juste 
entendre par là? La première impression du lecteur occidental, 
conditionné qu’il est par des siècles de valeurs humanistes et 
chrétiennes, c’est que “superficiel” signifie sans importance, distrait, 




les écrivains du Nouveau Roman, c’est bien autre chose: le refus 
précisément de croire au monde des “essences”, à l’indicible, à 
l’ineffable (“Un écrivain non réconcilié loc. 1628). 
 
Robbe-Grillet’s work, as well as the material world, in his view, nearly always resists 
recuperation by one side or the other of a given duality. In fact, binaries generally for 
Robbe-Grillet are not a valid approach. He rejects them as being yet another attempt 
at oversimplification of irreducible complexity:  
Les bons sont les bons et les méchants sont les méchants. Mais, 
précisément, le souci d’évidence qu’ils y mettent n’a rien à voir avec 
ce que nous observons dans le monde. Quel progrès y a-t-il si, pour 
échapper au dédoublement des apparences et des essences, on tombe 
dans un manichéisme du bien et du mal?...[on est] dans un monde 
complexe (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 37).   
 
Indeed, if for Robbe-Grillet, total recuperation is too reductive, binaries are also too 
reductive. In the very article in which Robbe-Grillet lays out his “tension” approach 
to order and disorder, he reproaches the interviewer for accusing him of “never 
leaving a binary system”: “Not at all, dear sir…It is my impression that it is rather a 
question of a series of slippages…of decentralizations, of displacements…It is never 
a question of replacing the Tsar’s statue by a statue of Stalin. It is a question of never 
placing any statue in position, but continuing to slip” (Morrissette “Order and 
Disorder” 16). 
In fact, Robbe-Grillet often fights or corrects binary readings of his work by 
critics, pointing out, for example, at the Colloque de Cerisy that his film Eden et 
Après was constructed “non pas sur la structure binaire réalité/imagination que 
certains critiques y ont vue,” but rather along a series of twelve themes reproduced in 




Raylene Ramsay mentions that her doctoral thesis was on “dislocations of traditional 
binary logic” in his work (Gardies 205; Modernity 4). Robbe-Grillet sees this – 
rejection of binaries for being too reductive of complex systems -- as yet another way 
in which art parallels science in confronting the reality of the contemporary material 
world: “Les différents niveaux de signification que nous venons de signaler ont entre 
eux des interférences multiples. Et il est probable que le nouveau réalisme détruira 
certaines de ces oppositions théoriques” (PUNR 143).  
Posthumanist critical theory agrees with Robbe-Grillet in this regard. 
Technological and scientific developments, along with their associated hybrid figures 
like Haraway’s cyborg, demonstrate the futility of the binaries produced by 
ontological distinctions conceived to distinguish the human from its others, such as 
man/machine, human/inhuman, and animal/human. Posthumanist theory views 
ontological categorizations like human and other as a constructed epistemological 
attempt at creating (a non-naturally occurring) order. It seeks to address the processes 
that gave rise to those distinctions “as a term of cultural criticism, posthuman aims at 
dismantling the many binaries endorsed by Western dualism: body/mind, self/other, 
culture/nature, global/local, and so forth” (Remshardt 135). Of course, binaries such 
as these rely to large extent on the idea of essential natures to establish their 
oppositional identities, which as I have shown, is viewed as problematic by 
posthumanist thought. Like Robbe-Grillet, posthumanist scholars view binaries as 
being overly reductive in the face of the actual complexity of the material world. As 
Braidotti states, following tendencies in scientific theory to valorize plurality and 




the dislocation of difference from binaries to rhizomatics; from 
sex/gender or nature/culture to processes of 
sexualization/racliaracialization/naturalization that take Life itself, or 
the vitality of matter as the main target. This sytem engenders a 
deliberate blurring of dichotomous differences, which does not in itself 
resolve or improve the power differences and in many ways increases 
them (The Posthuman, 96). 
 
With this in mind, Wolfe praises systems theory in particular for its potential for 
posthumanist theory, as it  “might more readily engage the “hybrid” or “cyborg” 
networks of postmodernity…a challenge to which the old ontological dualisms of 
subject/object, organism/machine, and so on would seem to be woefully inadequate” 
(Critical Environments loc. 150). Wolfe also points out that while midcentury first-
order systems theory was enormously useful to the creation of a posthumanist critical 
theory, one of its major limitations was “the dialectical antithesis of matter and 
information,” a problematic which is taken up and resolved by second-order systems 
theory via its emphasis on emergence rather than essence, which, as noted in Chapter 
1, has particular import within posthumanist theory, and which may be seen in 
modified form in the work of posthumanist scholars like Luhmann (What is 
Posthumanism? loc. 133). Here, Wolfe also gives credit to Deleuze, whose work was 
achieved by “passing through all the dualisms which are the enemy” (What is 
Posthumaism? loc. 160).  
Indeed, it is not just binaries that are viewed as moot but “traditional” 
ontological categorization in general. A consequence of the rejection of essence, 
universality, and unity, and the binaries they generate is a widespread breakdown of 
boundaries generally. From a posthumanist standpoint, in the face of events such as 




and unitary frameworks, such as human and non-human, are put into question, or 
even are exposed as having never been valid in the first place. Clarke states, “Nature 
at all scales is penetrating the prior boundaries we thought to place around the human 
essence,” while Reket says, “technological mutations of the human species…erode 
the symbolic binaries constitutive of modern thought. As divisions between the 
natural and the cultural, the mind and the body, and the human and the technological 
all grow increasingly difficult to maintain, so too, it follows, do the anthropocentric 
terms by which social theory tends to operate” (Clarke Literature xiii; Reket 82).  
For both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars alike, such categories 
amount to yet another humanist attempt at epistemological oversimplification, a bid 
to force order and meaning on a world that is too complex to be categorized and 
labeled, which actually resists the order such categories would impose. As John 
Muckelbauer and Debra Hawhee point out in their article on posthumanism,  
Is it really so easy, for example, to distinguish between a speaker, an 
audience, a message, and a context? Most readers will undoubtedly 
acknowledge that these con cepts are quite slippery in practice, but that 
one tries to do the best one can in each situation -- assuming, of 
course, that a "situation" can be circumscribed. Instead of attempting 
to reduce the complexity of actual events, might there be a way of 
rethinking rhetoric that would encourage us to engage this complexity 
and to respond to it? (768-769). 
 
Critical posthumanists approach the question of breakdown of boundaries from many 
different angles, from the “boundary-dissolving” figure of the cyborg in Haraway to 
Derrida’s “animal question” (Remshardt 136). However, one of the most highly 
developed critical approaches to epistemological categorization that has been taken 
up by posthumanist theory is Bruno Latour’s Nature/Culture divide. In the treatise We 




consisted of attempts at imposing artificial distinctions among material phenomena 
and human knowledge, which he calls “purification.” These artificial categories have 
proven increasingly problematic with time, more so in recent years (he was writing in 
1991). He gives as an example a daily newspaper, with its ubiquitous distinctions 
between “science,” “political,” “cultural,” “religious,” and “local” news – distinctions 
that are more or less universally recognizable by the general reading public (Latour 1-
3). And yet such a widespread and widely observable phenomenon as global warming 
does not fit neatly into any category, or rather, it fits into all of them.  
The phenomena, such as global warming, that refuse to submit to 
categorization he terms “hybrids” because they cross or deny the boundary between 
one or more established categories. According to Latour, our “modern” culture has 
witnessed a proliferation of such hybrids, a proliferation that was facilitated by our 
willful ignoring of their true interrelatedness. For Latour, the entire project of 
modernity has been to establish categorical boundaries in an attempt to organize 
knowledge; the most prominent of these boundaries are what he terms Nature (in 
brief, the material world; that which can be “discovered”) and Culture (that which 
pertains to human existence and the exercise of power). Or, to put it more succinctly, 
the human and the non-human; as Latour puts it, “Let us not mix up heaven and earth, 
the global stage and the local scene, the human and the non-human” (3).  For him the 
foundational problem of modernity is this artificial division between the human and 
non-human, and subsequent imposition of ontological categories, which belies the 
true state of the world, that is to say the human being implicated in relationships 




global warming is evidence of the falsity of the Nature/Culture divide and of the 
futility of the modern desire to impose categories like the paper’s sections on these 
phenomena, which are after all not separate but inherently linked or unbounded. 
Instead of distinctive categories, Latour proposes a model of innumerable “networks” 
emphasizing multidirectional connections, permeability, and multiplicity. Hence the 
title of his treatise; if the modern project amounts to establishment of such boundaries 
and the reality of contemporary existence has exposed their futility, then “we have 
never been modern” (Latour 46). In the face of such phenomena that buck 
categorization, boundaries begin to dissolve; it is the symptom of a “late modern, 
posthumanist culture, in which the boundaries between human and animal…once 
again, this time through bio- and other technologies, have become, to use Donna 
Haraway’s word, ‘leaky’” (Herbrechter Introduction 14). 
Robbe-Grillet, like Latour, thus sees the presence of these “false” categories 
as part of the contemporary condition, and their breakdown as an important part of his 
project: “C’est à chaque instant que nous devons lutter contre ces liens qu’on tisse 
autour de nous” (Alter “Discussion: Perspectives” 65). Interestingly, Latour makes a 
similar statement regarding imposition of such categories as having the goal of 
“reassurance,” saying, “we would be dizzy without these soothing features” (2).  
Posthumanists tend to emphasize current technological developments as the 
main catalyst that “challenge[s] the entire humanist system of categorization and 
exclusion,” while Robbe-Grillet focuses more on the critical reticence to let go of the 
humanist apparatus of the 19th century that established such categories, but both point 




construction of artificial essentalist boundaries (Herbrechter Analysis 28-29). Take, 
for example, Herbrechter’s explanation: 
It is this risky partitioning-off of an essential difference…which produces a 
more and more frantic process of exclusion…boundaries have been 
constructed which are supposed to create a community of humans based on 
their ‘humanity’…On the other hand, these boundaries are supposed to protect 
‘us’ in our essence from more or less concrete and threatening forms of 
‘otherness.’ The side effect – and this is where true criticism of humanism’s 
essentialist approach lies – is that the constructions of these boundaries which 
are always portrayed as absolute, inviolable and universally valid for all time 
are in fact concealing a perfect permeability (Analysis 47). 
 
 
It is exactly this kind of essence-driven false boundary that Robbe-Grillet attacks in 
one particular commentary on the sexes, injecting his trademark penchant for 
sadomasochism. The similarities between the two commentaries are strikingly 
obvious: 
 All the studies that are being conducted on sexuality…show that the 
great categories that have been fixed do not correspond to truth at all, 
not even to statistical truth. According to stereotype, for example, man 
is sadistic and woman is masochistic. Man likes to beat and woman 
likes to be beaten. In all the specialized newspapers, like the ones that 
exist in America, where people ask for partners in order to indulge 
their pleasures, what one finds most are men looking for women who 
would beat them. It runs completely counter to the great stereotype. I 
think all that is very important; it shows very well that such barriers do 
not exist. They aren’t real. So that’s the first point…the reversals of 
situations in my books already correspond to that reversal (Mistacco 
42) 
 
Boundaries in Robbe-Grillet’s approach tend therefore to dissolve. He consistently 
operates by breaking down established categories, whether ontological or narrative, 
both in terms of his fictional writing and in terms of his worldview. As noted in 
Chapter 1, for example, he makes little to no distinction between literary production 




permeable; the writer’s task is to “faire parler le monde” and also to “inventer le 
monde,” an open exchange between literature and materiality (Mansuy 96, 97).  
This breakdown of categories also applies to his fiction, and in his evaluation, 
critics frustrated by the plot of a given novel might well chalk it up to their frustration 
to their insistence on assigning categories in their reading, where instead Robbe-
Grillet has emphasized permeability and fluidity; for example Robbe-Grillet points 
out that the book Dans le labyrinthe does not respect “cette différence fondamentale 
que vous [la critique] faites entre la chambre et la ville;” instead “tout le livre a été 
fait pour mettre en place un jeu d’écluses, de glissements constants entre l’une et 
l’autre”  (Alter “Discussion; Perspectives” 65). Boundaries of the relationship 
between the reader, the narrator, and the hero are likewise affected: “Le premier 
narrateur est écrivain, le second est un soldat, mais que se passe-t-il?...Tout d’un coup 
le narrateur est le médecin, produit par le soldat” (Alter “Discussion: Perspectives” 
65). And this from the beginning of his critical presence; in his first televised 
interview, on the topic of La Jalousie he says, “Mon personnage, le héros, est le mari, 
c’est aussi le narrateur, mais est-ce qu’on ne peut pas imaginer que si le lecteur fait 
l’effort [de participation] en question, il sera lui-même le narrateur? Et il sera le héros 
à ce moment-là” (“Jalousie” 5:30-6:18).  
Such a refusal of categorical belonging is effected not only in his books, but 
also applies to himself as an artist. Indeed, one of the aspects that critics find most 
frustrating about Robbe-Grillet is his stubborn resistance to categorization at nearly 
every turn. Interviews and roundtables prove quickly disheartening for anyone 




to change or qualify his remark in the next breath. In one televised interview, for 
example, within the first thirty seconds he corrects the interviewer who presents him 
as “un écrivain” – a rather innocuous label that few would likely refute -- by saying 
he is an “auteur-realisateur,” adding that in terms of education, he is more of a 
biologist than anything (“Le Cinéma” 00:24-00:53). In another, he has himself 
applied the cross-genre label “ciné-roman” (already a blending of formerly distinct 
categories) to three of his novels, but when asked what exactly the label means by a 
presenter, demurs to answer definitively and emphasizes their differences rather than 
their similarities, thus refusing to legitimize any label, even one that he created 
himself (“Le ciné-roman” 00:01-2:09). And of course he resisted for a long time the 
label of “chef” of the Nouveau Roman, and when he does write or speak of it as a 
group, he almost never does so without qualifications. It is much for this fluctuating 
treatment of labels, categories, and boundaries that many critics have viewed Robbe-
Grillet as unreliable or too contradictory to be taken seriously. However, when 
viewed from a posthuman perspective, his resistance to categorical classification can 
be seen not as a contradiction but as an affirmation of the reality of the complex state 
of the material world, and a rejection of humanist essentialist distinctions.  
Like Robbe-Grillet, who makes no real distinction between literature and the 
material world, posthumanists also observe a categorical breakdown between general 
and academic culture and, what’s more, see this breakdown as becoming more and 
more pronounced in the face of “modern” society and its sociotechnological 
developments; Herbrechter, for example, points out the growing use in popular 




categories: “The borders between science, culture and technology have been eroded 
to such an extent that it has become customary to refer to contemporary culture as 
‘technoculture’ and to contemporary science as ‘technoscience’” (Analysis 19). 
Robbe-Grillet’s stance on literary representation and the external world might well be 
termed liter-culture. He too, recognizes the dissolution of categorical boundaries as a 
contemporary phenomenon, one which he also credits to changes in general culture as 
well as the sciences: “La vie d’aujourd’hui, la science d’aujourd’hui, réalisent le 
dépassement de beaucoup d’antinomies catégoriques établies par le rationalisme des 
siècles passés” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 143). It is for this reason that he considers his 
literary project capable of “creating” reality and “inventing” man. 
Instead of these separate “categorical antinomies” Robbe-Grillet emphasizes 
“slippages” or “glissements” between different ideas (“Des goûts et des couleurs” 
57:42-57:52). The vocabulary is revealing; instead of a distinct line marking 
discontinuity between two disparate ideas, the crossing of which would necessitate 
breach or rupture, there is rather flow, openness, and continuity. His boundaries, 
when they exist, are fluid, permeable, changeable, not rigid and not permanent. Ben 
Stoltzfus in particular has observed this phenomenon in Robbe-Grillet’s fiction, 
noting:  
The perpetual dialectical movement between the self and the other, 
between the subjective and the objective, between the inside and the 
outside. Thus, rooms, cellars, corridors, and attics communicate 
mysteriously and spontaneously – with no visible openings or 
transitions to justify the connection – with streets, cafes, buildings, 
cities, beaches, and forests on the outside (Life 39).  
 
Here Stoltzfus rightly puts the emphasis on between when discussing binaries and 




that traditional boundaries, and the traditional means of breaching them -- the doors 
that would separate inside from outside – are conspicuously absent.  
To humanist ideas of unity and integrality, Robbe-Grillet posits plurality and 
multiplicity. Instead of there being a question of “l’homme,” he says, “il y a des 
questions et des reponses” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 53). Speaking of his book La Belle 
Captive, he says, “Contre [l’ordre etabli] ma petite captive propose au contraire du 
mobile et du pluriel: les possibles multiples” (Robbe-Grillet “Le droit au jeu et à la 
volupté” loc. 2108). He points out that characters in his books are in fact meant to be 
plural; critics who spend their time trying to discern a singular identity for a given 
character are misled and should simply accept that any given character could be 
singular or plural; that characters are plural is an interpretation that is “plus 
intéressant” (“Echos du Cinéma” 20:33). The same can be said for the state of the 
novel, whose future comprises a simultaneous plurality of existence: “Quant à dire ou 
va le roman, personne évidemment ne peut le faire avec certitude. Il est d’ailleurs 
probable que différentes voies continueront d’exister pour lui parallèlement.” (Robbe-
Grillet PUNR 13).  
In the Colloque at Cerisy he again comments on his attempt to establish 
multiplicity in narration –this time in film -- and once again finds it erroneously 
interpreted into the singular:  
Voulant mettre en scène une voix narratrice, j’avais pris la peine de la 
dédoubler sous la forme de trois personnages [dont un] que j’ai 
imprudemment…joué moi-même. Le public a vu…un véritable auteur 
expliquant son film, qui, en même temps, est en train de se dérouler 
sous les yeux du spectateur. Mais le film entier était précisément 
construit de façon de rendre cette interprétation-là impossible, c’est-à-






In fact, Robbe-Grillet considers “proliferation” to be a key aspect of the New New 
Novel: “on est passé du récit d’une histoire à la proliferation des histoires, ce qui 
définit justement le Nouveau Nouveau Roman” (Pinget 341). 
One sees the parallel in posthumanism: “The cultural politics of humanism’s 
ideology thus remains the target for any posthumanist critique inspired by 
postmodernist and poststructuralist principles, which, instead, have been stressing 
alternative values like ‘particularity’, ‘difference’, ‘multiplicity’, and ‘plurality’” 
(Herbrechter Analysis 12). Through its adoption of plurality, posthumanist critical 
theory manages, or at least attempts, to escape the paradox of humanism and its unity 
principle, wherein humanism posits essentialist unitary identities but does not itself 
correspond to this precept, because no such singular humanism exists. Posthumanists 
point out that a multiplicity of humanisms contradicts what they see as the humanist 
emphasis on singularity and unity, and is one of the reasons posthumanist critical 
theory finds it problematic as the most widely accepted framework for interpretation: 
“There is no immediate consensus about what constitutes some imaginary “human 
nature.” This alone should be reason to abandon the simplistic idea of a monolithic 
(presumably Eurocentric) humanism” (Herbrechter “passion” 45). The true state of 
the world is that of complexity, wherein there may be shared experiences through 
overlaps and interactions, which occur among multiple entities and their composite 
realities, but such shared experiences do not constitute singularity or even consensus: 
“The world is an ongoing, differentiated construction and creation of a shared 
environment, sometimes converging in a consensual domain, sometimes not, by 




modalities, and so on…the world is thus a virtuality and a multiplicity” (Wolfe What 
is Posthumanism? loc. 214).  
Over the idea of universal essence, Robbe-Grillet proposes emergence, 
constructivism, and contingency. As critics such as Jean Alter and Zahi Zalloua have 
noted, one salient characteristic of Robbe-Grillet’s oeuvre seems to be that of 
contingency,23 which can also be conceived of as conditionality: “The effect of X on 
Y when W is low is different from the effect of X on Y when W is high…There is no 
valid bivariate relationship between X and Y that can be stated” (Donaldson 6). Or it 
may be conceived of in terms of chance. Morson prefers the simple Aristotlian 
“something could either be or not be” (223). Hacking is more specific: “X need not 
have existed, or need not be at all as it is, is not determined by the nature of things; it 
is not inevitable” (Martin 920). In any case, contingent events hinge on chance or 
possibility, rather than immanence or determinism. Hans-Georg Moeller highlights 
what he calls “the contingency and even the unlikelihood of the present state of 
affairs. Given all the infinite evolutionary possibilities, what is actually the case was 
by no means necessary” (loc. 66).  
While there is an element of chance, a contingent world is not totally absurd, 
nor is it completely random. Borrowing from systems theory, posthumanist critical 
theory posits the actual state of the world as the result of a series of interactions and 
reactions between systems, none of which is more likely or more meaningful than any 
other. This idea can be conceptualized in terms of possibilities. As Rosi Braidotti 
points out, posthumanism benefits from “[stressing] the crucial importance of the 
                                                
23 Zalloua cites the “contingent perception of reality,” (20). Jean Alter invokes “contingence” in his 





process of actualization of virtual possibilities, over and above universal essences and 
linear realizations” (The Posthuman 170). Any given state of a subject or object at 
any given moment constitutes the outcome of an event that could have also occurred 
with different results, the event itself the consequence of the actualization of a 
previous event that could itself have ended up with different results, and so on. As 
Moeller puts it, for every observable element of our universe “it could have come out 
otherwise” (loc. 66). At any given point an actualized possibility has consequences, 
either a single necessary outcome, or a limited set of outcomes, which give rise to 
more possibilities, and so on.  
One of the most helpful models of the posthumanist/systems theory take on 
contingency comes from Niklas Luhmann, who posits the notion of Sinnhorizont, or 
“horizon of sense” (Moeller loc. 1190) In this paradigm, a sense-making system (a 
perceiving subject, in phenomenological terms), confronts a multitude of possibilities 
of interpretation; his “knowledge” constitutes the selection he chooses from among 
the possible interprations available. No single possibility is any more probable, 
consequential, or important than any other; contingency takes precedence over 
inevitability. Moeller helpfully illustrates Luhmann’s view of the contingent nature of 
cognition through the analogy of a ship on the sea (loc. 1187). The sense-making 
subject is the ship and his material external environment is the sea; the ship is 
unbounded by limitations in any direction, but it may move in only one: The sea 
constitutes infinite (or nearly infinite) possibilities; choosing any given one “could 
have produced any one of numerous, ontologically incompatible interpretations” 




to travel -- is equally as likely as any other. “The ship is not bound only by its actual 
location; its horizon is a horizon of possibilities. It could also be elsewhere. Sense-
making is this interplay between the actual and the possible” (Moeller loc. 66). I will 
develop these ideas further in Chapter 6. 
For some, contingency is also a mark of modernity: “Clearly the notion of 
causality, implying necessity and absoluteness, is at odds with a theory that converges 
around contingency – in politics, in law, in science, in intimacy, in art – in brief, 
modernity!” (Schultz 170).  As with many of the other elements treated above, 
Michael Schultz notes that contingency has already worked its way through general 
culture as well as many disciplines in response to the supposition of inevitability 
within humanism. Robbe-Grillet makes the same observation: “Les conceptions 
essentialistes de l’homme voyaient leur ruine, l’idée de “condition” remplaçant 
désormais celle de “nature,” says Robbe-Grillet (PUNR 22-23). Or, in posthumanist 
terms, “The subject is not a given. Eternal Man is no more; ‘he’ now has a history and 
a contingency denied by humanism” (Badmington Introduction 5). This vision of the 
contingency of the environment in Robbe-Grillet’s fiction has been noted by John 
Sturrock, in particular in the novel La Jalousie; he writes of “an awareness of the 
contingency and irreducibility of all external phenomena” on the part of the narrator 
(195). 
This is one reason for which Robbe-Grillet favors the idea of “jeu” so much in 
his work: he envisions a game as an analogy for the contingent state of the world: a 




for an infinite number of eventual actualized possibilities, which do not ultimately 
contain any deep significance.  
Le sérieux suppose qu’il y a quelque chose derrière nos gestes: une 
âme, un dieu, des valeurs, l’ordre bourgeois…tandis que derrière le 
jeu, il n’y a rien. Le jeu s’affirme comme une pure gratuité. Quand, 
peu à peu, par la pratique de notre écriture au sein du contact sensible 
avec le monde, nous nous sommes trouvés non plus hantés par une 
profondeur mais de plain-pied avec des surfaces…c’est elle qui définit 
le champ de cette liberté. On vous distribue les cartes et vous 
commencez à les organiser en ce qu’on appelle une main; et ce seul 
ordre donné à des figures plates commence à projeter votre 
intervention dans le monde (Barilli 127). 
 
This is the reason for which Morson links the idea of games and contingency together 
in his chapter “Contingency, Games, and Wit.” 
Robbe-Grillet speaks often of the notion of “freedom” as it applies to writing 
and the writer: “Ce qui fait la force du romancier, c’est justement qu’il invente, qu’il 
invente en toute liberté, sans modèle. Le récit moderne a ceci de remarquable: il 
affirme le propos déliberé de ce caractère” (PUNR 30). This freedom can be 
understood as the writer as being in the same position as Luhmann’s ship; confronted 
with a sea of possibilities, the writer is free to make any number of choices; the 
modern writer in particular would be inventing without the intervention of fixed 
codes or roles – without the artificial imposition of determinacy. The text, then, 
would be the sum total of these actualized possibilities, the combination of which is 
what makes the final product unique. And these possibilities do not contain any 
inherent value, any inherent meaning, any “profondeur” that would drive or order 
their actualization; the choice of an agent (a writer, a player, a ship) is simply a matter 
of choice in which all possibilities are open and no action or outcome matters more 




aspects; they are the product of this novelist, but also of any novelist, and any novelist 
includes all those able to use their imagination,” says Sturrock (201). That Robbe-
Grillet does not consider any particular possibility to be more likely or more 
important than any other is highlighted by Hédi Bouraoui: 
 The novelist supplies us with a wide spectrum of possibilities as he 
stages each event, conditioning our interpretation within the given 
limits of the “clues” he provides. Within those limits he affords us 
complete freedom of interpretation. Although certain consistent 
patterns can be disengaged from the work, a certain continuity without 
which there would be no novel, for the most part Robbe-Grillet resists 
the temptation to tilt the scale one way or the other in presenting 
alternatives (87). 
 
When one interpretation does occur it is but ”un des sens possible de son oeuvre,” 
which illustrates not only the idea of a horizon of possibilities of which one is 
selected, but also of the multiple nature of interpretations – one reader can make one 
choice; another reader may make another; both are equally valid and simultaneously 
existent (Robbe-Grillet “Un écrivain non réconcilié” loc. 1539).  
What gives a particular choice signification and/or significance, whether in 
games or in books, is the choice of the agent within the context of the game. Robbe-
Grillet describes this contingent aspect of games thusly: 
Les figures plates que l’on distribue aux joueurs sont des purs signes, 
et qui ne signifient rien en eux-memes: pour un bridgeur, il n’y a rien 
derriere la dame de pique ou le dix de trèfles, pas de sens, pas de 
valeur…donc, ces cartes qu’on lui a distribuées, il commence par les 
ranger dans sa main, et déjà l’ordonnance qu’il leur donne constitue un 
projet de sens. Et quand il fera ses announces et quand, ensuite, il 
abattra ses cartes l’une après l’autre face à celles de ses partenaires et 
adversaires, son geste sera libre et l’ordre de la partie qu’il invente 
constitutera un ordre original du monde…son intervention créatrice 





In these terms, wherein a given event is to some degree fortuitous rather than 
inevitable, when a discovery or perception is made, it is context-dependent rather than 
eternal and universal. Its meaning is unique to its own existence and conditional upon 
the particular qualities of its circumstances. If meaning is to be made, it depends on 
context, or what Robbe-Grillet would term “structure.” For Robbe-Grillet  in texts, 
the meaning is also contingent upon the reader and his individual perceptions, past, 
and biases. Hence his heavy insistence on “active” rather than “passive” reader 
participation – it all comes down to the contingent nature of meaning, and to the 
choices of the writer are added the qualities and choices of the sense-making subject, 
or the reader: “the reader [is] solicited as a collaborator in building a tenuous 
structure” (Smith 63). The combination of the choices of the author and the qualities 
of the reader constitute the “game” of possibility that produces meaning and 
significance, the choices of meaning and interpretation analogous to the ship on the 
sea: “For the reader to plunge into the “game” of the novel requires a kind of 
existential commitment amidst an infinity of choices, of grilles d’interpretation, 
tentatively advanced by the author” (Bouraoui 85).  
Borrowing from other “post-“ theories, posthumanism likewise stresses the 
contingent and contextual production of meaning: “A poststructuralist and 
postmodernist critique emphasizes the radically local and temporal context-
specificity, negates the immanence of signification and instead stresses 
the…construction of meaning” (Herbrechter Analysis 12). Posthumanist theory 
valorizes and takes up those theoretical approaches, including, but not limited to, 




traditional philosophical paradigms of positivism, empiricism, and the like, which 
stress instead the contingency and social construction of knowledge (pragmatism, 
poststructuralism, materialist feminism)” (Wolfe Critical Environments loc. 44). As 
Latour states, describing the scientific approach to measuring the weight of air, “No 
science can exit from the network of its practice. The weight of air is indeed always a 
universal, but a universal in a network. Owing to the extension of this network, 
competences and equipment can become sufficiently routine for production of the 
vacuum to become as invisible as the air we breathe; but universal in the old sense? 
Never” (24). 
For Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars, contingency is closely related to 
emergence. A contingent actualization is not fixed; reality is not chronically static; it 
is in constant flux, and from moment to moment liable to change. The same sea that 
carries the ship in Luhmann’s analogy is in unceasing flow and unrest, never still. 
Interestingly, Morson turns to literature to illustrate his notion of the contingent and 
emergent nature of the world, citing Tolstoy’s War and Peace in a scientific article: 
“’What science can there be,’ asks Prince Andrei, ‘in a matter in which, as in every 
practical matter, nothing can be determined and everything depends on innumerable 
conditions, the significance of which becomes manifest at a particular moment and no 
one can tell when that moment will come?” (225). Emergence, as Morson conceives 
it, constitutes the qualities of a given phenomenon as they are “‘at a particular 
moment’: presentness matters in the sense that at least some moments are not simply 




“eventness” and “surprisingness.” They contain an ineliminable element of 
contingency” (225).  
Robbe-Grillet understands the world and the entities that inhabit it as being in 
a constant state of change or transformation. It is not for nothing that he consistently 
speaks about “movement,” for dynamism, not static, is the default quality of any 
given system. Qualities are never fixed, but continually mutating. He frequently 
qualifies his remarks with the expression “en train de” or “sans cesse” to 
communicate this notion of continual coming-into-being. As Stoltzfus puts it, 
“Robbe-Grillet is in constant motion, emphasizing not what he is, but what he is 
becoming” (Life 39). Robbe-Grillet sees the material world is constantly in a state of 
flux: “C’est la matière elle-même qui est à la fois solide et instable” (“Description, 
representation” loc. 1137). With no fixed, eternal essences, entities in the world, 
including man, can only be in an endless state of transition or emmanence: “le monde 
change, lui aussi” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 136).  This emergent nature applies to 
literature as a discipline as well as to the human subject: “Le roman ne peut exister 
que s’il change. Comme l’homme, il ne peut exister, non pas comme héritage, mais 
que s’il est en mouvement. C’est seulement le mouvement des choses qui les 
conserve en vie” (“Réactionnaires” 58:00-58:08). Wolfe closely echoes this sentiment 
when he says we must “consider human life as a project in ‘composition’” and “any 
notion of the posthuman that is to be more than merely the extension of the 
human…must be premised upon a mutation that is ongoing and immanent” (What Is 
Posthumanism? loc. 199, 133). Nayar, for his part, highlights the emergent nature of 




emergence rather than in a state of being when the system is constantly traversed by 
information flows from the environment” (9). 
In this fluctuating state of being, material phenomena can only be captured, 
perceived, described or observed as they are in the moment; they are characterized by 
Morson’s “presentness”: “La réalité ne serait plus sans cesse située ailleurs, mais ici 
et maintenant” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 37). When non-human objects are described in 
Robbe-Grillet’s works, rather than an inherent essence that is revealed, it is a 
depiction of a perception (or perceptions) of how the object is only in the moment of 
observation. His objects are not just things-in-themselves but things in-the-process-
of-becoming; their literary representation is a sort of screenshot taken from a constant 
stream of data, an image captured and extracted from the unceasing movement of 
existence: “Ces objets appréhendés dans une prétendue fixité sont au contraire un 
transformation permanente” (C. Simon, 93). Barthes once said of Robbe-Grillet’s 
project, “The author’s entire art is to give the object a Dasein, a ‘being-there,’ and to 
strip it of a ‘being-something’ (Barthes “Littérature Objective” 15). It might rather be 
more accurate to say that Robbe-Grillet strips objects of a ‘being-something’ and 
transforms them into a becoming-there. Robbe-Grillet himself gives the example of 
the painting in Dans le labyrinthe, an object that might at first be presumed to be 
static: “Le tableau du Labyrinthe est le contraire même d’un objet figé, ce qu’il 
représente est en continuel mouvement” (C. Simon 93). 
Robbe-Grillet sees not only the world at large and literature as a whole as 
being emergent, but also his individual texts: “L’oeuvre d’art, comme le monde, est 




constantly changing: “Je n’ai pas arrêté de changer au cours de – au fur et à mesure -- 
de mes romans. Et ce que je réclame pour le Nouveau Roman, c’est justement 
l’invention permanente du roman” (“Le style c’est l’homme” 21:05-21:12). This is 
where posthumanism allows Robbe-Grillet to escape accusations of contradictions by 
his critics – in a model that stresses emergence, his theory and his literature are 
constantly in flux. There is no fixity, nor should there be. And he demands a critique 
that respects it, responding affirmatively to Jean Alter’s summary of his arguments at 
the Colloque de Cerisy in 1972 that “C’est le mouvement et la liberté qui lui dictent 
sa production et il aime les interprétations qui justement respectent ce mouvement” 
(Alter “Discussion: Perspectives” 73). And so, just six years before Ihab Hassan put a 
name to a framework that encompassed the phenomena he observed, Robbe-Grillet, 





Chapter 3: Repositioning the Human Subject 
 
3.1 Alain Robbe-Grillet, Posthumanism, and the Human Subject 
Within this “modern” world, where a general rejection of the “myth” of 
“profondeur” has taken place, what, then, is man’s place in the world? And what can 
our understanding of him be? Robbe-Grillet is preoccupied by this question. He 
maintains that his work, both critical and fictional, is, like humanist texts, concerned 
above all with the question of the human and is human-focused; his work consists of 
“la réflexion précise (et limitée) sur l’homme, sa situation dans le monde, les 
phénomènes de son existence” (PUNR 47). However, as part of his reflections on the 
human subject he rejects the humanist approach to knowing or “creating” the human, 
for the reasons listed in the previous chapter. In doing so he casts aside the type of 
classical model of humanist subjectivity described thusly by Braidotti: “universal 
consciousness [that] …posits the power of transcendence as its distinctive 
characteristic and humanistic universalism as its particularity,” which follows “the 
binary logic of identity and otherness” (The Posthuman 15). Instead he “invents” one 
of his own, a subject that would respect the conditions of the Robbe-Grilletian and 
posthumanist affirmations discussed in the previous chapter, including plurality, 
breakdown of boundaries, complexity, relationality, constructivism, contextuality, 
and emergence. From the time of his first publication critics accused him of forsaking 
the human, a claim which held strong for decades; as late as 1982, R.O. Elaho stated 
“pour Robbe-Grillet l’intérêt du roman n’est plus l’homme mais autre chose” (107). 




expect such a negative reaction: “l’on me condamnait au nom de l’humain” and “je 
suis…reconnu coupable de crime contre l’humanité” (PUNR 46, 47).  
According to Robbe-Grillet, such criticism is illogical, for to question the 
effect of humanism is not to reject the human but to concentrate on him: “Que 
pourrait être, autrement, une œuvre “inhumaine”? Comment, en particulier, un roman 
qui met en scène un homme et s’attache de page en page à chacun de ses pas, ne 
décrivant que ce qu’il fait, ce qu’il voit, ou ce qu’il imagine, pourrait-il être accusé de 
se détourner de l’homme?” (PUNR 47-48). Indeed, while his call for “art for art’s 
sake” has been invoked as proof of his turn away from the human, many of the same 
critics point out that this does not constitute proof of a rejection of the human, and 
that the human remains a primary preoccupation for him. Morrissette, for example, 
reformulates the phrase into a human-focused one, stating “Loin de régresser vers un 
idéal désuet d’art pour l’art, la doctrine de Robbe-Grillet peut nous conduire à une 
conception plus vraie, l’art pour l’homme” (Romans 36). Indeed, for Robbe-Grillet, 
the fact that man was an essential concern for him was never in question; a surprised 
Robbe-Grillet responding to critics says, “Le Nouveau Roman ne s’intéresse qu’à 
l’homme et à sa situation dans le monde” (PUNR 116).  
However, “to engage with humanism, to acknowledge its persistence, is not 
necessarily to support humanism,” a claim at which many of those critics who 
recognized Robbe-Grillet’s preoccupation with the human arrived (Badmington 
“Theorizing” 15). Jean Alter, for example, rightly sees that the notion of the human is 




the umbrella of humanism by concluding that because Robbe-Grillet wrote a book at 
which man was the center, the work was necessarily a humanist one:  
De ce tableau pitoyable une certaine valeur humaine émerge: une 
bonne volonté pathétique mais irréductible qui porte l’homme à 
projeter sa petitesse même sur le monde qui l’entoure: les choses et les 
êtres. Parce qu’il a su voir cet effort, et qu’il l’a placé au centre de ses 
romans, Robbe-Grillet a bien fait d’œuvre humaniste (“Humanisme” 
217).  
 
Morrissette famously found a  “humaniste” Robbe-Grillet in his earliest critical study; 
the previous citation of his about art for man’s sake was used in his defense of this 
conclusion.  
Nor does his focus on the human mean that Robbe-Grillet is antihumanist. 
Those who did not see in him a humanist often saw a sort of destructive antihumanist 
who wanted to do away with any ideological or interpretive system whatsoever: “La 
fonction de cette forme est non seulement de renvoyer à une métaphysique implicite, 
mais encore et surtout, à détruire la métaphysique” (Bernal 247).  However, Robbe-
Grillet himself emphasizes the notion of invention, of inventing the human, of 
inventing new systems. Despite the label of “école du refus” attributed to him by 
critics, he does not only negate humanist phenomena but proposes alternative 
affirmations in their place (Pingaud 1958). As seen in the first chapter, his entire 
project can be considered to be oriented toward the invention of a new literature 
designed to respond to the challenges posed by the exposure of fallacies in the 
humanist paradigm. He can therefore be said to be just as if not more interested in the 
creation of new interpretive frameworks than in the destruction of old ones. 
So he must be situated somewhere between the two poles of humanist and 




As Braidotti points out, “The issue of the limits of both humanism and of its anti-
humanist critics is therefore central to the debate on the posthuman predicament” 
(The Posthuman 7). Posthumanism attempts to find a middle ground between the two, 
to avoid falling into one or another camp. As Hayles says: “the posthuman need not 
be recuperated back into liberal humanism, nor need it be construed as anti-human" 
(Became, 287). Indeed, the impulse of critics to relegate their objects of inquiry back 
into the fold of humanism, even as the reason for their study is “a-“humanist, as 
critics of Robbe-Grillet did, is recognized by posthumanist scholars as a common 
tendency, one that must be consciously addressed when carrying out such research 
and one that posthmuman critical study, when done with care, allows one to avoid: 
“One has no choice but to face the prospect of posthumanism if one is serious about a 
critique of humanism and anthropocentrism without giving into the rehumanization 
reflex, which does not really seem prepared to question humanist foundations” 
(Herbrechter Analysis 71). Posthumanist scholars like Herbrechter stress the 
importance for the critical posthuman project of avoiding facile regressions to 
different versions of humanism; this is why other authors like Wolfe and Nayar 
critique transhumanism, a subset of posthumanism that emphasizes the enhancements 
to human qualities or abilities that technology can render. For Wolfe, for example, 
such belief in the perfectibility of the human is nothing more than an “intensification 
of humanism” (Nayar 6). 
Robbe-Grillet, then, asks his readers what it means to be human, asking the 
same fundamental questions as humanists, anti-humanists, and posthumanists: “Et 




place de l’homme sur la terre?” and “Si ‘[l’homme] n’est pas un mot vide de sens, 
quel sens possède-t-il au juste?” (PUNR 119, 47). This is the main preoccupation also 
of posthumanist scholars: “Humanism’s most fundamental question – What does it 
mean to be human? – is being asked with more urgency than ever before” 
(Herbrechter Analysis 76). What sets such inquiry apart and where Robbe-Grillet and 
posthumanist scholars split with humanism is not a rejection of the human, but of a 
humanist treatment of the question of the human, a preconceived notion of the human 
subject: “N’y aurait-il pas, d’abord, dans ce terme d’humain qu’on nous jette au 
visage, quelque supercherie?” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 47). As Herbrechter states, “The 
aim is not in any way to ‘overcome’ the human but to challenge its fundamental 
humanism, including its theoretical and philosophical underpinnings and allies (e.g. 
anthropocentrism, speciesism, universalism, etc.)” (Analysis 123).  
As seen in the previous chapter, many of Robbe-Grillet’s criticisms of 
humanism and the affirmations he proposes fall neatly in line with those of 
posthumanist scholars and for this reason alone it is worth considering in what ways 
he may be considered posthumanist. Yet viewing Robbe-Grillet as a posthumanist 
also allows for a more accurate examination of his preoccupation with the human 
subject, one that allows him to address it as a problematic while simultaneously 
criticizing humanism, and does not force him into one of the categories of the binary 
humanist/anti-humanist, neither of which satisfactorily correspond to his project; for, 
as Clarke states, “posthumanist discourses promote neither the transcendence of the 
human nor the negation of humanism. Rather, critical posthumanisms engage with the 




Some posthumanist scholars consider wrestling with the issue of humanist 
anthropocentrism a question of moral engagement: “Whoever cares about humans 
and their past, present, and future might want to critically engage with humanism’s 
anthropocentric ideology” (Herbrechter Analysis 3). While Robbe-Grillet maintains 
that artists should not be socially or politically engaged, he also seems to consider 
questioning humanism a moral imperative. He refers to his project as a “revolution” 
and the retention of a humanist literature “dangerous” and places his hope for new 
literary frameworks that would reflect the true state of the world in man: “Nous 
reportons sur l’homme tout notre espoir” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 16, 25, 120). This 
parallels posthumanist scholars who see the search for a new conceptualization of the 
human not as simply as a negation of humanism but as an affirmation driven by a 
genuine concern and hope for the human: “A critical posthumanism is 
indispensible…out of care for humans and the survival of the human and other 
species” (Herbrechter Analysis 200). By asking himself these fundamental questions 
about the human subject and looking to invent a new framework that would 
correspond to his inquiry, Robbe-Grillet is participating in the posthumanist project 
by creating affirmative, and, for him, morally acceptable visions of what the human 
subject could be:  
While some prophets of a coming post- or transhumanity joyfully 
proclaim (once again) the ‘end of man,’ the kind of critical 
posthumanism advocated in this volume seeks to investigate the 
possible crisis and end of a certain conception of the human, namely the 
humanist notion of the human, and, if possible, contribute to the 





Robbe-Grillet himself points out the affirmative, rather than negative, nature of his 
project: “Personne ne voulait admettre qu’une telle affirmation [la destitution des 
mythes de profondeur] n’entrainait pas nécessairement la négation de l’homme.” 
(PUNR 45). And, like Herbrechter, he emphasizes that the creation of new 
frameworks is indeed done with the goal of the human in mind: “Ce n’est guere être 
inhumain que de vouloir batîr une nouvelle vie pour l’homme” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 
143). Thus, for both posthumanists and Robbe-Grillet, the goal is to envision a new 
human subject that moves away from the classical humanist subject, while still 
privileging the human as the main point of inquiry and care. Now I will examine in 
more detail just what the new vision of the (posthuman) human subject proposed by 
Robbe-Grillet entails. 
3.2 The Human Subject: Anthropocentrism, Hierarchies, and Centrality 
As with humanism and its posthuman alternatives, although no definitive 
posthumanist conception of the human subject exists, there is broad agreement among 
scholars regarding some of its most basic characteristics and the alternatives to 
aspects of the classical human subject that a posthumanist subject might encapsulate. 
As in the previous chapter on humanist priciples, I will begin by enumerating the 
criticisms that posthumanists and Robbe-Grillet share of their vision of the classical 
human subject, before laying out the affirmative alternatives they propose in place in 
place of the characteristics they criticize.  
A good definition of the humanist subject that is put into question by 




The human is traditionally taken to be a subject one who is conscious 
of his/her self), marked by rational thinking/intelligence, who is able to 
plot his/her own course of action depending on his/her needs, desires 
and wishes, and, as a result of his/her actions, produces history. The 
human has traditionally been treated as male and universal. It is always 
treated in the singular (the human) and as a set of features or 
conditions: rationality, authority, autonomy, and agency (5).  
 
Roughly speaking, this is the image of the classical humanist subject that Robbe-
Grillet also criticizes. Additionally, the model of the human subject that Robbe-
Grillet takes to task is a singular, bounded, thinking subject which can be defined by 
an essential nature and by the difference of that nature to that of his environment. He 
maintains that Nathalie Sarraute belongs in the category of the Nouveau Roman 
because she “s’attaque sans relâche…à la notion humaniste du personnage, c’est-à-
dire tout individu vivant que l’on pretend rassembler dans une totalité cohérente, 
stable, entièrement perméable au sens, dont les morceaux épars et l’apparent désordre 
ne seraient que les pièces d’un puzzle que le romancier doit remettre en place pour 
constituer une image fixe et rassurant” (Robbe-Grillet “Nathalie Sarraute” loc. 780-
784). 
The criticism of both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars is not limited, 
however to the specific attributes of the classical humanist subject. One of the most 
salient criticisms by posthumanists and by Robbe-Grillet of the humanist human 
subject, concerns not his person but rather his placement or positioning in the 
humanist paradigm. For Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars, humanism’s 
emphasis on the human as its main point of the departure has made the human subject 
an artificially inflated figure. From its normative tendencies that privilege the 




which man is placed at the top above the animal, object, and the non-human; to its 
disposition of man as the generator and measure of objective knowledge, 
posthumanist scholars criticize what they regard as humanism’s placement of man at 
the central focus of the paradigm. From being the object of its epistemological 
investigations, to the subject that carries them out, to being the measure of their value, 
posthumanists maintain that humanism attributes to man an outsize importance that 
elevates him above all non-human elements of the material and spiritual worlds and 
puts him everywhere all at once. As Sorin Ivan states,  
From a philosophical perspective, humanism places man at the center 
of the universe, at the top of the ontological and axiological scales of 
creation and being. This anthropocentrism has its origins in Greek and 
Latin culture….humanism is based on reason and rationality, which 
serve as instruments of understanding of the world, seeking truth and 
interacting with the universe. Humanism exalts man, his intellectual 
powers and his ability for higher understanding, in an anthropocentric 
vision in which everything evolves, and is ordered around, the human 
being (62). 
 
While for Ivan, this central position of the human subject is attributed to his superior 
intellect, for others it is by dint of his role as the principal actor in the universe, of 
whom the universe carries the mark of his innermost thoughts, feelings, and exterior 
activities. As Nayar states, posthuman criticism postulates that “[humanism] treats the 
human subject as the center of the world, which is influenced by the human’s 
thoughts and actions;” Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden invoke a posthumanism 
that would eventually move away from a world that is understood 
“humanocentrically” (5; 644). For his part, Robbe-Grillet bemoans this “point de vue 




proclamer que l’homme est partout…l’humanisme décide de choisir l’homme comme 
justification de tout” (PUNR 48).  
It is for this reason that both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars speak of 
humanist “anthropocentrism.” For them, the humanist model makes man “the center 
of meaning, value, knowledge, and action” and “considers humans as the source of 
knowledge and value,” placing him as its locus and inflating his importance 
(Weitzenfeld and Joy 4, 5). In fact, for Adam Weitzenfeld and Melanie Joy, 
“anthropocentrism, in its purest and most pervasive form, could only come into being 
with humanism” (5). For his part, Wolfe speaks of the dangers of the humanist 
“anthropological universals” that have led to a “dogma” dictating what man must be 
and placing him at the forefront of any epistemological inquiry, a dogma “which [the 
inquisitive spirit of] the Enlightment], if we are true to its spirit, should have no 
patience” (What Is Posthumanism? loc. 108). Like these scholars, Robbe-Grillet 
evokes the notion of anthropocentrism, reproaching humanism its “atmosphère 
anthropocentrique, vague mais baignant toutes choses, donnant à toute chose sa 
prétendue signification, c’est-à-dire l’investissant de l’intérieur par un réseau plus ou 
moins sournois de sentiments et de pensées [humaines]” (PUNR 47). Interestingly, 
Robbe-Grillet also uses to term “dogma” to lament what he feels are the prescribed 
humanist notions of what literary form should be, imposed on him by the literary 
critical establishment, and which include not only a particular humanist narrative 
form, but also a particular type of human character that reflects the classical humanist 
model of the human subject:  
J’ai réagi contre les dogmes de cette critique: c’est-à-dire une critique 




espèce de justice, de droit divin, une forme qui était très récente et qui 
était celle qui a connu son apogée au moment du triomphe de la 
société bourgeoise en France (“Réactionnaires” 56:54-57:11).  
 
Thus, posthumanist scholars and Robbe-Grillet wish to question, if not completely 
restructure, their vision of a humanist paradigm that places man at its center and in so 
doing, reformulate the human subject. In terms of man’s anthropocentric situation, for 
posthumanists and for Robbe-Grillet, and as illustrated by Sorin Ivan’s quote, the 
humanist paradigm situates the human subject simultaneously at the top of a 
hierarchy that places him in a position of superiority above the non-human elements 
of the material world, and at the center of epistemological investigation. That 
posthumanism postulates the humanist situation of the subject at the center of 
knowledge and the apex of power is neatly summed up by Elena Gomel: “Recently, 
theoretical elaborations of posthumanity have described “new forms” that subjectivity 
assumes within the postmodern configurations of power/knowledge” (178). And that 
recongfiguring this position in terms of man in his environment (“Nature/Culture”) 
and his role in knowledge production (“subjectivity”) is truly at the center of the 
posthumanist project is affirmed by Mackelbauer and Heehaw: “Drawing on work by 
Katherine Hayles and Bruno Latour, Brooke suggests that what is at stake in 
posthumanism is a refiguring of relations between nature, culture, and subjectivity” 
(771). Other elements of the classical human subject that are seen as being 
problematic are the notion that the human subject can conform to a preconceived 
notion, one that includes an inherent essence or nature, that he is singular, unitary, 
and bounded, and that his attributes can be considered fixed and immutable. Thus 




man from his place at the locus of the paradigm as well as create the image of a 
subject whose characteristics would be other than those of the classical human 
subject, or as Herbrechter puts it, “’deanthropocentring’ the principle of subjectivity” 
because as Robbe-Grillet states, we must recognize that man is not “a natural and 
eternal animal” (Analysis 200; Morrissette “Order and Disorder” 5).  
Robbe-Grillet thus participates in this “posthuman” project by “reconfiguring” 
these precise relations. He “demotes” and “decenters” the human in his fiction by 
constructing his narrative in such a way as to oppose the following ways in which he 
sees the humanist human subject as manifesting itself in popular culture and in 
literature: by placing the human subject at the center of narrative; by depicting man as 
having a unifying and unitary connection to the material world; by asserting his 
dominance over the same material world; by presuming that the world is full of 
meaning which has import for man specifically and uniquely; by presuming that the 
actions and qualities of man have any significance or impact for the material world at 
large; by endowing him with the unique and universal capacity to “know” an 
objective external reality and extrapolate objective truths from his own observations 
and interpretations; by endowing him with the unique ability to acquire or produce 
meaning; by endowing him with the unique capability of communicating such 
knowledge to others; by depicting him as capable of domination and mastery; and by 
presenting him as a unitary, unbounded, fixed entity with individuating and easily 
identifiable characteristics that would set him apart from his non-human others. As 
with the elements of humanism that I examined in the previous chapter, Robbe-Grillet 




now examine these in more detail, and demonstrate the ways in which Robbe-
Grillet’s approach to these problematics parallels that of posthumanist critical theory. 
3.3 Repositioning Man vis-à-vs His Environment 
For Robbe-Grillet, one salient characteristic of the humanist subject is that of 
his relationship to his environment, or the material world. As seen in the previous 
chapter’s section on unity, Robbe-Grillet sees humanism as implying that the human 
subject has a privileged connection to the world, a unitary link that connects the 
human subject in a favored or advantageous way to the world at large, uniting the two 
inherently together. Speaking of humanistic representation, Ivan says, “In this 
representation…the humanistic man is endowed with all the essential, defining 
qualities of being, emblematic of his position in the universe. He is…defined by 
harmony with oneself and the world” (62). Robbe-Grillet espouses a similar 
sentiment: “Il ne peut s’agir, pour les écrivains qui usent d’une semblable 
terminologie, que d’établir un rapport constant entre l’univers et l’être qui l’habite” 
(PUNR 49).  
The “hidden unity” criticized by Robbe-Grillet in the previous chapter thus 
does not just pertain to the unity of a singular entity but also to these connections 
between man and his environment. Robbe-Grillet sees humanism as positing the 
human subject and his world as constituting a symbiotic unitary relationship: “c’est 
justement cette participation qui est fâcheuse puisqu’elle conduit à la notion d’une 
unité cachée,” he says (PUNR 50). He speaks often of the problematic “solidarité” 
between man and the world posited by humanism: “on posait en principe 




est avant tout le gage d’une solidarité” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 46, 48). According to 
Robbe-Grillet, for humanists, this complicity between man and his world is evidence 
of a unity that ties man to the universe at large, a sort of “sublime communion” that 
serves as proof of transcendence (PUNR 50). This insistence on nature as a support 
for man is at least then partially due to the essentialist belief in a transcendent 
“nature,” which becomes transferred to Nature in literary representation and 
metaphorical language: “Ce n’est pas l’effet d’un hasard si la Nature justement – 
minérale, végétale, animale – s’est trouvée la première chargée de vocabulaire 
anthropomorphique. Cette Nature, montagne, mer, forêt, désert, vallon, c’est à la fois 
notre modèle et notre cœur. Elle est, en même temps, en nous et en face de nous” 
(Robbe-Grillet PUNR 51-52). This Robbe-Grilletian conception of the humanist 
vision of the relationship of man to his environment is evoked by Morrissette: 
The essentials of Robbe-Grillet's tightly conceived answer to these 
attacks may be summarized as follows. At the bottom of most 
objections to his doctrine lies a false humanism, a humanism which is 
in reality a transcendental metaphysics by which man is linked to 
nature through mystical correspondences, anthropocentric images and 
metaphors, symbols, and the like. Even when man is envisaged as 
"separated" from one-ness with nature, it is only because those who 
see him thus wish to exploit this division in the name of tragedy. 
Tragedy, along with humanism, implies the possibility of man's 
"recuperation" into a divine or quasi-divine scheme of potential one-
ness (“Theory and Practice” 264).  
 
For Robbe-Grillet, as manifested in humanist artistic representation, this 
subject/environment distinction is not balanced, with both having equal weight, but 
always returns its focus to the human subject in one way or another. For him, through 
humanism, the human subject is located on the top of a hierarchy in which non-




dominant norm of the subject was positioned at the pinnacle of a hierarchical scale 
that rewarded the ideal of zero-degree of difference. This is the former ‘Man’ of 
classical posthumanism” (The Posthuman 28).  
Robbe-Grillet’s project, then, like that of the posthumanists, questions this 
prioritization of the human subject: “Posthumanism studies cultural representations, 
power relations, and discourses that have historically situated the human above other 
life forms, and in control of them.” And “[it] interrogates the hierarchic ordering – 
and subsequently exploitation and even eradication – of life forms” (Nayar 3, 9). 
Indeed, in place of the humanocentric humanist model, Robbe-Grillet proposes a 
world in which man is on the same plane as the rest of the material world; he is but 
one agent in it, and not a particularly important one. He has no privileged position 
and no inherent unity with the world: “L’homme regarde le monde, et le monde ne lui 
rend pas son regard” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 53). Man is “that animal,” an object in the 
world just like any other, and not one that can claim any particular importance: “Les 
choses sont les choses et l’homme n’est que l’homme” (Morrissette “Order and 
Disorder” 14; Robbe-Grillet PUNR 47).  
One way in which this lopsided relationship between man and the material 
world is manifested in humanist representation is by characterizing the relationship of 
man to his environment as one of domination. As Jörn Rüsen points out, in various 
iterations of the humanist model, the external environment is often conceived of as 
being made to serve man; man is depicted as dominating his material world, taking 
from it what he needs: “Humanism emphasizes the difference between man and 




refers to nature as a matter of domination and possession, as a matter of 
subjugation…an ideology of human mastery over nature” (269). Man is the master 
over Nature; Nature is meant to bend to his will and interpretation; it is to be 
exploited for his own gain. Arguing that the humanist notions of liberty, equality, and 
property can be defined in terms of Nature’s exploitation by man, Rüsen states,  
This holy trinity of the modern secular world expresses the guidelines 
of human agency as follows: All humans are equal in the liberty to 
acquire property. Property is the result of appropriating nature. 
Appropriating nature is done by exploiting it as a means to realize 
human purposes. In this cultural context, nature is an object of 
exploitation. It becomes exploited in three dimensions: Cognitively, by 
science, practically, by technology, and socially by economy (270-
271). 
 
Indeed, one need only look to Descartes, one of the fathers of humanism, to find this 
notion of man as the “maîtres et possesseurs de la nature” (36). Even the division 
nature/man or nature/culture can be conceived of as a humanist attempt to reduce the 
irreducible through the imposition of ontological categories that do not actually exist, 
as seen in the previous chapter with Latour’s take on Nature/Culture and the modern 
Constitution. Latour makes the same claim but invokes capitalism as a cause: “By 
seeking to reorient man’s exploitation of man toward an exploitation of nature by 
man, capitalism magnified both beyond measure” (8). Robbe-Grillet agrees with this 
vision of the humanist model of the human subject’s domination over the world: “Le 
monde [est] cette sorte de proie, qu’il s’agissait moins de connaître que de conquerir” 
(PUNR 28). In consequence, the literary role of a humanist character becomes 




For Robbe-Grillet, then, humanist literary descriptions of natural objects are 
useful only insofar as they can tell man something about man, to the extent that they 
reflect his image or act as supports for his actions; they are subordinated to man 
rather than acknowledged on their own terms. In terms of literary manifestations of 
this phenomenon, Robbe-Grillet criticizes above all the use of metaphor to speak 
about natural objects. Robbe-Grillet maintains that, by using human terms to describe 
objects, literary description artificially subordinates natural objects to man: “La 
hauteur d’une montagne prend, qu’on le veuille ou non, une valeur morale; la chaleur 
du soleil devient le résultat d’une volonté.” (PUNR 49). The purpose of such 
metaphors is not actually to describe the natural object as it is, but to use it as a means 
of returning to the idea of man: ”La métaphore, qui est censée n’exprimer qu’une 
comparaison sans arrière-pensée, introduit en fait une communication souterraine, un 
mouvement de sympathie (ou d’antipathie) qui est sa véritable raison d’être.” (Robbe-
Grillet PUNR 49). In this paradigm, Nature, landscapes, etc. are nothing in 
themselves but are important only because of what they can communicate to us, about 
us. Man sees them in his image, and sees his image in them. 
For Robbe-Grillet, the existence of such metaphors that always point back to 
man is proof of the ubiquity of the humanist mindset still present in literature, despite 
the changing times that demand a new framework for understanding: “Dans la quasi-
totalité de notre littérature contemporaine, ces analogies anthropomorphistes se 
répètent avec trop d’insistance, trop de cohérence, pour ne pas révéler tout un système 
métaphysique.” (PUNR 49). They reveal an all-encompassing focus on man, 




nature metaphors in L’Etranger, Robbe-Grillet signals “les métaphores classiques les 
plus révélatrices, nommant l’homme ou sous-tendues par son omniprésence: la 
champagne est “gorgé de soleil”, le soir est comme “une trêve mélancolique”, la route 
défoncée laisse voir la “chair brillante” du goudron, etc.” (PUNR 57). Humanist 
literature has contributed to this mindset of dominance over the world and serves as a 
vehicle for the voice of the man who is sure of his power and domination:  
Descendu dans l’abîme des passions humaines, [l’écrivain] envoyait 
au monde tranquille en apparence…des messages de victoire décrivant 
les mystères qu’il avait touchés du doigt. Et le vertige sacré qui 
envahissait alors le lecteur, loin d’engendrer l’angoisse ou la nausée, le 
rassurait au contraire quant à son pouvoir de domination sur le monde. 
(Robbe-Grillet PUNR 22). 
 
Once again speaking of his project in moral terms, Robbe-Grillet maintains that such 
metaphors are not “innocent” because, even if it helps a reader better understand the 
scene by associating himself with it, it misleads because it brings the reader back to a 
humanist narrative, one that is false and does not accurately reflect the true state of 
the world; as Stoltzfus puts it, “words…remain impure, forever contaminated by 
man’s tendencies to order, control, and dominate his environment” (PUNR 48; 
Stoltzfus “Bon Dieu” 304). These kind of descriptions should simply “fournir des 
indications sur les choses elles-mêmes: forme, dimensions, situation, etc.” but they do 
not (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 48). Rather than staying on the outside, where they should 
be, such descriptions “implique[nt] toujours plus ou moins un don reçu par l’homme.” 
(Robbe-Grillet PUNR 50). Although not coming strictly from an artistic perspective, 
Herbrechter agrees that “anthropocentric humanism is first and foremost of course 




According to Robbe-Grillet, in this model, man-made objects are also 
depicted only insofar as they serve man. In this world where man is inherently 
connected to the material world around him, the world was his reflection; in literature 
the objects are at his service: “Ainsi ce décor était-il déjà l’image de l’homme: chacun 
des murs ou des meubles de la maison représentait un double du personnage qui 
l’habitait – riche ou pauvre, sévère ou glorieux – et se trouvait de surcroit soumis au 
même destin, à la même fatalité” (Robbe-Grillet “Description, représentation” loc. 
1111). In this sense, man-made objects, like natural objects, are subordinated to the 
human subject. Man is given a primary place over objects, which are but tools used to 
serve him and prop him up. In response to the type of realist description he criticizes 
in the previous citation, he reverses it in his work: “’Objects’ have the precedence: it 
is they that support the anecdote and not the other way round” (Sturrock 215). 
Robbe-Grillet and posthumanists alike take issue with this imagery of man 
dominating the physical world. Following Latour, they see the ontological 
differentiation between man and Nature as a false delineation, made to reassure those 
still operating in a humanist mindset: “The economic, social, and political formations 
of Western modernity have been constituted by and through constructions of social 
inequality, of class, race, and gender, and these social categories of difference and 
domination have also been cross-cut by prevailing ideas about 'nature' and the 
separation of the human from it” (Cudworth and Hobden 645). For posthumanists and 
Robbe-Grillet alike, the actual state of the world is not one in which man has any sort 
of mastery or dominion over his physical world, and, furthermore, it is too complex to 




moment, Robbe-Grillet points out to what extent this trope is prevalent while also 
signaling to what extent it is no longer accurate, if it has ever been: “nous ne 
considérons plus le monde comme notre bien, notre propriété privée, calquée sur nos 
besoins et domesticable.” And “Le monde lui-même n’est plus cette propriété privée, 
héréditaire et monnayable, cette sorte de proie, qu’il s’agissait moins de connaître que 
de conquérir” (PUNR 22, 28). Posthumanist scholars make similar observations: 
“Nature, over which we were supposed to gain absolute mastery, dominates us in an 
equally global fashion, and threatens us all,” says Latour (8). Gillian Whitlock points 
out that “Huff and Haefner associate humanism and life narrative with a (gendered) 
desire for “mastery” that is profoundly disturbed by posthumanism’s distributed 
notions of agency and affect” (xii-xiii). 
Rather, both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanists see man as co-existing in his 
world alongside the non-human, with one having no particular privileged relationship 
to the other. “We concur with those who suggest that 'our' human condition was ever 
populated with, by and in, other worlds of beings and things. The imperative of 
posthumanism is not just to develop tools for developing an understanding of human 
embeddedness in non human animate and inanimate systems” (Cudworth and Hobden 
644). Robbe-Grillet often speaks of this situation in terms of “distance” or 
“separation” while posthumanist scholars talk about the inherent connectedness of 
man to his environment through “networks,” but although this terminology would 
seem at first glance to be contradictory, both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars 
are more or less advocating the same idea. When he talks about “distance” and 




refuses the signification and privileged ties he claims are established between man 
and the world by humanism; he is remarking on this lack of humanistic privileged 
connection that would elevate the human above his non-human counterparts: “Il 
existe quelque chose, dans le monde, qui n’est pas l’homme, qui ne lui addresse 
aucun signe, qui n’a rien de commun avec lui” (PUNR 47). He also uses absence in 
this way, removing man from the top of the hierarchy and the center focus by 
removing him entirely. His fictional works constitute an attempt to cleanse 
description of this connection, to detach objects from the human in terms of their 
significance and their subservience to him:  
La nature et le monde des choses, tels qu’ils sont décrits dans les 
romans de Robbe-Grillet, n’offre guère prise au sentiment de 
complicité. Ce ne sont qu’indications de texture, de volume, de 
couleur, de formes géométriques, de distance exprimée en unités 
métriques, de mouvement rectiligne, circulaire, elliptique – toutes 
notions qui relèvent des disciplines scientifiques et soulignent la 
disparité entre l’homme et ce qui l’entoure. (Alter “Humanisme” 214). 
 
Such clinical descriptions are what caused him to be termed by critics such as Barthes 
as overly “objective,” a “chosiste” and accused of neglecting the human (Barthes 
“Preface” 1963; “Littérature Objective” 1972). However, if he is concerned above all, 
as he states, with the question of the human, then an interpretive paradigm is needed 
that would allow the detachment of this privileged connection, a demotion of man to 
the same level as the non-human elements of the material world and at the same time 
allows man to continue to be the focus of investigation. Posthumanism provides this 
perspective, and attempts to embody the lesson to be drawn from Robbe-Grillet’s 




until [change in perception] occurs, man will always be the victim 
rather than the master of his environment. Man must reject ‘tragedy,’ 
accept ‘distance,’ and refuse to anthropomorphize the world. He must 
learn to see the world with new eyes…Man must relearn to see the 
world and, by implication, understand his own relationship to it (Life 
89). 
 
When overly reductive onotological categorizations such as “man” and “nature” are 
removed, one is confronted with the various and multiple ways that the disparate 
elements once contained within these categories operate with and interact with each 
other. “When we contend that theorisations should be critically posthuman in quality, 
we mean that they need to understand our human condition as embedded in and 
constituted with, relations and practices with other species,” say Cudworth and 
Hobden, while Nayar states, “critical postumanism does not see the human as the 
center of all things: it sees the human as an instantiation of a network of connections, 
exchanges, linkages and crossings with all forms of life” (645; 5).  
 One may see then, the overly “objective” passages in Robbe-Grillet, his 
“privileging” of the object in narration not as neglecting the human subject but rather 
as “acknowledging the embodied and embedded character of the human situation 
within a myriad of non-human systems brings these inter-relations into the 
foreground and through the analysis of complex systems provides the tools to explore 
these relation ships beyond a central focus on territory” (Cudworth and Hobden 645). 
Indeed, the posthuman model “demonstrates how the human is always already 
evolving with, constituted by and constitutive of multiple forms of life and machines” 
(Nayar 2). In fact, some of Robbe-Grillet’s critics have used the term “network” to 




materials Robbe-Grillet draws on are cultural myths, but their articulation is atypical, 
calculated to expose a network of relations between sacred, sexual and violent 
activities which myths generally repress” (Bogue 39). 
As seen in the previous chapter, rather than the reduction and simplicity 
(“recuperation and reassurance” in Robbe-Grilletian terms) they see as sought out by 
the humanist imposition of ontological categories, Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist 
scholars both insist on the dissolution of such categories in favor of complexity. 
Man’s “demotion” from his place at the top of the hierarchy in the move “from the 
comfortable old hierarchical dominations to the scary new networks” is considered a 
step toward the acceptance of complexity: “Ecological crisis is taken to intensify the 
sense that human existence is entangled with a complex infrastructure,” (Haraway 
Cyborg 28; Reket 82).  
This repositioning of man within networks along with the non-human can 
even be seen as a move toward a systems-theory approach to the human subject. 
Theorists such as Wolfe and Clarke talk about feedback loops, by which a system 
(which can be understood to be, but is not necessarily, a human subject) and its 
environment act and react to each other in an exchange that allows for the constant 
transformation of both. A system will restructure itself in response to its environment 
and vice versa, increasing the complexity of both with each operation. In this way, 
networks and complexity can be understood as the most “basic” state of the material 
world: “By posthuman we mean an analysis that is based on complexity theory, 
rejects Newtonian social sciences and decentres the human as the object of study. We 




understanding the complexity of the world” (Cudworth and Hobden 643). What this 
means for the human subject is that if one understands him to be a node within a 
network, he is implicated within an environment in which he does not have a 
privileged position but has the same importance and significance as the non-human 
others as a standard part of the material world. Olga Bernal observed as much in her 
analysis of Robbe-Grillet’s work: “Il s’agit d’un théâtre écrit pour l’homme. Pour 
quel genre d’homme? Pour un homme qui est comme ces objets, dépourvu a la fois 
d’historicité et de tout caractère absolu” (211).  
Robbe-Grillet’s project, then, is to reflect a world in which man is no more 
important than his non-human others by demoting man from a position of superiority 
over the material world to one in which he is implicated on an egalitarian basis within 
it. Accusing the humanistic metaphors that would use nature as a support for man’s 
desires, thoughts, and image, he posits a posthuman vision in which man is implicated 
with his non-human others, substantiated in networks in which he is but one nodule in 
an endless mass of them, equal to them in stature and importance. In this illustration, 
man does not sit in a position of dominance over nature; in fact, the nature/culture 
dichotomy is a falsification of humanism, an attempt at reducing complexity that is 
impossible to reduce. Instead the complexity of the world escapes his mastery; he is 
but one system, like any other, surrounded by an environment of overwhelming 
complexity, in a network, not at the top of a hierarchical pyramid that insists on 





3.4 Repositioning Man and Knowledge 
This repositioning of man alongside his others – rather than superior to them – 
has implications for the subject: “[posthumanism] imagines agentic assemblages, 
where human agency is entangled with the nonhuman in ways that call for new 
models of agency, recognition, and subjectification” (Whitlock xii). In addition to 
removing man from his hierarchical position of superiority over the material world, 
Robbe-Grillet and posthumanists also seek to “decenter” him from what they see as a 
rather arrogant position at the core of the humanist epistemological model. Humanism 
favoring man’s reason and rationality as one of the salient characteristics of the 
human, they see humanism as maintaining that this a power unique to the human, 
distinctly human, a “Humanistic norm” (Braidotti The Posthuman 15). This vision of 
the humanist epistemological model criticized by posthumanist scholars is neatly 
summed up by Ivan:  
On this philosophical basis, humanism promotes a type of holistic 
knowledge, using the instruments of reason, science, and artistic 
sensibility. It is a model of knowledge  [that combines Antiquity with 
Renaissance humanism]…the humanist paradigm of knowledge is 
encyclopaedic knowledge, which includes sciences, humanities and 
arts, in a holistic approach that is integrated, interdisciplinary, and 
transdisciplinary (in more modern terms), and as a result, is able to 
explain and provide representations of the world and the universe. And 
man is at the centre of the universe…the man created by the humanist 
vision of the world is able to span all the fields of knowledge with his 
mind force. By having access to knowledge, in all its domains, he 
gains access to universality (63). 
 
Like Robbe-Grillet and his “bourgeois ideology,” Braidotti indicates that humanism’s 
insistence on the inherent nature of human rationality allowed Western thought and 




civilisational model, which shaped a certain idea of Europe as coinciding with the 
universalising powers of self-reflexive reason. This self-aggrandising vision assumes 
that Europe is not just a geo-political location, but rather a universal attribute of the 
human mind that can lend its quality to any suitable object” (“Yes” 10). 
In terms of literature, Robbe-Grillet sees this model of rationality play out thusly in 
narrative constructions: Man uses his superior capacity to unearth or discern nuggets 
of objective, incontestable, transcendental, essential truths from within the material 
world, and the text constitutes the means by which he communicates this discovery to 
others (also human). The observations made by such an author and the interpretations 
of those observations lead him to the essential truth that he has discovered, through 
writing, often about human nature. In this paradigm, man’s role within this paradigm 
is that of discoverer or investigator. His function then becomes to communicate this 
knowledge to the reader, also through writing: “Le rôle de l’écrivain consistait 
traditionnellement à creuser dans la Nature, à l’approfondir, pour atteindre des 
couches de pus en plus intimes et finir par mettre au jour quelque bribe d’un secret 
troublant” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 22). 
Furthermore, says Robbe-Grillet, in this model, any truth(s) revealed have 
both particular significations and significance for man. What discoveries are made 
about human nature, whatever meaning is found, are particularly relevant to the 
human subject in particular. Any serious reflection done by man in the humanist 
paradigm, according to Robbe-Grillet, is only carried out within the confines of his 
own consideration; whatever discoveries are made can only be important insomuch as 




avons retrouvé l’affirmation humaniste: le monde, c’est l’homme.” (PUNR 63). And, 
moreover, Robbe-Grillet, claims, humanist narrative assumes that the material world 
and the non-human are also concerned with the state or destiny of man; whatever he 
may discover or know has import – it matters - for his universe and for the non-
human others surrounding him. In other words, the material world cares about the 
human discovery. But in today’s “modern” moment of the crisis of humanism, that is 
beginning to change: “Le destin du monde a cessé, pour nous, de s’identifier à 
l’ascension ou à la chute de quelques hommes, de quelques familles” (Robbe-Grillet 
PUNR 28). 
In this paradigm, according to Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars, not 
only is man the investigator or discoverer or essential knowledge but he is also its 
recipient and its judge. He is the measure of the quality or utility of such knowledge; 
he decides what constitutes knowledge and he decides on that which is useful (insofar 
as it concerns a global idea of man). This role of man as both endpoint and measure 
of knowledge is explained by David Cooper as “…an insistence that human beings 
are the sole source and measure of value…It is worth observing that Heidigger refers 
to humanism as not merely explaining ‘whatever is’ in relation to man, but as 
‘evaluating’ this solely from ‘the standpoint of man’” (2). In this way, according to 
Robbe-Grillet, man is the instigator, the object, the agent, and the measure of 
epistemological investigation. He is the start and endpoint of knowledge, its generator 
and recipient. The human is everywhere all at once, the question and the answer:  
La nature commune, une fois de plus, ne pourra être que l’éternelle 
réponse à la seule question de notre civilisation Greco-chrétienne; le 
Sphinx est devant moi, il m’interroge, je n’ai même pas à essayer de 




réponse possible, une seule réponse à tout: l’homme (Robbe-Grillet 
PUNR 52-53).  
 
Posthumanist scholars both share this particular vision of the humanist liberal subject 
that puts him in a position of centralized dominance within the paradigm. 
Badmington, for example, points to the shift from religion to man as the ultimate end 
game: “God is no longer as central a figure as in previous times. Centre-stage is now 
occupied by the human, by the figure of Man [sic], the cogitating ‘I’: ‘I think, 
therefore I am” (Introduction 3). Braidotti, for her part, cites  “the humanistic vision 
of Man as the measure of all things” (The Posthuman 28).  
But in this crisis of humanism,“The ideals of Enlightenment rationality are 
having a very hard time” (Levine 228). In the current “crisis” mode of the historical 
moment,  
We no longer believe that the world is teeming with inherent 
resemblances whose signatures are inscribed on the face of the world, 
things already emblazoned with signs, words lying in wait like so 
many pebbles of sand on a beach there to be discovered but rather that 
the knowing subject is enmeshed in a thick web of representations 
such that the mind cannot see its way (Barad 812). 
 
As Robbe-Grillet puts it, “Le culte exclusive de “l’humain” a fait place à une prise de 
conscience plus vaste, moins anthropocentriste” (PUNR 28). Therefore, a new 
paradigm, is needed, one “decenters” the human subject from this epistemological 
position. Robbe-Grillet says, “La raison des Lumières a fait faillite…L’homme aurait-
il à inventer un autre type de raison?..lançons-nous dans les égarements, et alors, 
peut-être, une autre raison apparaîtra-t-elle, qui ne sera plus la ratio de nos ancetres” 
(Dufour loc. 8632). This describes precisely the critical posthuman project, which 




coherent and autonomous human” (2). Badmington says, “To read Freud is to witness 
the waning of humanism. Unmasked as a creature motivated by desires which escape 
the rule of consciousness, Man loses ‘his’ place at the center of things” (Introduction 
6). For his part, Robbe-Grillet signals the modern literary character, in particular the 
American soldier in Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms as being “celui qui a perdu le 
centre fondateur du moi humaniste” and says, speaking of himself, “[je vis] cette 
projection hors d’un centre abandonné par le sens” (Montalbetti loc. 3598, 3607). It is 
interesting to see to what extent this lack of center place is signaled in the work of 
critics examining Robbe-Grillet’s texts, especially earlier ones. In her work on the 
notion of absence, Bernal indicates the absence of center in particular: “[absence], le 
creux au coeur de la réalité…c’est parce qu’il y a le manque d’un centre – centre qui 
pourrait être une idée, une histoire, une valeur, un point de vue définitive, une morale 
ou une croyance univoque” (246). Roch Smith is even more unequivocal: “Robbe-
Grillet’s fiction subverts any possibility of finding a center” (61).  
In Robbe-Grillet’s “decentered” knowledge paradigm, rather than man’s all-
encompassing, infinite mastery of knowledge, the absence of objective truth or 
meaning is emphasized, and the limitations of the subject and that of the “knowledge” 
that he can create are highlighted. The human subject is still a “conscience active, 
soucieuse de se comprendre and de se reformer,” but the paradigm in which he 
operates is different. (PUNR  62). If, as George Levine, states, 
in the Cartesian tradition, authoritative knowledge entails a purging 
away of the merely personal – even if it settles on the foundation of a 
thinking self -- a purging of the limitations of individual perspective 
and the establishment of a method by which human consciousness may 
overcome its fallen – its perspectively and sensibly limited – condition 





then the posthumanist/Robbe-Grilletian paradigms seek to confront and concentrate 
on those limitations of individual perspective and human consciousness. They start by 
denying the very possibility of completely objective truth. For without transcendence, 
objectivity is impossible. After all, if essence, natures, and unities do not exist, then 
pre-existent meaning does not exist either. Man cannot “discover” a ready-made truth 
located externally to him. They refute the existence of a singular, “true” knowledge of 
the type evoked in the citation; in fact there are no preexisting essential truths to be 
“found.” Modern man must, says Robbe-Grillet, “say "No" to tragedy, and accept 
existence in an objectively meaning- less universe” (Morrissette “Theory and 
Practice” 264).  
Both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanists see the notion of objectivity as one of 
those aspects of humanism that is in fact a social construct but seems natural because 
of humanism’s emphasis on its own innateness: “Knowledge cannot be grounded in 
the human subject and its cognitive processes because knowledge, like human nature, 
is socially constructed,” and a “social constructionist critique of account of 
knowledge [that] has been so thoroughly taken for granted since the epochal work of 
post-structuralists in the 1970s” (Nayar 12; Wolfe Critical Environments loc. 76).  
For his part, Robbe-Grillet opposes this constructivist idea of knowledge to 
the type of objective realism suggested by realist literature, in which “[la description 
balzacienne] ne pouvait que convaincre de l’existence objective – hors de la 
littérature – d’un monde que le romancier paraissait seulement reproduire, copier, 




quelconque document” (“Description, Representation” loc. 1111). Like Robbe-
Grillet, posthumanist theorists, following upon the poststructuralist vein of thought, 
criticize exactly this notion of a single reality “which, through appropriate…means of 
representation, can be ‘transferred’ realistically, objectively and with universal 
validity” (Herbrechter Analysis 81).  The revelation of the constructed nature of 
humanism, which disguises objectivity as natural, is echoed by Robbe-Grillet’s 
critics: “The objective or mathematical stance itself is a freely chosen one, however 
great the pressure which the scientific culture of the present exerts on intelligent men 
to adopt it” (Sturrock 201). Imbricated and implicated through networks to his 
“others,” no human being can possibly occupy the outside perspective needed to 
produce such objectivity:  
Qui décrit le monde dans les romans de Balzac? Quel est ce narrateur 
omniscient, omnipresent, qui se place partout en meme temps, qui voit 
en meme temps l’endroit et l’envers des choses, qui suit en meme 
temps les mouvements du visage et ceux de la conscience, qui connait 
à la fois le présent, le passé et l’avenir de toute aventure? Ca ne peut 
etre qu’un Dieu…c’est Dieu seul qui peut prétendre être objectif 
(Robbe-Grillet PUNR 118).  
 
No human subject occupies this impossible place of objective positioning – and as 
noted in the previous chapter, God himself is absent from this post.  
Knowledge in this paradigm becomes constructed, multiple, subjective, and 
contingent, with little to no import outside the bounds of the individual entity that 
constructs it. All knowledge is unobtainable by man. Perhaps man is indeed the center 
of a limited kind of knowledge, but it is a subjective, individual knowledge, not an 
objective, collective knowledge. There is only the individual and the knowledge he 




ne vise qu’à un subjectivite totale” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 118). Once again, plurality 
replaces unity – there is not human knowledge and experience, but an individual’s 
knowledges (perhaps it is not for nothing that this word – connaissances - is 
pluralized in French) and experiences; Haraway’s essay “Situated Knowledges” on 
the topic emphasizes this idea even simply in the title (Haraway Simians 1991).  
Subjective plurality supplants singular objectivity, a condition signaled in Robbe-
Grillet’s work by his critics: “While it may be true that the spaces are relative and the 
objective center nonexistent, such is the nature of the modern world. If this state 
causes distress, man can take comfort in the fact that while no true objective center 
exists, he, at least, can provide a subjective focus with which to orient the relative 
spaces” (Stoltzfus “Labyrinths” 302-303).  
Instead, man must manufacture his own meaning, his own significations, from 
his individual observations and interpretations: “ce sont les forms qu’il cree qui 
peuvent apporter des significations au monde” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 120). In Robbe-
Grillet’s fiction, meaning cannot be found externally but must be actively produced 
by an individual subject: “Only man can order, relate, and give objects, images, and 
events any kind of meaning” (Stoltzfus New French Novel 91). Knowledge thus 
amounts to an individual and subjective cognitive process: “Bien évidemment il ne 
peut s’agir, de toute façon, que du monde tel que l’oriente mon point de vue; je n’en 
connaîtrai jamais d’autre. La subjectivité relative de mon regard me sert précisément 
à définir ma situation dans le monde. J’évite simplement de concourir, moi-même, à 
faire de cette situation une servitude” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 66). A subject observes a 




phenomenon by drawing on his own interiority – his previous experiences, his 
memory, his dreams, his imagination.  From these processes he may produce 
interpretations that constitute what is “known.” But such interpretations are limited in 
that they can only be produced by and apply to the individual producing them; they 
no longer apply to a universal conception of man. The objective reality of humanism 
is displaced in favor of constructed, subjective, individual realities: “Chacun voit dans 
le monde sa propre réalité” (PUNR 136). This Robbe-Grilletian meaning-making 
corresponds to Chris Calvert-Minor’s understanding of posthumanist epistemology as 
“practice:” 
Epistemologies have improved over the years. The ‘social turn’ 
revealed that what we take to know or take to be rationally justified is 
a function of social and cultural contexts. In more recent times, many 
social epistemologists, sociologists of knowledge, and science studies 
practitioners recognize that what lies at the heart of knowledge 
production are not individuals, or communities, but practices (124). 
 
And, for Robbe-Grillet, man does not only manufacture meaning, he also constructs 
his own reality/ies: “C’est pour la même tâche, l’interprétation du même univers ou 
bien sa création” (PUNR 89).  This alignes with the posthumanist paradigm in which, 
“Knowledge does not simply represent reality, it also makes reality. In other words, 
knowledge literally matters” (S. Smith 105). Examining this notion in the works of 
Robbe-Grillet, Sturrock claims that “for Robbe-Grillet, as for Butor, the reality which 
the novelist creates must be seen to be distinguishable from the reality in the midst of 
which we live” (170). Sturrock is correct that the individual reality created within the 
texts is different from the objective “out there” reality posited by humanism. But 




Grillet’s extreme subjectivity; there is no objective reality in which we live; the 
material world simply acts as a catalyst for a reality constructed by each individual. 
In this paradigm, the relationship of man to the material world follows a 
different model – rather than man using the material world as a resource for the 
unearthing of essential truth, the material world serves as a sort of stimulus for the 
cognitive processes of any given individual, from which he constructs his own reality 
and knowledge base. A material world exists, but not as a pre-fabricated deposit of 
truths waiting to be unearthed; rather it is a catalyst for the processes of cognition that 
are triggered within any individual observer: “Le rêve n’est que cela: le 
“préssentiment” de ce que sera le monde réel quand notre esprit aura donné sa forme 
définitive à la matière,” and  
Même si l’on y trouve beaucoup d’objets…il y a d’abord le regard qui 
les voit, la pensée qui les revoit, la passion qui les déforme. Les objets 
de nos romans n’ont jamais de présence en dehors des perceptions 
humaines, réelles ou imaginaires; ce sont des objets comparables à 
ceux de notre vie quotidienne, tells qu’ils occupant notre esprit à tout 
moment (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 89, 117).  
 
Robbe-Grillet also illustrates this idea in terms of fiction: An author takes elements of 
this external world – which Robbe-Grillet terms his éléments générateurs – and 
creates the “reality” of a text using them as a base, in the same way as a cognizing 
system conceives its own reality: “Le seul “personnage” important est le spectateur; 
c’est dans sa tête que déroule toute l’histoire, qui est exactement imaginé par 
lui…l’oeuvre n’est pas un témoignage sur une réalité extérieure, mais elle est à elle-
même sa propre réalité” (Robbe-Grillet “Sur le choix des générateurs” 1972; PUNR 




of reality and cognition parallels closely Niklas Luhmann’s (posthumanist) theory of 
communication. 
Interestingly, relatively early in his career, Robbe-Grillet and the critic Bruce 
Morrissette had an exchange regarding the notion of “objets correlatifs,” a term 
coined by Morrissette to describe the relationship of Robbe-Grillet’s human 
characters to objects in his books. Morrissette correctly observed the attempt by 
Robbe-Grillet in Les Gommes to eliminate any hint of the specialized rapport between 
humans and objects that Robbe-Grillet sees as being characteristic of humanism and 
its subsequent manifestation in realist literature:  
Cette gomme, dans sa masse compacte, irréductible, de son être-là, 
existe, plus encore que le loquet de porte ou la racine de marronnier de 
La Nausée, d’une façon neutre, extérieure à l’homme, dans cet univers 
non humain des choses qui n’entendent aucun appel à elles adressé par 
l’homme et qui ne lui font aucun signe “familier.” Cette gomme ne 
cache aucune correspondance baudelairienne; elle n’a aucun lien 
mystique avec l’homme; elle n’est pas, dans le sens courant du mot, un 
symbole (Romans 65).  
 
In this way, Morrissette recognized the tentative by Robbe-Grillet to describe objects 
as they are in their own right and to minimize or eliminate any hint of a special or 
privileged connection between them and man. However, channeling Barthes and his 
“chosiste” interpretation of Robbe-Grillet, he then proposed his theory of “objets 
correlatifs,” in which such objects serve as supports for the literary expression of a 
human character’s passions and thoughts (Barthes “Preface” 1963). In this 
interpretation, then, objects continue to serve as supports for the goal of expression of 
psychological phenomena that ultimately places man back at the top of the hierarchy 
(objects are subordinate to man because their role is to support his psychological 




dynamic that ultimately privileges man. At first, Robbe-Grillet effectively agreed 
with Morrissette, writing him a letter thanking him for saving him from 
interpretations in which objects served as symbols for the kind of humanistic 
metaphors previously outlined (Spencer 286). However, there is a difference between 
supports for psychological analysis (which continues humanist placing of man 
“above”) and having objects be generators for cognition/symbols. In later years, 
Robbe-Grillet insisted instead on the appartenance of such objects, as well as other 
thematic elements, to the category “éléments générateurs” in the paradigm described 
previously.  
This is why Robbe-Grillet speaks of connections between man and the world 
as not pre-existing but being created; they are created through the cognitive processes 
of the subject seeking to “make sense:” “Le monde sensible qui [nous] entoure n’est 
plus, comme le rêve ou le souvenir, que la matière à laquelle il doit prêter son 
imagination pour la sauver du néant…il n’est plus ici question d’insuffler après coup 
une conscience à des phenomènes ayant déjà leur vie propre: sans cette création, la 
matière ne saurait avoir aucune forme” (PUNR 83).  This lines up almost exactly with 
Hayles’ description of the posthumanist concept of intra-action:  
Intra-action posits that there is no prior existence of determinate 
objects and things. Instead, the properties and boundaries of things are 
enacted in intra-active processes. What this implies is that the 
distinction between the human and the non-human is not pre-existing, 
nor does it emerge from interaction between the two. Instead, the 
distinction is emergent within the phenomena themselves: properties 
and boundaries are enacted by certain constellations that give meaning 






A perceiving subject’s perceptions serve as the first step in processes of cognition; 
starting from his perceptions, he creates his own individual subjective reality by 
drawing on his own memory, dreams, and imagination. As such, reality and 
knowledge cannot be considered to be linear; memory deals with the past and dreams 
and imagination are timeless: “[dans la littérature modern les histoires] se dissolvent 
pour se recomposer au profit d’une architecture mentale du temps” (Robbe-Grillet 
PUNR 32). A non-linear chronology thus becomes the model: “posthuman theory 
rests on a process ontology that challenges the traditional equation of subjectivity 
with rational consciousness, resisting the reduction of both to objectivity and 
linearity” (Braidotti The Posthuman 169).  
In this new (posthuman) conception of knowledge and reality, the nature of 
narration changes. For Robbe-Grillet, in humanist narration, the purpose is didactic, 
that “communication” of essential truth:  
For the literate 18th-century public, the chief utility of history consisted 
in its true narrations of lives and events presented as guides both moral 
and practical for readers. On this rhetorical humanist model, history 
schooled both judgment and character by exempla. The more 
ambitious forms of philosophical history also sought out universal 
generalizations, especially in the realms of politics and human nature 
(Bod 28). 
 
That insistence on an objective reality translates to an emphasis on the “real” and 
“believable” in narrative; Robbe-Grillet says, “pour avoir son poids de vérité 
humaine, il lui faut encore réussir à persuader le lecteur que les aventures dont on lui 
parle sont arrivés vraiment à des personnages réels et que le romancier se borne à 
rapporter, à transmettre, des évènements dont il a été le témoin” (PUNR 29). In the 




meaning and signification, but its creation: “Une nouvelle sorte de narrateur y est né: 
ce n’est plus seulement un homme qui décrit les choses qu’il voit, mais en même 
temps celui qui invente les choses autour de lui et qui voit les choses qu’il invente” 
and: “les oeuvres nouvelles n’ont de raison d’être que si elles apportent à leur tour au 
monde de nouvelles significations, encore inconnues des auteurs eux-mêmes” (PUNR 
140, 123). Furthermore, the text constitutes the construction of just such a reality: 
“L’écriture romanesque constitue la réalité” (PUNR 138). In this paradigm the role of 
narrator is not that of a transmitter of a discovery but an individual subjective creator 
of meaning and of reality.  
However, if man’s epistemological role becomes the creation of meaning, 
rather than its discovery and transmission, man is not necessarily up to the task. 
Rather than embodying authority over his object of investigation, he is (potentially) 
perennially incapable of realizing this fuction. Unlike the humanist paradigm outlined 
by Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars, which emphasizes dominance and 
mastery, in Robbe-Grillet’s vision, man may not succeed at his job of the creation of 
meaning. Attempts at creating meaning can be characterized by failure: “This 
ordering of events, however, is a dimension of consciousness which, with the 
exception of the author and of X in Marienbad, is not an attribute of Robbe-Grillet’s 
heroes. They are the victims of the very things which they, as men, should be capable 
of ordering and directing but do not” (Stoltzfus New French Novel 91).  
Or, when a subject does successfully create signification, it is not inherently 
significant, nor is it permanent. Whereas, according to Robbe-Grillet, in the humanist 




a in the new paradigm, no unitary human subject exists. When that meaning is 
created, it does not have import for the world, or for some singular and universal 
“man,” but only for the individual creator. His opinion is not the measure of the 
utility of all knowledge, but rather a viewpoint limited to himself  - as an individual -- 
and himself alone. “C’est ici l’homme lui-même qui doit donner l’unité au monde et 
l’élever à sa ressemblance. On regrette surtout qu’il ne soit pas précisé que 
l’operation restera à l’échelle humaine et aura de l’importance pour l’homme 
seulement” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 94). Or, as Alter puts it, “l’homme y est bien le seul 
temoin de l’homme” (“Humanisme” 210). The individual human subject is the only 
measure and producer of knowledge and his capacities are characterized by 
limitation: “Tandis que dans nos livres, au contraire, c’est un homme qui voit, qui 
sent, qui imagine, un homme situé dans l’espace et dans le temps, conditionné par ses 
passions, un homme comme vous et moi. Et le livre ne rapporte rien d’autre que son 
expérience, limitée, incertaine. C’est un homme d’ici, un homme de maintenant, qui 
est son propre narrateur, enfin” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 118). Each individual thus 
creates his own individual meaning, which has import for him alone – if he is even 
capable. 
Observation plays a central role in this schema of knowledge, since 
observation of external phenomena constitutes the catalyst for development of its 
construction “Le regard apparait aussitôt dans cette perspective comme le sens 
privilégié” in a model that leads to “la contemplation” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 65-66). 
Once again, limitations are emphasized; knowledge is not universal; one can only 




PUNR 53). And man is limited in his point of view, his ability to observe and 
perceive:  “La médiocrité du monde tient à l’imperfection de notre vision, à notre 
incapacité d’attention. Notre vision des faits demeure vague et brumeuse, pareille à la 
perspective creusée dans la nuit par les phares d’une auto, et si imparfaite que 
l’imagination du conducteur doit sans cesse interpréter et paraphraser les signes 
aperçus” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 90). And the observers, the cognizing systems that 
produce these realities, are not necessarily human, but could also be constituted by 
the non-human others with which he is imbricated: “The strength of systems theory in 
relation to posthumanist critique lies thus in a ‘deontologization of the human subject’ 
and the resulting transformation of the question of an autonomously acting free 
individual. Instead humans can be seen as one form of observing subjects among 
many others” (Herbrechter Analysis 201). 
The contingency and context-dependency outlined in the previous chapter also 
then applies to the concept of knowledge. If reality is constructed in the mind of each 
individual, then any “knowledge” is not essential and timeless but contingent and 
context-dependent, following the individual’s own perceptions, point of view, 
observations, and his cognitive processes, which draw on experiences such as 
memory, dreams, and imagination to interpret observation: “Le domaine de la vue, du 
reste, comporte lui-même différentes qualités d’appréhension: une forme, par 
exemple, sera généralement plus sûre qu’une couleur, qui change avec l’éclairage, 
avec le fond qui l’accompagne, avec le sujet qui la considère” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 
59). Posthumanism acknowledges this contingent nature of knowledge: 




bound” (Best and Kellner 195). Truth itself is contextual rather than eternal: “Truth is 
‘the successful working of an idea’ with a specific (and always limited) context. Truth 
is verification in practice” (Wolfe Critical Environments loc. 100). After all, after 
“the failure of objectivity… by now commonplace in the social sciences, in history, 
and in literary theory,…A large number of theorists, scholars, critics, and social 
scientists will accept the premises that all knowledge is limited and situated” (Levine 
228). Robbe-Grillet himself comments on the subjective and contextual nature of 
individual knowledge, calling out Newton, (like Morson), in the process: “L’équation 
de Newton sur la chute de la pomme, ce n’est pas le portrait de la pomme, c’est le 
fonctionnement du cerveau de Newton” (Montalbetti loc. 7809). This is yet another 
reason for which a systems-theory based model of cognition can be useful for reading 
Robbe-Grillet, for “the priority of systems theory resides in its pursuit, rather than 
“evasion,” of the problem of the contingency of knowledge” (Wolfe Critical 
Environments loc. 125).  
Thus do Robbe-Grillet and posthmumanist scholars conceive of a paradigm in 
which knowledge and reality are contingent, subjective and multiple; where no 
objective transcendent meaning exists, but is rather created by the individual 
cognizing subject, using the perceptions he makes of the material world. In the 
function of the production of knowledge, man is no longer the master of knowledge 
but is potentially incapable of its manufacture. He is also “demoted” from his 
humanist position of domination at the top of the hierarchy that includes him and all 
the elements of his material existence. He is placed on the same plane as they, his 




him and his “others” highlighted in a model that emphasizes the complexity of 





Chapter 4: Posthuman Narration – Emergence, Contingency, 
Plurality, and Breakdown of Boundaries in La Maison de 
rendez-vous and Topologie d’une cité fantôme 
4.1 Emergence 
As seen in Chapter 2, Robbe-Grillet proposes a paradigm in response to what 
he considers the traditional humanist one. Elements of this paradigm that may also be 
considered posthumanist include: an emphasis on emergence rather than essence and 
fixity; contingency over universality; plurality and multiplicity over singularity and 
unity; a valuation of complexity over reductivity; an emphasis on the idea of 
possibilities; dissolution of ontological boundaries, rejection of binaries; and a 
general rejection of transcendence. I will now demonstrate the ways in which these 
affirmations manifest themselves in two of his fictional texts, La Maison de rendez-
vous and Topologie d’une cité fantôme, which, in the interest of space, I will refer to 
in my citations as Maison and Topologie, respectively. 
 In his theoretical texts, Robbe-Grillet emphasizes the notion of emergence, or 
the idea that the standard state of the world is to be constantly coming into being; 
there is no fixed essence or permanent state for any person or object, including the 
text itself. The object of narration or observation can be observed only as it is in the 
moment, at any moment. Within his narration, Robbe-Grillet indicates regularly this 
notion of constant coming-into-being. In La Maison de Rendez-Vous, this notion is 
signaled to the reader before the principal narrative even begins, in one of the two 




Si quelque lecteur, habitué des escales d’Extrême-Orient, venait à 
penser que les lieux décrits ici ne sont pas conformes à la réalité, 
l’auteur, qui y a lui-même passé la plus grande partie de sa vie, lui 
conseillerait d’y revenir voir et de regarder mieux: les choses changent 
vite sous ces climats (Maison 8). 
 
Here he indicates the notion of consistent change in two ways: by stating it directly 
(“les choses changent…”) and also by implying that reality itself is subject to change; 
if elements in the book do not resemble elements in real life that is because the “real” 
elements change. Of course, Robbe-Grillet’s avant-propos are often meant to 
destabilize, play with, or confuse the reader so any statements made therein should be 
not necessarily be taken at face value. However, regardless of his intention of its 
effects on the reader, the emphasis on the notion of change is certainly present in this 
passage. 
 The notion of emergence continues to be present in the main part of the 
narrative. One of the most common ways in which Robbe-Grillet emphasizes the 
notion of becoming and continual transformation is through his use of the present 
tense. He uses the present tense often to describe a scene, notably often when in a 
novel of the type he labels “traditional” would use past tenses; he himself indicates 
the desire to evoke the “presentness” of a given situation through use of the “present 
de l’indicatif,” indicating that film has an advantage in this regard, for  
Cette irréductible présence de l’image filmique s’oppose 
incontestablement au jeu complexe des temps grammaticaux dont 
dispose le roman classique: il n’existe aucun code photographique qui 
permette de signifier que telle ou telle scène est au passé – ni défin, ni 
indéfini, ni imparfait – ou au futur, encore moins au mode 
conditionnel. Si je vois un évènement se dérouler sur l’écran, je le 
reçois comme en train de s’accomplir: il est au présent de l’indicatif 





In the novel, then, he uses the present indicative tense to evoke this same presence, or 
“present-ness” as Morson puts it (225). Whereas the past tense would indicate 
finished events already seen and experienced, the present tense indicates events that 
are in process. As I will outline in Chapter 6, Robbe-Grillet seems to be more 
interested in process than final outcome, especially in regards to cognitive processes. 
This emphasis on process applies not only to cognition of events taking place in his 
novels, but also to the events themselves. The events being observed by a narrator are 
in process – both/either in process of occurring and in process of being observed; the 
event and the observation are both actively happening at the moment of narration.  
 For example, in an early scene from the party at the Villa Bleue, the narrator 
describes a dancer, pointing out both the present-ness of her movements and actions 
and of his own observation of her:  
Souvent je m’attarde à contempler quelque jeune femme qui danse, 
dans un bal. Je préfère qu’elle ait les epaules nues, et aussi, quand elle 
se retourne, la naissance de la gorge. Sa chair plié luit d’un éclat doux, 
sous la lumière des lustres. Elle exécute avec une application grâcieuse 
un de ces pas compliqués ou la cavalière se tient éloignée de son 
danseur, haute silhouette noire, comme en retrait, qui se contente 
d’indiquer à peine les mouvements devant elle, attentive, dont les yeux 
baissés semblent guetter le moindre signe que fait la main de l’homme, 
pour lui obéir aussitôt tout en continuant d’observer les lois minitieux 
du ceremonial (Maison 10). 
 
In this passage the use of the present tense indicates the action as it is happening, as 
well as the observation being made simultaneously of the same actions. The idea of 
observation is invoked several times, with the words “contempler,” “attentive,” 
“yeux,” “guetter,” and of course “observer.” The notion of the present-ness of the 
observation, in addition to use of the present tense, is further emphasized with the use 




a figurative sense (observing the rules of the ceremony). Thus both the coming-into-
being of the actions and of the observation of the actions are emphasized. 
Interestingly, in this passage the narrator subtly indicates yet another level at 
which the notion of emergence takes place – that of the creation of the story itself. By 
stating “je prefere qu’elle ait” the narrator signals to the reader that the text is an 
invention, his invention; the reader is supposed to know that the person whom he is 
observing is not meant to be a real person but a creation, an element imagined and 
chosen by the narrator. Robbe-Grillet himself confirms the story/ies in Maison as 
being in process, with the use of en train de, in an interview on Lecture pour tous: 
“l’histoire est continuellement en train de se constituer dans le livre même. Le livre 
est déjà l’aventure de quelque chose qui est en train de se faire”  (“Maison de rendez-
vous” 1:23-1:41).  
The continuity indicated by the present additionally indicates the present-ness 
of the act of communication: By using the present tense to narrate the scene, the 
narrator/observer is indicating that he is inventing the woman at the same time he is 
observing her and her actions, and at the same time conveying all of this information 
to the reader. All of these actions on the part of the narrator – invention, observation, 
communication - are happening simultaneously and actively - they are in process of 
occurring and being narrated at the moment of narration. Furthermore, the reader is 
actively reading the text that contains all of these emergent actions, thus creating a 
further layer of actions and observations in process. The signalization of the emergent 
nature of the text to the reader also implicates the emergent process of reading that 




passage is exemplary of the emphasis that Robbe-Grillet places on becoming and 
emergence, taking place over several levels of text and even implicating the reader. 
Similar use of the present tense establishes the emergent nature of narrative 
observation, narrative communication, and textual construction from the beginning in 
Topologie: “Mais il n’y a plus rien, ni cri, ni roulement, ni rumeur lointaine” 
(Topologie 9). The text continues almost exclusively in the present tense for almost 
90 pages, keeping the narrative in a continual state of present-ness. Occasionally the 
narration changes from past to present tense; for example, in the first passage in 
Maison in which the narrator purports to undertake an attempt recount the party at 
Lady Ava’s: 
Comme j’avais l’impression d’être un peu en avance, c’est-à-dire de 
me trouver parmi les premiers invités à franchir la porte…j’ai préféré 
ne pas entrer tout de suite et j’ai obliqué vers la gauche pour faire 
quelques pas dans cette partie du jardin, la plus agréable. Seuls les 
alentours immédiats de la maison sont éclairés…on ne distingue 
bientôt plus que le contour des allées de sable clair…Le bruit est 
assourdissant (Maison 18). 
 
Once again, the narrator implicates the notion of observation, in particular 
observation in process; with “éclairer” the ability to see into the garden is implied, 
and observation is of course invoked as well with the word “distingue.” These 
instances serve to emphasize the notion of emergence through contrast with what 
Robbe-Grillet considers a more “classic” scene recounted in the past tense. 
 In the same scene, just a few pages later, the narrator emphasizes the notion of 
emergence in a different way. He describes two figures arguing in the garden, 
recounting their postures and actions as he observes them; but as he describes them, 




would be having an argument. As recounted by the narrator, their gestures are slowed 
or their bodies immobile; every movement they make is measured and atypically 
isolated:  
Deux personnages immobilisés dans des attitudes dramatiques, comme 
sous le choc d’une intense émotion…A trois mètres environ…se tient 
un home en spencer blanc qui parait sur le point de s’écrouler, comme 
s’il venait d’etre frappé d’un coup de pistolet, la femme ayant lâché 
l’arme aussitôt et restant ainsi la main droite ouverte…Puis très 
lentement, sans redresser le corps ni les genoux ployés, il ramène cette 
main en avant et la porte à ses yeux….et il demeure alors sans plus 
bouger que sa compagne. Il reste encore figé dans la même posture 
lorsque celle-ci, d’un pas lent et régulier de somnambule, se met en 
route vers la maison aux reflets azurs, et s’éloigne, les bras conservant 
toujours leur position levée, la main gauche repoussant devant elle 
l’invisible paroi de glace” (Maison 20). 
 
For Robbe-Grillet, immobility can be seen as a way to signal the present-ness of a 
given moment; the idea that any object can only be as it is in the moment in which the 
description is fixed: “Le souci de précision qui confine parfois au délire (ces notions 
si peu visuelles de « droite » et de « gauche », ces comptages, ces mensurations, ces 
repères géométriques) ne parvient pas à empêcher le monde d’être mouvant jusque 
dans ses aspects les plus matériels, et même au sein de son apparente immobilité” 
(“Description, représentation” loc. 1137).  
This description of figures and scenes in postures of immobility is even more 
pronounced in Topologie. The narrator even refers to human figures as “insensibles 
hommes-statues” (Topologie 48). Nearly all the scenes recounted emphasize some 
form of stillness or immobility, whether on the part of people or of a city that, under 
other circumstances, would be bustling with human activity; a city in ruins. These 
ruins are not definitive but constantly in a state of transition between deconstruction 




destroyed; some are partial. Some of the structures are being rebuilt and repurposed 
while others are reduced to rubble with no indication as to their future restitution. The 
narrator often juxtaposes both in his narration, insisting upon both construction and 
deconstruction rather than one or the other: “Quelques injections de ciment plastique 
dans les masses fissurés suffiront ensuite à en arrêter la dégradation…mais le plus 
périlleux sera, sans aucun doute, la construction du Saint des Saints…il n’est plus 
question de remettre en cause, maintenant, le choix de cette construction en ruine 
pour l’établissement du sanctuaire” (Topologie 120). Thus the notions of construction 
and deconstruction/destruction are evoked together repeatedly, even as the 
“construction en ruine” is impossible in real world terms. As the narrator recounts his 
observations, some of the ruins are actively in process of tumbling down: “derniers 
craquements des murailles brûlées, cendre ou poussière s’écoulant en menu filet 
d’une fissure…une pierre qui se détache à la façade éventrée d’un immeuble 
monumental, dégringole en rebondissant d’anfractuosités en corniches, et roule sur le 
sol parmi les autres pierres” (Topologie 10). This intermediary state between 
(re)construction and deconstruction can be understood to be another example of 
emergence – the state of the city is not fixed or definitive but continually in process of 
being built/destroyed. A similar consistent state of change in terms of the setting is 
present in Maison, where “settings fail to remain static either in time or in space” 
(Goodstein 92). 
4.2 Binaries and Boundaries 
Additionally, by insisting on the transitory state between construction and 




construction/deconstruction, instead remaining squarely in the tension between the 
two; in Chapter 2 I discussed this aspect of Robbe-Grillet’s vision. The state of flux 
between the two poles is the default state of the novel’s setting, rather than one side 
or the other. That he insists on remaining between the two, or on their simultaneous 
coexistence, is demonstrated by the title of the second section of the text of 
Topologie: “Construction d’un temple en ruines à la déesse Vanadé”: Construction of 
ruins would be an impossibility in real-world terms, but the insistence of the text on 
complexity and multiplicity allows for the simultaneous existence of these two 
notions, allowing the text to settle in between the two in a refusal to enter into one 
side of the binary. 
The binary of construction/destruction also operates on the level of the text 
itself. It is not just the story that is implicated in this tension between construction and 
deconstruction/destruction but also the narration. Often the narrator will make a 
statement only to refute it and replace it with another one. This sort of deletion 
indicates the emergent nature of the text itself, and its own situation in the space 
between construction and destruction. Robbe-Grillet states that his work “s’est 
accomplie dans un double mouvement de création et de gommage,” a technique that 
Pierre van den Heuvel (and others) call “dysnarration” and that Brian Richardson 
terms “denarration” (“Description, representation” loc. 1124; “Texte, Film” 2002; 
Unnatural Voices, xi). In the opening of Topologie, the narrator states, “C’est le 
matin, c’est le soir;” in Maison, “Boris’s ferry-boat in La Maison de rendez-vous 




constant movement between irreducible fact and monstrous fantasy, or creation and 
destruction” (Sturrock 223). 
The binary construction/destruction is not the only one refused by Robbe-
Grillet in the two texts. He often talks about binaries in terms of contradictions that, 
under real-world circumstances, would render impossible. For example, in Maison, 
within a single line, he plays with the notion of immobility and movement, invoking 
both at once in describing the scene of the young woman walking a dog: “La jeune 
femme conservant tout le corps immobile, malgré le mouvement vif et régulier des 
genoux et des cuisses sous la jupe entravée” (Maison 25). In another instance, the 
dog’s mouth is dripping with wet saliva and yet it closes its mouth with a “dry snap” 
(Maison 12-13). The narrator even refuses the binary existence/non-existence with 
contradictory statements about the existence of certain elements in scenes; while 
observing the woman with the dog, who goes into a building, the narrator wonders 
what happens to the animal while she is gone, invoking the existence and non-
existence of several material items in turn: “L’aurait-elle attaché à quelque anneau, 
piéton, tête de rampe (mais l’escalier n’a pas de rampe), heurtoir (mais il n’y a pas de 
porte)” (Maison 29). In a similar way, the narrator invokes the simultaneous existence 
and inexistence of a ceiling in the prison in Topologie (Topologie 17-25). In Chapter 
5 and 6, I will illustrate the functions that such contradictions serve in demoting man 
from his central place in a humanist epistemological model as it is conceived by 
Robbe-Grillet; and in producing cognition in Luhmann’s systems-theory model of 
communication; but here I affirm that they also serve to undermine and refuse 




Within these ruins, the narrator describes various sorts or barriers or 
boundaries  -- walls, windows, fences. The structure that is most central to the story is 
(perhaps) a prison for young women. Here the notion of boundaries and barriers is 
central, for keeping a boundary between those inside and those outside is the sole 
function of a prison. However, in almost every instance of description of a barrier, 
especially within the prison, there is a reference to its porosity –  the narrator finds a 
crack, a space, a gap, a hole, etc. For example, following a description of the prison as 
nearly impenetrable, with thick walls and windows that are placed far higher than any 
prisoner could possibly reach, the narrator notices the faults in the barriers, the gaps 
in the bars: “A mieux observer le détail des différentes grilles, on découvre vite que 
l’une d’elles est incomplète, celle de la muraille latérale gauche, dont un des barreaux 
manque” (Topologie 20). Even as he describes its impenetrability, however, he 
qualifies his description with references to the openings and lack of solidity of the 
barriers: the building is “apparently” intact; the walls have no openings “ou peu s’en 
faut” (Topologie 12). As he continues to observe the building, he notes that a more 
major part of it is missing – either the ceiling or the fourth wall that would enclose the 
prisoners. 
As remnants of the destruction visited upon the city previous to the narrator’s 
visit, this helps to emphasize this tension between construction and deconstruction, 
but it is also a literal depiction of the inefficacity of strict boundaries, barriers, and 
delineations. By insisting on openings, space, and movement within solid barriers, 
Robbe-Grillet emphasizes the notion of the openness and fluidity, and the breakdown 




observed by the narrator are literally unbounded: “Mais il n’y a plus rien…ni le 
moindre contour discernable accusant quelques différences, quelque relief, entre les 
plans successifs de ce qui formait ici des maisons, des palais, des avenues” 
(Topologie 9). The boundary – the contour – is not visible, with no apparent 
delineation between what would normally be disparate elements of a typical city 
scene - houses, streets, and so forth. In the broken glass from the fallen champagne 
flute/the crates in the wings of the theater in Maison, Sturrock also sees a reference to 
the inefficacity of barriers: “the crates full of broken glass – since glass represents the 
flimsy barrier that circumscribes and protects a world projected only in the 
imagination or reflective consciousness – are open” (203). 
The dissolution of categorical boundaries also happens on other, less literal, 
levels of the text. Self-contained, integral, unitary, bounded elements are set aside in 
favor of what Peter van Heuvel calls “brouillages,” a mixing and transitioning that 
allows for flow, openness and continuity among what would ordinarily be disparate 
elements (Van den Heuvel 56). One of the most common instances of this is in the 
lack of delineation between scenes at the level of the story. Events and scenes that are 
ostensibly distinct from one another – occurring at different times, or different places, 
or enacted or observed by different characters – are recounted in such a way that there 
is no distinction or boundary between them; one slides seamlessly into the other with 
no verbal indication in the narration that would separate them. This happens most 
notably in Maison, where the lack of transition among or between scenes is more 
apparent than in earlier texts. For instance, early in the text, the narrator recounts 




the torture of a young girl, a young woman walking her dog in a public street, a 
woman dancing at a party, and a man recounting a story at a party. However, in the 
narration he makes no distinction that would delineate one scene from another. The 
narration of elements of these scenes in the opening pages is done in such a way as to 
present these scenes – or fragments of them – without making any categorical 
separation among them, one sliding seamlessly into another:  
Le pied droit de celle-ci, qui s’avance presque jusqu’au niveau de la patte arrière du 
chien, ne repose sur le sol que par la pointe d’un soulier à très haut talon…la soie 
blanche de la jupe est fendue latéralement, laissant deviner le creux du genou et de la 
cuisse. Au-dessus, grâce à un discret système à glissière, presque indiscernable, la 
robe doit s’ouvrir entièrement jusqu’à l’aisselle, d’un seul coup, sur la chair nue. Le 
corps souple se tord, de droite et de gauche, pour essayer de se libérer des minces 
liens de cuir qui enserrent les chevilles et les poignets; mais c’est en vain, 
naturellement. Les mouvements qu’autorise la posture sont d’ailleurs de faible 
amplitude; torse et membres obéissent à des règles si strictes, si contraignantes, que la 
danseuse parait maintenant tout à fait immobile…et tout d’un coup, sur un ordre muet 
de son cavalier, elle se retourne en une volte-face légère…elle fait seulement bouger 
l’étoffe mince sur le ventre et les seins. Et voila que le même gros homme sanguin 
s’interpose de nouveau, parlant touours àvoix haute de la vie à Hong Kong et des 
magasins élégants de Kowloon, où on trouve les plus belles soies du monde (Maison 
11-12). 
 
The scenes thus recounted flow from one into the next without any boundary marking 
the division among them.  
It is worth noting that variations of the word “glisser” appear frequently 
throughout the book, as they do in many of his text, in this instance indicating where 
a discreet system “a glissière” allows the opening of the dress. Once again, here the 
notion of “opening” is emphasized. The same is true of Topologie: a tramway, in spite 
of its rickety state, “glisse sans faire autre bruit que la note grêle d’un timbre 
metallique”  (Topologie 60). The use of terms like “glisser” emphasizes the notion of 




rather than rigidity, blockages, or even ruptures, what is emphasized is above all a 
sort of continuous sliding and slipping, from one scene, image, or moment to the next, 
in a sort of continual flow without boundary.  
Other scenes or collections of scenes are narrated in much the same way: A 
rickshaw driver running on an exterior avenue surrounded by fig trees merges into the 
sanguine man attempting conversation at a party, speaking although no one is 
listening; a theater piece that the narrator leaves to wander about backstage merges 
into a description of debris floating in a canal on an outdoor street (Maison 13, 24). 
Similar lack of narrative transition among scenes occurs in Topologie, although these 
scenes resemble more of a freeflowing stream-of-consciousness type of narrative 
style than carefully combined and calibrated passages containing a finite number of 
scenes. For example, the opening of the chapter titled “Le Navire à sacrifices” 
transitions directly without any particular demarcations through the following scenes: 
From an enclosed building, a stylus and a rock are visibly lying on the ground near a 
body of water; a convalescent adolescent lies in bed thinking of a book which has 
recently been read to her; in the prison traces of old architectural elements can still be 
seen, including the remains of a text in Latin, which must be about the ancient 
goddess Vanadé, of which the mythological function is queen of the girls trapped in 
the prison and goddess of fertility: “Caillou et stylet gisent à même le sol, dans le 
soleil…mais la convalscente allongée rêve encore aux mots envolés de la liseuse. Sur 
la haute muraille extérieure de la prison …les pierres apparantes dessinent la trace de 
nombreux éléments d’architecture depuis longtemps disparus…” (Topologie 43-45). 




Maison, are evoked by the narration in a fluid way without borders or divisions, in 
which one flows directly into the other. 
 Other instances of dissolution of barriers and boundaries in his fiction include 
the lack of distinction between observation of lived events and the subsequent 
recounting of the same events; the event and the story of the event become mixed 
together. What begins as a retrospective “témoignage” transitions into a present-tense 
observation of the events being recounted. For example, in Maison, the narrator states 
that he is going to try to recount the incident of the police raid of the Villa Bleue 
exactly as it happened, and for this he begins his narrative in the typical way, using 
the past tense: “Une fois, la police est arrivé chez elle au milieu d’une réunion, mais 
une réunion parfaitement ordinaire” (Maison 15). Shortly thereafter, however, the 
narration switches to present tense and the entirety of the rest of the passage is 
dedicated to narrating the observation of the events as they occur: “Quand les 
gendarmes en short kaki et chaussettes blanches font irruption dans la villa, ils ne 
trouvent que trois ou quatre couples qui dansent encore dans le grand salon” (Maison 
15). Many critics have worked on the notion of chronology and temporality (or lack 
thereof) in Robbe-Grillet’s work; indeed, this is an example of his typical blurring of 
temporalities. But setting aside a perspective strictly concerned with chronology, it 
may also be considered a dissolution of boundaries between levels of narration – the 
events and their recounting -- in addition to a dissolution of temporal boundaries.  
In Topologie this dissolution between events and their retelling, the 
dismantling of a chronological temporality between these elements, manifests for the 




to the fact that events being reported have not only already occurred – despite the 
frequent use of the present tense -- but have also already been recounted: “Mais l’eau 
trouble au sein de laquelle la jeune survivante vient ainsi de baigner sa chair meurtrie 
était – selon ce qui vient d’être dit – mélangé au sang tout frais de ses compagnes, 
assassinées par milliers dans la rade. De cette étrange union naquit le demi-dieu 
David. La suite de l’histoire a déjà été rapportée” (Topologie 52). In this way, the 
observations and events become mixed between the telling and the occurrence 
through mixed use of the past and present tenses, but also through the narrator 
making reference to a previous recounting. The references to textual creation and 
mythology herein add an interesting layer to the mythical stories presented in the text 
in that these mythological elements constitute “origin” stories that, in a “real world” 
sense, are perpetually told and retold. Their link to creation as well as the text’s as a 
whole is significant; as Roch Smith states, “Topology of a Phantom City 
simultaneously creates and explores a world in space and time as a means of telling 
the story of such artistic creation” (95). With the text itself being the site of their 
generation, the text itself becomes the origin of the origin story, thus further blurring 
the boundaries between creation and narration. 
 Robbe-Grillet also blurs the distinction between observation and invention. In 
their implication in narration, as Sturrock points out, “there is nothing remotely 
revolutionary about Robbe-Grillet as far as this goes: novels have always been part 
observation and part invention” (223). However, Robbe-Grillet’s innovation lies in 
breaking down the distinction or refusing to make a distinction between the two while 




in an explicit way: “He is an innovator only in so far as he displays [this] within the 
novel itself” (Sturrock 223). Returning to the notion of textual creation as a primary 
focus of the text, the narrator often marks his commentary with elements that signal 
to the reader the invented nature of the text, even as he recounts his observations. 
Indeed, we can consider this concentration on the practice of writing, over the 
depiction of events recounted, as a posthumanist trend. In her article “Posthumanist 
Performativity,” Katherine Barad evokes “the move toward performative alternatives 
to representationalism” that “shifts the focus from questions of correspondence 
between descriptions and reality (e.g. do they mirror nature or culture?) to matters of 
practices/doings/actions” (Barad 802).  
Occasionally this observation/invention is juxtaposed and mixed with 
representations of artistic representations – paintings, theater pieces, posters, etc. – so 
that the distinctions between observation, creation, and artistic representation become 
indistinguishable. For example, in one passage in Maison, the narrator observes an 
illustrated party scene on the cover of a Chinese magazine that he sees in the street. 
As he describes the scene on the cover, it morphs into a live scene that the narrator is 
observing and experiencing at the moment of recounting, but as he does so, he uses 
terms such as “au centre de l’image,” and “au premier plan,” terms alluding to his 
role in the invention of it all: “Au premier plan, par exemple, sur la droite, deux 
femmes assez proches l’une de l’autre…n’ont encore rien vu et poursuivent la scene 
commencée sans se soucier de ce qui se passe à dix metres d’elles” (Maison 27). The 
lived scene, the observation of the scene, the art object (the magazine cover), the 




mixed together, fluidly transitioning from one to the other. Similar blending occurs in 
Topologie: “Sans interrompre sa course, elle se retourne à demi vers la route en lacets 
jalonnée de gouttes vermeilles qu’elle vient sans doute de parcourir, regardant comme 
avec effroi le sommet de la colline où se cache l’autel du sacrifice dans le sinistre 
sanctuaire pentastyle. Non, ce modèle d’architecture est trop improbable…ce qu’il y 
a, dehors, ce sont seulement des rues” (Topologie 28). The boundary between 
observation/recounting of the young girl running (narrator) and invention of the 
scenery through which she runs (author), the roles of author and narrator are 
combined. 
I will discuss in Chapter 6 the centrality of processes of cognition in Robbe-
Grillet. Involved in these processes are dreams, imagination, and memory, and so 
these occupy a prominent place in Robbe-Grilletian narration. When they are 
invoked, the lines between these are also broken down and these elements often 
mixed together without distinction in the two novels. This blurring occurs in both 
novels from the very opening passage; in Maison, the author says,  
La chair des femmes a toujours occupé, sans doute, une grande place 
dans mes rêves. Même à l’état de veille, ses images ne cessent de 
m’assaillir. Une fille en robe d’été qui offre sa nuque courbée – elle 
rattache sa sandale – la chevelure à demi renversée découvrant la peau 
fragile et son duvet blonde, je la vois aussitôt soumise à quelque 
complaisance, tout de suite excessive…souvent je m’attarde à 
contempler quelque jeune fille qui danse, dans un bal. Je préfère 
qu’elle ait les épaules nues… (Maison 9-10). 
 
In this single passage, the narrator invokes dreams with the word “rêves” but then 
refers to being bombarded with images even while awake, which could invoke either 
imagination or memory. Then he recounts something he sees, which could either be 




lived at the moment of narration. With words like “souvent,” the author implies lived 
experience, which would normally be attributed to memory, but then almost 
immediately qualifies that image with “je préfère qu’elle ait,” which implies 
imagination and invention. Thus the boundaries between dreams, lived experience, 
memory, and imagination are broken down, each one moving seamlessly into the 
others. In Topologie, the opening pages contain a similar occurrence:  
L’arme de mort, le couteau à large lame étincelante et froide a 
séché jusqu’aux pleurs, dans la chambre abandonnée où 
maintenant déjà me gagne le sommeil sans rêves d’après la 
destruction. Je suis là. J’étais là. Je me souviens. Avant de 
m’endormir, la ville, encore une fois, dresse devant mon visage 
pâli…Je suis seul. Je marche au hasard devant moi (Topologie 
11). 
 
Once again, the idea of dreams is invoked with the words “dormir” and “rêves” – 
except that the author states explicitly that it is a sleep without dreams. Immediately 
afterwards is invoked the notion of lived experience – and thus perhaps memory – 
with the notion of being there. But by moving from present tense to past tense, it is 
unclear whether the author is referring to memories or current and active lived 
experience. The text then moves again to the notion of memory as the narrator states, 
“je me souviens,” then back to the notion of sleep with “avant de m’endormir.” The 
phrases that follow, the buildings standing in front of the narrator’s face, and his 
movement through the city, could thus be either observed, dreams, memory, or 
imagination. In just a few lines, then, the narrator jumps seamlessly between all of 
these ideas, without distinguishing or creating any solid barriers among them. Indeed, 





Finally, the dissolution or blurring of categorical boundaries also occurs at the 
level of the author, narrator, character, and reader. With the blurring of the 
distinctions between observation, recounting, and invention, the distinctions between 
narrator and author also break down. The role of narrator (recounting/observing) and 
the role of author (creating/inventing) are contained within the same narration; for 
instance in the scene I have already evoked in Maison where the narrator is observing 
a woman dancing but “prefers” her to have exposed shoulders (Maison 10). The 
distinctions between narrator and character are also blurred, as the narrator both 
observes at a distance and participates in the events he recounts; sometimes at the 
same time he makes references to his role in their creation as text. As Goodstein 
notes, “The accounts are structured to present a movement from the subjective 
narrator to the objective third person coupled with a seemingly contradictory 
movement from a kind of speculative observation of events to an active participation 
in them” (94).  Later, he notes, “The point of view changes from an unidentified first-
person observer to a third-person narrator, but the third-person narration seems to 
deal with the first-person narrator, now become an actor rather than an observer” 
(Goodstein 92). Furthermore, the narrator depicts several levels of reading and 
spectatorship; sometimes he recounts the act of reading or viewing a piece of art (a 
poster, a theater piece, etc.) himself; sometimes he evokes himself and/or other 
characters as spectators of art or as observers of events, thus attributing to himself as 
well as to other characters the role of “reader” or “observer.”  
 And if the narrator’s role is to recount what he observes, and by extension, the 




then the complex and layered levels of observation in the text would make many 
characters simultaneously also narrators and readers/spectators. I will elaborate on the 
notion of observation and its role in cognition and complexity in Chapter 6, but these 
elements also serve to illustrate a breakdown of typical narrative boundaries. For 
example, in one party scene, a man who has been watching his dance partner bows 
“devant son interlocutrice dont les yeux demeurent baissés avec modestie, la 
servant…s’arrête à quelques pas d’eux et reste à les observer en silence….la coupe de 
cristal qui choit sur le sol de marbre et se brise en menus morceaux, étincelants, la 
jeune femme aux cheveux blonds qui reste à les contempler d’un regard vide” 
(Maison 28). Here, the narrator observes the man observing the woman, who is not 
herself observing anyone, who are in turn observed silently by the servant, who also 
observes a blond woman who is observing the broken glass; all of which scene is 
observed by the narrator, and through him by the reader. In this way, through the use 
of observation, several characters simultaneously occupy the roles of character and 
spectator. 
 The narrative voice occasionally changes in such a way as to place the 
narrator as a participant involved in events narrated by someone else, thus casting him 
as a character and narrator simultaneously. For example, in Topologie, the narrator 
states, “Le sens exact des gestes ou des objets n’y est pas clairement discernable, à 
cause apparemment de la tête du narrateur qui se trouve juste devant et dont les épais 
cheveux bouclés brouillent la vue” (Topologie 36). In this way, the narrator is 
inserted as a sort of mise-en-abyme in his own text as an observed character, and this 




who is supposed to observe, and subsequently to recount, but in this instance, it is 
himself, by dint of his own position, that blocks the observation and thus the 
recounting of the event. Roch Smith sees in this image yet another level of 
observation, in that the reference to thick hair is a reference to Robbe-Grillet himself, 
thus adding “author” to the various transgressions of boundaries effected (94). 
 In other instances, the narrator places on the scene a character recounting a 
story to which he is listening, thus placing himself in the role of “spectator” and 
another character in the role of narrator. For example, the narrator in Maison places 
himself explicitly in the role of narrator – he who observes and recounts a series of 
events – near the beginning of the text: “Je vais donc essayer maintenant de raconter 
cette soirée chez Lady Ava, de préciser en tout cas quels furent, à ma connaissance, 
les principaux évènements qui l’ont marquée” (Maison 18). However, later on, it is 
the character of the sanguine man at the party who has taken on the role of narrator 
and who is recounting the events as the original narrator listens: “Puis, sans liaison 
apparente avec ce qui précède, il se met à raconter la mort d’Edouard Manneret. Ça, 
c’était un personnage!’ ajoute-t-il en conclusion” (Maison 34). By using the term 
“personnage” the man also invokes the invented and fictional nature of the story, thus 
referencing also the role of author, and referring to the constructed nature of the text. 
In Topologie, these roles are also mixed; for example, the narrator makes reference to 
the constructive nature of writing – the role of the author – in the passage where he 
states, “Je m’approche en tatonnant et je pose la main sur la muraille refroidie où, 
gravant dans le schiste avec la pointe du couteau à large lame, j’écris maintenant le 




laquelle je nomme les ruines d’une future divinité” (Topologie 13). Thus the role of 
author, that of writer and creator, as well as he who names his creations, is taken up 
by the narrator. The knife used by the narrator in this scene has been implicated in a 
possible scene of violence or crime in a previous passage, and thus the narrator is also 
implicated in the story as a potential criminal – one of the characters whose actions 
are being narrated.       
Finally, there is no division between text and commentary on the text (fiction 
and critique). As noted in Chapter 1, Robbe-Grillet sees fiction and theory as working 
in tandem, feeding off each other and intertwining with each other. This vision of 
criticism and fiction plays out also in his novels. Several remarks made by the 
narrator in both novels can be understood as being commentary on the text itself or on 
the nature of writing and/or artistic representation. For instance, in Topologie, the 
narrator states “La contradiction chronologique qui existe ainsi entre les caractères et 
ce qu’ils racontent posent une énigme que personne n’a encore resolue” in a fairly 
obvious reference to the problems of chronology encountered by critics of Robbe-
Grillet’s work (Topologie 42). In another section, which contains a description of 
sexual violence (the shipwreck and rape of a group of women), the narrator cites “les 
outrages ainsi cent fois répétés avec les variantes barbares,” which can be understood 
to be a reference to the text itself, which takes up the same imagery and story 
elements again and again in numerous variations throughout the novel and perhaps 
also refers to its negative reception by critics (Topologie 51). In yet another, more 
obvious, passage, the narrator makes a reference to a museum of machines, adding 




reconnu là, aussitôt, le schéma générateur initial” (Topologie 113). This is a clear 
reference to his own use of “éléments générateurs,” his repetition of each such 
element in various scenes, and the recuperation of this practice by critics.  
In Maison, as the narrator watches a scene of torture of a young woman that 
occurs in the Villa Bleue as part of a theatrical representation, he comments on the 
lack of vraisemblance in the gestures that the woman makes to protect herself: “La 
fille qui joue le rôle de la victime tient les bras écartés de part et d’autre du corps, en 
se collant à la paroi…une mise en scène réaliste commanderait plutôt de lui faire se 
servir de ses mains pour se protéger…ce mode de défense n’est pas explicable que 
par un souci d’ordre ésthetique, visant à introduire quelque variété dans le point de 
vue de la salle” (Maison 32). This comment can be understood also to be concerned 
with the critical reception of Robbe-Grillet’s work; it can be seen as a sort of response 
to criticism and a defense of the idea that, if his novels do not respond to that which 
seems “realistic” it is because he is trying to create a new structure, concerned with 
variety and variations, for his own spectators (his readers). Thus can some 
commentary on the text, often a response to criticism, be found within the fictional 
text itself, mixing criticism with the fiction. 
4.3 Contingency 
Following the breaking down of boundaries, as ontological categories 
dissolve, the observations made by the narrator become contingent. Without the 
essences associated with ontological categories, there is no objective truth for the 
narrator to communicate. His affirmations are thus conditional, contingent upon his 




narrator points out explicitly that the scenes that take place and the elements they 
contain are not a given but depend on his own perspective; in one instance he evokes 
a “table de bois rectangulaire…ou peut-être, à la réflexion, carrée: ici encore l’effet 
de perspective est trop marqué pour que l’on puisse en décider à coup sûr” (Topologie 
21). In this case, the shape of the table cannot be determined, or depends on the 
perspective of the observer. This information is contingent upon his placement and 
his ability to observe. 
The images and elements observed by the narrator also have different 
meanings depending on the context in which they are observed. Robbe-Grillet 
recycles elements, re-using them in a variety of different scenes, or repeating them in 
scenes with slight variations (his “éléments générateurs”). Each time, the contribution 
of the elements observed and recounted to the meaning changes depending on the 
scene. For example, one of the commonly recurring elements in Maison is a leash; 
when it occurs in a scene where a woman walks her dog, it is an innocent accessory 
for the dog; when it is used in scenes of violence to tie up women it is an instrument 
of torture. The same, singular element – a leash – thus has a different significance 
depending on the scene in which it appears. In Topologie, the image of a girl lying 
face up on a bed is one of pleasure or violence, depending on the scene in which it is 
found; on one page the other elements of the scene imply pleasure; while on the 
following page some elements are changed in order to imply violence: “une autre 
adolescente est allongée sur le dos, nue, les membres en croix, le corps étalé en 
travers d’un divan très bas dans le désordre des draps défaits…même sourire hors 




11). In contrast, the same image appears on the following page, signifying violence 
this time: “le lit défait où repose le corps offert, éventré, la flaque de sang qui déjà se 
fige sur le drap blanc” (Topologie 12). The same image of a girl splayed across the 
bed thus has two different meanings depending on the context of the scene in which it 
occurs. 
The idea of context and contingency is further emphasized in particular in 
Topologie, with the many scenes involving a game of cards. As noted in Chapter 2, 
the notion of games is significant to Robbe-Grillet in particular because of their 
relationship to contingency and possibility. This is depicted textually in Topologie in 
various scenes portraying a game of cards played among the female prisoners. The 
meanings of the cards depend on the game being played; the “règle du jeu” is written 
but its contents are not communicated by the narrator, so that there is no context on 
the part of the narrator or the reader for interpreting the cards that are shown. When a 
card is finally played, its meaning is not communicated directly and explicitly, but 
remains in suspense, to be “deciphered” according to the rules and context of the 
game by the player whose turn comes next: “Au lieu de déchiffrer en hâte, ou même 
avec avidité, le dessin colorié reconnaissable au premier regard grâce à la tâche rouge 
vif qui en marque le quart inférieur…la jeune femme qui est assise en face, cessant 
alors au contraire de montrer le moindre intérêt pour cet arcane majeur enfin abattu 
par sa partenaire, a levé la tête à son tour vers la tâche du soleil qui brille sur le mur 
de droite” (Topologie 26-27). Without the rules of the game, and thus context being 
made explicit, and without the active interpretation within that context that must be 




known. And Roch Smith, in his critical reading of Maison, envisions the murder as a 
sort of game: “[The death of Manneret] “takes place on a narrative chessboard 
without obvious rules” (67).  
In other instances, the import of information proffered by the narrator has 
different significations depending on the choice and interpretation of the reader, and 
occasionally, narrator. In Maison, for example, the narrator hypothesizes the potential 
existence of a ring to which the woman could have tied her dog while going indoors; 
this is followed by an affirmation regarding the state of the ring: “L’aurait-elle attaché 
à quelque anneau, piton, tête de rampe…heurtoir…patte-fiche, crochet, vieux clou 
grossièrement recourbé vers le haut, tout tordu et mangé de rouille, planté dans le mur 
à cet endroit? Mais ce clou lui-même n’est pas bien solide” (Maison 29). The state of 
the ring, presented as an affirmation, is in fact contingent upon the ring’s very 
existence, which is presented as a hypothetical. In the same passage, the narrator 
signals to the reader that the subsequent sequence of events in the story depends on 
the choice he and/or the reader make regarding the possibilities of the actions of the 
woman in attaching the dog: “Si, comme tout l’indique, il n’est pas monté avec elle, 
a-t-il attendu tranquillement au pied des marches, n’ayant désormais plus besoin 
d’être tenu en laisse? Ou l’aurait-elle attaché…” (Maison 29). The series of 
suppositions regarding the object to which she attaches the dog depends in the first 
place on the narrator and reader choosing the possibility of the attachment of the dog 
over the possibility of the dog waiting calmly outside. The use of the conditional 
tense reflects the conditional existence of these elements. With the use of “si” in the 




the veracity of the indications laid out by the text, which is itself not a given. As 
Smith points out, regarding the villa, “its very existence is questionable, a 
dependency of the oft-used conditional of conjecture in this novel’s original French 
narrative” (Smith 70). All of the subsequent elements – the various objects to which 
the dog could be attached, the state of the object – depend on this choice being made; 
they are thus contingent on the respective selections made in this particular series of 
textual or narrative possibilities. By basing his affirmations contingent on the 
conditional, Robbe-Grillet is emphasizing contingency and contextuality over 
objectivity and essence. 
4.4 Plurality 
Finally, the texts are characterized by acceptance of and mise-en-scene of 
multiplicity and plurality over singularity and unity. As seen in Chapter 2, Robbe-
Grillet emphasizes plurality and multiplicity, which manifests itself in the text in 
several ways, one of the most obvious being the multiple identities of a given 
character. In Maison, for example, one of the primary characters has a multitude of 
names: Johnstone, Johnson, etc. as does Lauren, Laureen, Loraine, etc. Johnson also 
has multiple nationalities; at one point he is referred to as being American; at another 
point he is referred to by the narrator as being British. The name “Sir Ralph” seems to 
apply to multiple indviduals, and “The American” is both a nickname for Sir Ralph 
and a reference to the Johnson character: “celui qu’on appelle Johnson, ou même 
souvent “l’Américain,” bien qu’il soit de nationalité anglaise et baron…Sir Ralph (dit 
“l’Américain”) ne peut se départir d’un demi-sourire presque méprisant” (Maison 




Bleue who recurs as an observer throughout the story is simultaneously Japanese, 
Chinese, or both. Not only do particular characters have multiple names, but the 
names also each refer to multiple items; Jonstone might be the American/British 
character, but it is also the name of the sculptor responsible for the statues in the 
garden. “L’appât” is both the name for the sculpture group and for the theater piece 
put on during the soirée. That critics should consider the characters multiple as such, 
rather than attempting to assign them invidual identities, is confirmed by Robbe-
Grillet himself. When correcting a critic who says that some find his work difficult to 
read, Robbe-Grillet suggests that the difficulty is coming perhaps from the fact that 
such a reader would be relying on old models that presuppose singularity, and that the 
reader who would accept an approach permitting multiplicity instead would find 
Maison easy:  
Si vous acceptez de le lire comme il a été écrit, c’est-à-dire … sans 
s’arrêter à ce qui semble être des contradictions. Par exemple, un 
personnage, on vous dit qu’il est américain à la troisième page, on 
vous dit qu’il est anglais un peu plus loin, qu’il est portugais encore un 
peu plus loin. Mais il faut admettre tout simplement que c’est un 
personnage à nationalité multiple  (“ Lindon” 17:35-18:13). 
 
This multiplicity also extends to the narrator and to narrative voice. The text in both 
books cycles through different yet simultaneous identities for the narrators as well as 
changing variously from first to third-person. These differences are not just 
changeable, but coexistent and multiple. In Maision, the central event of the text – the 
murder of Edouard Manneret – is recounted in various ways by various characters, 
repeated with variations. As Goodstein points out, in Maison, “The novel is made up 
of five distinct sections,” including “four separate accounts of the events surrounding 




combined into a unified whole but coexist simultaneously. They “are not readily 
attributable to a single psychological perspective” but remain “a multiplication of 
narrative perspectives and spaces” (Smith 62). A multiplication of narrative voices 
also occurs in Topologie, as the narrative passes from narrator to various characters, 
and from first-person to third-person point of view.  
The murder of Edouard Manneret, not just its narration, is also multiple. As 
Goodstein points out, “Edouard Manneret has been murdered, but the murder has 
been committed in three different ways and under three completely different sets of 
circumstances” (Goodstein 92). He dies variously by suicide, being mauled by a dog, 
being stabbed by a criminal disguised as a policeman, and by the character Johnson. 
The text offers another possibility as well: that the death was part of a theater piece 
called “The Death of Edouard Manneret” and that his death does not “actually” occur 
at all. All of these various “deaths” of Manneret are equally present in the text. 
Robbe-Grillet affirms the plural existence of multiple stories in the text: “Dans La 
Maison de rendez-vous, il y a une histoire, comme vous dites. Il y a même des 
histoires.” (“Lindon” 11:20-11:25). 
In the text there is also a proliferation of images, scenes, and “éléments 
générateurs,” one engendering the other in a profusion: “A series of images constitute 
the presence of the novel and form a thematic motif that runs throughout the 
novel…The circumstances surrounding them may change, but the images themselves 
remain constant” (Goodstein 93). These elements multiply themselves: “Two images 
occur over and over, alternating from one to the other, expanding their contexts into 




seems at times a conglomeration of different parties telescoped together and at other 
times a specific party which is raided by the police” (Goodstein 93, 92). As a text, 
Topologie itself as plural, as it is a “montage of several collaboratively inspired texts” 
(Smith 88). The text itself is made from multiple texts, each one a collaboration 
generated by a plurality of authors. “By constructing Topology from diverse 
collaborative projects,” says Ronald Bogue, “[Robbe-Grillet] subverts belief in a 
work’s intrinsic unity” (36). Such multiplicity also allows for the simultaneous 
coexistence of multiple textual possibilities, as well as possibilities for reader 
interpretation, which I will address in Chapter 6. Thus do the affirmations of 
emergence, contingency, plurality, and breakdown of boundaries that are espoused by 
both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist scholars play out in his fiction. I will now 







Chapter 5:  Confronting Anthropocentrism – Decentering the 
Human in Dans le labyrinthe and La Reprise 
 
5.1 Repositioning Man vis-à-vis Knowledge and Communication 
In Chapter 3, I outlined the criticisms that Robbe-Grillet has of the humanist 
positioning of the human subject. In brief, he understands the humanist human subject 
to be placed at a position of hierarchical superiority over the material world and non-
human “others” such as objects; and to be placed at the center of knowledge 
production as subject, object, agent and measure of epistemological investigation. In 
his fictional texts, then, Robbe-Grillet seeks to displace the human from these 
respective positions. I will demonstrate the ways he effects this displacement in Dans 
le labyrinthe and La Reprise, to which I will refer with the terms Labyrinthe and 
Reprise, respectively 
In regards to the question of “knowing,” in the next chapter, I will undertake a 
reading the cognitive processes or “sense—making” of the human subject that take 
place in Robbe-Grillet’s texts, following Niklas Luhmann’s systems-theory based 
theory of communication. The specifics of the cognitive processes in question will be 
outlined in that chapter; for now, I will concentrate on the manner in which Robbe-
Grillet depicts the human subject as being limited, incapable, or failing in that 
function (of sense-making and its communication).  
To briefly summarize the humanist epistemological paradigm against which 
Robbe-Grillet is writing, outlined in Chapter 3: Observations of experiments and 
lived experiences constitute the primary matter of knowledge; conclusions drawn 




The intelligent, rational, autonomous human subject who interprets the observations 
has enough importance and authority that his interpretation of these observations 
constitute knowledge. Robbe-Grillet conceives of humanist narrative as a model in 
which a privileged human author “discovers” – or demonstrates a premeditated - 
objective truth from observations made through the practice of writing, which he then 
communicates to the reader, also through writing. The characters in this narrative 
must be believeable and identifiable in order for the narrative to serve its didactic 
function of communicating a truth about human nature. Robbe-Grillet’s human 
characters serve to interrupt this paradigm at almost every level. 
In response to this paradigm, throughout both Labyrinthe and Reprise, the 
characters’ inability to “know” and to communicate (knowledge or information) is 
highlighted rather than their knowledge demonstrated. This inability is demonstrated 
by the characters at several levels, beginning with that observation. While critics such 
as Roy Jay Nelson have seen in this lack of signification and significance a return to 
the absurd, due to “la lutte entre la raison humaine et la réalité multiple, inclassable, 
inexplicable,” it is worth remembering that Robbe-Grillet himself denied any 
recourse to the absurd. If one accepts his claim at face value, another interpretation is 
needed for this incapacity to know (401). 
When an affirmation is stated by the narrator, it is tends not to be stated as 
fact, but as observation: “grands tilleuls, qui…ont survecu aux bombardements sans 
mutliations ni blessures visibles” (Reprise loc. 532). Even as a third-person, 
presumably omniscient, narrator, he is unable to say definitively that, objectively, the 




narrator is recounting what he is seeing, but often his characters are limited in their 
ability to see or observe, and subsequently, to know. For instance, in La Reprise when 
the victim is assassinated, the protagonist is unable to place the direction of the 
gunshot based on the direction of the sound: “L’amplification du fracas par l’effet de 
résonance empêche d’en localiser l’origine comme aussi de supputer la nature exacte 
de l’arme qui l’a produit” (Reprise loc. 299). As for visual observation, “Les jumelles 
de guerre, comme l’avait prédit Pierre Garin, ne m’étaient d’aucun secours” (Reprise 
loc. 274). Because his powers of observation –seeing and hearing -- are not effective, 
he narrator is unable to establish any information about the identity and placement of 
the assassin. In Labyrinthe, both the narrator and the characters consistently remark 
on their difficulty seeing; in his description of the bedroom in the opening pages, he 
cannot tell whether an object is a knife or a flashlight because “il est difficile de 
l’interpréter; aucun relief en particulier n’est discernable” (Labyrinthe 20). 
Interestingly, here the narrator speaks of “interpreting;” normally in the production of 
knowledge the first step would be to observe and then to interpret, but the narrator 
points out that interpretation is impossible precisely because he is unable to complete 
the step of observation (“discerning”).  
When a narrator does make an affirmative observation, he either does not 
attempt to interpret the information -- to transform it into that which is “known” -- or 
he offers multiple interpretations, possibilities, and contradictions, all of which render 
impossible the type of objective essential knowledge targeted by Robbe-Grillet. 
Speaking about this narrative refusal to interpret, in one of his first televised 




qui voit” and who “refuse de beneficier de…ce rôle d’interprétation.” (“Jalousie” 
4:18-4:20, 6:46-6:55). Ben Stoltzfus states, “His novels are noteworthy indeed for 
their absence of analysis” (Stoltzfus “Objective Subjectivity” 499). 
One narrative technique by which Robbe-Grillet typically “demotes” man is 
through the use of contradictions conveyed by the narrator regarding his observations. 
From the very beginning of Labyrinthe, for example, the narration is full of 
contradictions. In the opening lines one finds this passage regarding the weather, or 
rather, observation by the narrator of the weather:  
Dehors il pleut, dehors on marche sous la pluie en courbant la tête, 
s’abritant les yeux d’une main tout en regardant quand même devant 
soi…dehors il fait froid, le vent souffle entre les branches noires 
dénudées; le vent souffle dans les feuilles, entraînant les rameaux 
entiers dans un balancement, balancement qui projette son ombre sur 
le crépi blanc des murs. Dehors il y a du soleil, il n’y a pas un arbre, ni 
un arbuste pour donner de l’ombre et l’on marche en plein soleil, 
s’abritant les yeux d’une main tout en regardant devant soi (Labyrinthe 
9). 
 
In just this paragraph there is a remarkable amount of seeming contradictions: 
Outside it is raining, or it is cold, or it is sunny; the branches of the trees are naked or 
there are leaves; they cast a shadow or there is no shadow or not even a tree. In just a 
few lines the narrator manages to negate nearly every statement he makes. The only 
image that remains intact throughout the passage is that of a pedestrian covering his 
eyes with his hand to protect them from the elements as he moves through the street. 
The observations in this passage do not allow for anything to be “known” 
about the state of the weather outdoors, because the observations contradict each 
other – there is no singular truth; furthermore, this indicates that perhaps the human is 




interpret these same observations; he merely makes them. He does not ultimately 
attempt to derive any particular conclusion or “truth” from the weather phenomena 
being observed; he simply recounts what he sees. In another passage, the narrator 
states, “il devient impossible de retrouver l’intonation qui paraissait à l’instant avoir 
un sens – crainte, ennui, doute, solicitude, intérêt quelconque –et seule demeure la 
contestation: “Vous n’avez pas mangé”” (Labyrinthe 64). In the absence of 
interpretation, and thus knowledge, all that remains is the observation. 
In La Reprise the narrator(s) emphasize this point even more directly, with the 
inclusion of notes as addenda to the story that put into question the veracity of any 
statements made by the characters and emphasize the faulty nature of memory. Much 
of that which the narrator states in the notes enters into direct opposition with the 
events recounted in the “main” part of the story. An exaggerated obsession with 
objective facts on the part of the commentator in the notes serves as a means of 
putting into question the very possibility of existence of such facts, as well as their 
importance:  
Le narrateur, lui-même sujet à caution…commet ici une légère erreur. 
Après avoir passé l’été sur une plage de la Baltique, Franz Kafka s’est 
installé à Berlin pour un ultime séjour, avec Dora cette fois-ci, en 
septembre 1923, et il est retourné à Prague en avril 1924, déjà presque 
mourant…Il y a ainsi 26 ans, et non 25, entre sa présence en ces lieux 
et celle de Kafka (Reprise loc. 241).  
 
In some the narrator goes so far as to impugn the integrity of the characters 
concerned: “Nous avons du mal à imaginer que la bonne foi du scrupuleux Ascher 
soit totale, dans cette prétendue mémoire défaillante, gommant comme par miracle 




into question, in a tongue-and-cheek way, the possibility of any observing human 
subject to “know” objectively and also diminishes his importance in this endeavor. 
Robbe-Grillet also plays with the idea of meaning and signification, portraying 
it as impossible or elusive for the characters attempting to pursue it. He therefore 
often depicts meaning as uncertain, changing, or impossible to obtain. Roch Smith 
notes in his reading of Labyrinthe that “meaning remains elusively resistant” (57). In 
Labyrinthe, when describing the position of the figures in the painting of the café, the 
narrator signals this, stating, “Leurs mimiques sont figés par les dessin, interrompus, 
arrêtés net en plein developpement, ce qui en rend la signification également très 
incertaine” (Labyrinthe 25). And not only does he portray meaning itself as elusive, 
but he often depicts characters as weak or struggling in the face of their attempts to 
derive meaning from observations or piece of information, whether verbal or visual. 
This is in direct opposition to the authoritative humanist human subject he envisions, 
whose knowledge is mastery. In these attempts the characters are unsuccessful more 
often than not.  
Or, meaning is simply marked as absent. For example, in Reprise, the 
protagonist overhears what seems to be an argument, of which he hears only the 
sounds of “un allemande guttural” in which he “identifie cependant le mot “morder” 
qui revient à plusieurs reprises, hurlé de plus en plus fort” (Reprise loc. 440). The 
protagonist thus hears a language, but from sounds, not words, which would contain 
meaning. The one indication of a word is singular – thus extracted and isolated from 
the context of the argument or conversation itself, which would also provide meaning 




unfamiliar with German – strictly as such, without any indication as to its 
signification. In Labyrinthe, the soldier is trying to determine whether someone has 
passed before him in the street, and decides that the footprints that he does not see 
does not mean anything: “Lorsqu’il parvient au carrefour suivant, aucune piste non 
plus ne sillonne les trottoirs de la voie transversale, et cela ne signifie rien non plus” 
(Labyrinthe 76). In fact, the notion of footprints is emphasized significantly in both 
books. This is interesting in that footprints are one of the most common tropes in 
detective novels as a “clue,” a material manifestation that provides important 
information that can be used through deductive reasoning to arrive at a definitive 
conclusion. Robbe-Grillet uses footprints in a subversive manner, reversing their role 
as a provider of concrete, objective information, to that which is demonstrative of 
meaninglessness and insignificance. Rather than constituting a step in the obtainment 
of concrete and objective knowledge, they lead only to the unknowable.  
It is not only the signification or meaning of information that characters are 
unable to discern; it is also the significance. When they obtain a piece of information, 
they find themselves incapable of being able to understand its importance, or even to 
determine whether it is important or insignificant. For example, in one scene in La 
Reprise, the protagonist (named Ascher in this section of text) confronts a guard as he 
tries to cross the frontier and encounters both the communication problem of not 
speaking the same language, and not being able to determine the significance of this 
problem: “Ascher parle avec faconde dans une langue approximative, dont il n’est pas 
certain que l’autre suive les méandres, ce qui lui semble sans importance” (Reprise 




his room in the night and stolen his affairs and asks himself, “mais dans quel but?” 
(Reprise loc. 401). The “why” of the act – its purpose, its significance, its motivation 
– remains unknown to the protagonist. In a passage in Labyrinthe, after an 
unsuccessful attempt to give the soldier the information he is looking for, the woman 
asks the soldier whether it is important, which he is unable to determine:  
Qu’est-ce que vous allez faire, demande enfin la femme, puisque 
vous avez perdu le nom de cette rue? 
-Je ne sais pas, dit le soldat 
-C’était pour une chose importante? 
-Oui…Non…Probablement (Labyrinthe 62).  
 
The same goes for their environment: “Robbe-Grillet’s fictions…start in a world that 
is inexpressive, deprived of essential significance” (Sturrock 216).  
In other instances, the futility of seeking information is emphasized. In 
Labyrinthe, the soldier who is looking for directions realizes that even if he were 
successful in obtaining a particular piece of information – the name of a street – this 
information would be of no use: “Du reste un nom de rue ne lui fournirait guere de 
renseignement utilisable, dans cette ville qu’il connait pas” (Labyrinthe 31). The 
information he seeks has no utility, no importance, and this is due, once again, to lack 
of knowledge – the fact that he does not know the city he is in. In another passage, the 
process of asking questions and receiving answers ends in a dead end: “Il n’a plus 
envie de répondre à cet interrogatoire qui ne mène à rien” (Labyrinthe 45). This 
reflects “the bewilderment felt by the reader…[as] the narrative provides no 
dependable answers to such questions” (Smith 56). Stoltzfus remarks on the futility of 
the search for meaning by the reader: “When you are trying to deliver ‘dead’ 




futility is…obvious” (Stoltzfus “Labyrinths” 300). In all of these instances, the 
importance, or significance, of the pursuit of knowledge is signaled as lacking. 
Robbe-Grillet thus refuses the importance attributed to the humanist knowledge-
seeking subject, removing human subject’s capacity for reason as his raison-d’être. It 
is interesting that this futile search for meaning is reflected in N. Katherine Hayles’s 
conception of narrative in posthumanist studies: “Stories help us to make sense of the 
world by giving shape to experiences that often seem chaotic, incoherent, or 
meaningless. Even narratives that subvert causality or deny meaning still create 
frameworks that orient us to a world in which the quest for meaning is itself part of 
the human condition, even if the quest is ultimately fruitless” (Van Puymbroeck and 
Hayles 25). 
This lack of significance applies to the characters themselves, as they have 
difficulty knowing or understanding their own purpose. In both books, characters are 
sent on missions without knowing where they are going, what the significance of the 
mission is, or what it is they are to do. For example, in Reprise, “le pseudo-Wallon,” 
wandering through the city to he place he does not know on a mission he does not 
understand, seems to envy the supposed purpose of the city’s denizens in contrast, 
who “se hâtent vers un objectif précis, raisonnable, et quotidien” (Reprise loc. 480). It 
is notable that the purported mission of the protagonist of Reprise is an investigation 
(“une enquête”), which can be understood of course as a search for information. “The 
man who is transmitting these “sacred” relics does so in vain and, in his attempt, dies 
a premature and violent death,” says Ben Stoltzfus; “is not Robbe-Grillet commenting 




That the entire novel is structured as a fruitless search for information serves to 
further cement the idea of the incapacity of the human subject to “know” definitively 
and objectively. The depiction of the central character wandering aimlessly through a 
foreign landscape serves the double purpose of de-centering the human from the 
center of knowledge -- by showing him as incapable of producing meaning, 
significance, or knowledge from his observations – and removing him from the top of 
the hierarchy over the material world, by eliminating his mastery over external 
elements in the material world, such as the structure of the city in which he circulates. 
Sturrock emphasizes the “foreign” nature of the city and the characters in them in 
Robbe-Grillet’s texts:  
Robbe-Grillet’s heroes or narrators are always strangers to the world 
they find themselves in – with the single exception of the husband in 
La Jalousie…Moreover as well as being strangers, they are also 
visitors, a status that foreshadows their ultimate release from a 
landscape whose presence is not altogether welcome to them (216). 
 
Sturrock takes goes a step further, seeing in the labyrinthine and fragmented 
landscape of Robbe-Grilletian texts a metaphor for man’s powerlessness in the 
obtainment of order and knowledge:  
Whenever Robbe-Grillet introduces roads, corridors, staircases and so 
on, he always does so in this fragmented and deliberately bewildering 
way. The progress of the narrator who tries to follow them and link 
them together into a coherent townscape or piece of architecture 
represents the will to find comfort in a definitive order of things. But 
the motion which Robbe-Grillet permits is only brief and fragmentary, 
each section of street, corridor, or the like, being simply the evidence 
of the mind’s frustration. (231). 
 
Indeed, in Robbe-Grillet’s labyrinths, knowing is impossible: “there are only neutral 
spaces of equal value that correspond to the shattered fragments of a universe in 




interpretation, I wish to avoid signaling metaphors, it is clear that the notion of human 
mastery over both knowledge and environment is destabilized through Robbe-
Grillet’s use of landscapes and positioning of characters within them. 
Finally, the notion of communicating that which is known is continually 
interrupted, faulty, defective, partial, or unsuccessful, either between characters in the 
story, between the narrator(s) and characters, or from the narrator to reader. 
Sometimes this lack of communication happens as a result of speaking different 
languages, but interestingly, in these cases the status of the ability of the speaker in 
each language is always changing. Rarely is a character presented as definitively not 
understanding a regional dialect or language; rather, he does not understand it now 
where he understood it before; or he is able to understand the local dialect but 
suddenly has less proficiency in his native language: “Maria, par chance, ne parlait ni 
ne comprenait le français. Et lui-même, déjà un peu perdu dans sa langue natale, avait 
cessé désormais d’entendre l’allemand” (Reprise loc. 587). Later, commentator states 
that “La jolie Maria…sait parfaitement le français, mais le cache avec soin, pour des 
raisons d’efficacité” (Reprise loc. 609). 
Often this (mis-)communication happens even when the language is 
understood to be French or at least a language understood by both speakers. In this 
instance it is more an inherent inability to communicate. For example, in La Reprise, 
the following dialogue occurs explicitly in French: 
-Bonjour Monsieur, est-ce que vous avez des chambres libres? 
… 
-Combien? 
-Vous voulez dire: combien d’argent? 
-Non. Combien de chambres! 




-Ca n’est pas evident: vous avez demande des chambres (Reprise loc. 558). 
 
This sort of miscommunication often happens when the protagonist explicitly asks for 
information, thus underscoring to what extent this lack of communication is related to 
a lack of knowing. In these instances, often the characters try to volunteer the name of 
a street but can’t quite remember the name. This inability to identify or to name is 
then both a problem of knowing (which is the street, which is the name of the street) 
and a problem of communication (inability to convey this information to the 
protagonist). Or there is silence: “[le] silence inhabituel au milieu duquel [un cri] 
s’élève…l’intérieur est très sombre, encore plus silencieux” (Reprise loc. 545).  
Interestingly, on this same page, the narrator cites a “bruit parasite,” which 
stays undisturbed by the cry, which could well be a reference to the “order from 
noise” principle posited by Heinz von Foerster, a founder of contemporary 
information theory, which is a field praised by Robbe-Grillet as having much 
potential for use in literary interpretation, including his own work, and which also 
serves as the basis for many aspects of posthumanist theory. The order from noise 
principle is also important in complexity and chaos studies (which are adopted by 
posthumanist critical theory). Very briefly, the theory states that self-organizing 
systems tend to organize themselves through random selections of actions in a 
feedback loop that connects the system to its environment. The attempts at making 
meaning here would constitute the tension between order and disorder, and the intent 
to impose order onto chaos described in Chapter 2. Indeed, “The attempts which he 




have a definite positive value,” says Sturrock, indicating that Robbe-Grillet is indeed 
depicting cognitive process in the face of complexity (189). 
Noise also has a key role to play in the notion of information, in various 
models of information and communication. In the “order from noise” principle, the 
transmission of messages is built upon information that must be actively extracted 
and constructed by the interlocuteurs from the randomness of a complex material 
world. These notions form the basis for models of communication in computer 
science, cognitive sciences, and cybernetics (from which Niklas Luhmann draws) that 
envision communication as happening between interlocuteurs that are other than 
human: human and machine; or machine to machine. The “parasite” aspect of this 
particular theory has been further examined by Michel Serres, who emphasizes the 
role of complexity in communication and the inefficacity of communication models 
that use the humanist human subject as their bases.24 In this way, with a single short 
phrase, Robbe-Grillet makes reference to the sort of theories that have been adopted 
by posthumanist theorists as useful for literary interpretation, points to models of 
communication that do not use the human as their most basic component, and 
demonstrates the ultimate incapacity of “humans” to know and to communicate, thus 
de-centering the human from this particular privileged place in his vision of the 
humanist paradigm.  
5.2 Repositioning Man vis-à-vis His Environment 
Robbe-Grillet also seeks to reposition man in terms of his environment, 
displacing him from a position of superiority and importance over the material world. 
                                                




Rather than being emphasized in a way that places the human characters above 
objects, animals, and the non-human in importance, equal weight and significance is 
given to humans and the non-human, especially objects. Nor are human characters 
depicted as integral, unified entities, distinct from the non-human, but are often 
confused with the non-human; the lines between them are blurred, with their plurality 
and fragmentation emphasized. Instead of displaying dominance over the material 
environment, the human characters are depicted as being diminished by it or victims 
of it.  
In both books, the human subject is also depicted as being subordinate to his 
external environment, at the mercy of his environment rather than a master of it. Both 
novels feature a protagonist wandering through a city unknown to him, which is at 
least partially in ruins. Neither protagonist knows exactly where he is going or why 
and keeps winding up lost. The notion of “labyrinth” is this central to this idea. 
Indeed, for some critics the labyrinth is emblematic of man’s decentering in the 
modern world and its corresponding depiction in art generally; Stoltzfus says,  
If structuralism, among other philosophies, has demystified the world, 
and art is full of relative spaces without presumptive centers, then 
man, by the force of circumstance (hence the fear and the anger), is 
compelled to seek new answers to the age-old problem of living. The 
anxiety of modern man reflects the fact that he has not yet been able to 
adapt to the fast pace of a rapidly changing world in which the 
“center” of values has shifted and in which everything seems relative. 
(“Labyrinths” 302). 
  
In this paradigm, “to escape from the labyrinth is to find answers” (Stoltzfus 
“Labyrinths” 307). It is notable, then, that Robbe-Grillet’s characters never do. In this 




knowing are intertwined. In Reprise, in the train station, the narrator says, 
“j’emprunte le souterrain qui donne accès aux différentes voies et, dans ma 
précipitation, je me trompe de sens,” in a passage that also links the imposition of the 
physical landscape over man and man’s lack of knowledge (Reprise loc. 173). 
For example, in the opening passage from Labyrinthe, the one unchanging 
element is the image of a human figure raising his hands to his eyes in a gesture of 
protection from the weather – whatever it may be. This is significant for a couple of 
reasons. Firstly, in this passage, the human figure is secondary to that of the external 
world. Much more space is given to the non-human in the passage than to the human 
figure. The description concentrates mainly on the weather patterns and the (possibly 
inexistent) tree, with the human figure constituting only the smallest detail of the 
descriptive passage. The human figure is not the focus of the observation or narration; 
rather the non-human is.  
Secondly, the human figure is depicted as being at the mercy of these elements. 
In Chapter 3, I described Robbe-Grillet’s notion of the humanist divide between 
Nature and Culture, in which man is depicted as having mastery over “nature” or that 
which is external to him. In the description that constitutes the opening passages of 
Labyrinthe, by contrast, man is at the mercy of the elements, making an almost futile 
gesture of protection; he is not its master. From the very beginning of the book, man 
has been “demoted,” his lack of dominance and mastery over the material world 
exposed. In this short passage, it is the material world that has mastery over man; 
instead of having power over nature, he is powerless in the face of it. Similar scenes 




suitable train compartment; he attempts to cross borders but then realize the place 
where he finds himself is not at all where he thought he was (Reprise loc. 30-173, loc. 
480). In this way, man is depicted as not having mastery over his environment. 
But nor is he a victim of it. In the type of realist literature criticized by Robbe-
Grillet, such a description of the extremeness of outdoor elements would be listed 
only insofar as they had consequences for the human subject; for example Jack 
London’s evocative descriptions of the cold in “To Build a Fire” are elicited 
exclusively in view of their (ultimately fatal) effect on the main character. To speak 
about man in terms of victimization is to have recourse to the humanist tragedy 
Robbe-Grillet criticizes in “Nature, Humansime, Tragédie.” Sturrock observes that 
“certainly, there are many moments in his fiction when Robbe-Grillet seems to 
be…showing the individual in futile conflict with the universe; at the same time, this 
rupture is exploited not for tragic ends but for mediocre or burlesque ones” (195).  
In Labyrinthe there are no consequences for the human figure attempting to 
protect himself against the elements; the reader does not know and the author does 
not seem to care whether this situation is of any consequence for the human subject 
depicted in it. This element of the story follows no thread and leads to no conclusions 
about the figure; as Stoltzfus notes, if man is dominated by his environment, the 
effect of this relationship is of no consequence: “These heroes either die in the 
labyrinth or are trapped by it, unable to find a center or an exit. They wander, 
repeating empty gestures in a space and time that have become meaningless” 




The human character is “demoted” – not superior to the other elements of the 
scene, and showing no mastery or domination over his environment. His lack of 
importance or particular significance is emphasized in that no emphasis is made on 
what effect the weather has on him, for better or worse, or what the future outcome of 
the situation for him. The narrator does not appear to care about the “destiny” of the 
character in question. The man simply appears and is listed as a part of the scene, one 
object among others; his goals, his preoccupations, his fate are not important enough 
to become a focus of the storyline. The non-human and the human are equal focal 
points of the scene. That the ultimate end of the human characters is not important is 
reinforced by Robbe-Grillet himself. At the end of the book, the reader discovers that 
the soldier protagonist is dead, and the narrator is likely at once the doctor who tends 
to him and the author of the text. Commenting on this development, Robbe-Grillet 
says, “Rien n’est résolu à la fin de Labyrinthe, on ne révèle dans les dernières pages 
que des choses sans importance, de petits fait adjacents et dérisoires” (Heath 141).  
Indeed, often in Robbe-Grillet’s descriptive passages, equal if not more space 
is given to objects rather than human beings. Just after the previously cited passage, 
the narration goes on to describe in great detail the interior of a house, returning from 
time to time to the weather outdoors. The descriptions focus painstakingly on 
geometric and concrete details of the objects that occupy the house:  
La fine poussière qui ternit le brillant des surfaces horizontales, le bois 
verni de la table, le plancher ciré, le marbre de la cheminée, celui de la 
commode, le marbre fêlé de la commode, la seule poussière provient 
de la chambre elle-même: des raies du plancher peut-être, ou bien du 





Over the seven following pages, a human subject is never once mentioned, with the 
exception of a couple of oblique references to an anterior action that would have been 
carried out by a person -- and even then referred to only as a supposition (“comme 
par”), not as a certainty: “[rings on the table are] plus qu’à demi effacée, comme par 
un coup de chiffon” (Labyrinthe 14). From the opening of the book, then, the human 
is established as secondary, both by dint of his absence in the majority of the opening 
passages, and by the references that refer to him only insofar as he has influenced the 
state of the objects that are the real focus of the description: a pair of shoes that has 
made shiny spots on the floor, marks left on the table by the setting down of an 
ashtray, and so on.  
 The manner in which the human subject is depicted when it is present is also 
significant. When human beings are present on the scene, they are often described or 
presented in ways that diminish their importance compared to the elements of the 
material world surrounding them. They are attributed the same importance as the 
objects that surround them by dint of the space they take up in the narration, the focus 
of the narration, and the manner in which they are presented.  
Usually the narrator presents human figures in an equivalent manner to the 
objects around them; humans and objects are given equal weight and place in the 
narrative descriptions. Additionally, the human figure is not attributed any particular 
qualities or signification that do not also belong to objects. For example, in 
Labyrinthe, when describing the appearance of a woman in a doorway, the narrator 
focuses first on her dress before moving to a description of her face and eyes, 




both: “Le bas du tablier est très ample, ainsi que la jupe, tandis que le haut n’est 
qu’un simple carré de toile protégeant le devant du corsage. Le visage a des lignes 
régulières, très accusés. Les cheveux sont noirs. Mais les yeux ont une teinte claire, 
dans le bleu-vert ou gris-bleu” (Labyrinthe 63). The narrator describes the object (the 
clothing) in terms of form and color, and does the same with the features of the 
woman (eyes and hair). He avoids emphasizing the “human” elements (the face) more 
than the object (the dress), and does not attempt any interpretation of emotion or 
thought on the part of the woman based on those features, any more than he does for 
the objects. In another passage, the narrator states more directly that representation of 
human figures has no more importance than any other type of motif representing an 
object: “Quant au papier peint lui-même, les innombrables et minuscules tâches qui 
en constituent le motif n’y conservent pas plus une forme de flambeau que de fleur, 
de silhouette humaine, de poignard, bec de gaz, ou n’importe quoi” (Labyrinthe 80). 
 In addition, depictions of human figures are often mixed with that of objects 
or presented as being part of objects; the boundaries between human and object tend 
to be blurred; they are not two distinct entities different from one another but are 
instead a part of one another. This occurs both at the level of the narration and the 
storyline, when humans are depicted as being part of an object of art. For example, 
human figures appear on wallpaper in the bedroom; in another scene, in a painting. 
However, the mixing of the object with the human does not always take place as part 
of a depiction of artistic representation. It also occurs at the level of the narrative: “Il 




avec la colonne de fonte contre laquelle sa hanche et son bras droit s’appuient” 
(Labyrinthe 42).  
Further emphasizing this blurring of boundaries between human and object, 
when the image of a human figure does occur, whether at the level of narrative 
observation or as a depiction of artistic representation, it is often indistinguishable or 
imprecise, the human form never being definitively delineated or discerned by the 
observer. For example, an observer looking at a human figure represented in a photo 
(an example of the human appearing as artistic representation) is unable to discern 
features: “Le soldat regarde encore le portrait sur le mur du fond: à cette distance, les 
traits du visage sont tout à fait indistincts” (Labyrinthe 89). And within the storyline, 
there are many instances of the observer not being able to distinguish the human form 
of another individual. For example, “[L’enfant] n’est d’abord qu’une silhouette 
indistincte, une tâche noire irrégulière qui se rapproche, assez vite, en suivant 
l’extrême bord du trottoir” (Labyrinthe 41). This occurs not only with visual 
perception but also with sound: “…faisant même douter qu’il s’agisse à coup sûr 
d’une voix humaine” (Labyrinthe 53).  
Often the narrating observer is not only unable to distinguish the boundaries 
and form of an image of the human figure but is also depicted as unable or struggling 
even to interpret as being human or a representation of a human as opposed to an 
object. In these instances, the observer cannot decide between whether the object of 
his observation is human or non-human. For example, in the passage following the 
opening (the seven pages of description of objects before the presentation of the first 




be a dagger, and the human form is “vague:” “Ou bien ce serait une figurine 
vaguement humaine: une tête ovale, deux bras très courts, et le corps se terminant en 
pointe vers le bas. Ce pourrait être aussi un poignard, avec son manche séparé par une 
garde de la forte lame obtuse à deux tranchants” (Labyrinthe 13). This serves two 
functions: firstly, from the viewpoint of the observer, to demonstrate the limits of 
human perception and therefore knowledge; to decenter the humanist human from his 
position as the generator and measure of that which constitutes knowledge. A 
(presumably) human observer who is not able to know what it is he is observing 
demonstrates his incapacity or limitations for knowing.  
Secondly, it places humans at the same level of importance as non-human 
objects; one is just as likely as the other; one can be replaced by the other; they are 
interchangeable. The human is not brought to the forefront; his presence is not 
privileged; he is on the same level, equally present and equally important as an object. 
If, returning to Luhmann’s model, the observer can be read as a cognizing system 
interpreting his observations by selecting one possibility among several, this 
demonstrates that the human is but one possibility among a plethora of others. Others 
may be non-human; the human option contains no particular significance or 
importance; it is not privileged by the observer. The human element is but one 
possibility for interpretation, and one that is not any more likely or significant than 
any other. 
Moreover, often, when actual humans are represented in the text (as seen in 




are much more applicable to objects, especially objects of art, than to actual human 
beings.  
Ils n’ont bougé ni l’un ni l’autre. L’enfant est toujours debout dans la 
pénombre, les bras le long du corps. Il n’a même pas vu remuer les 
lèvres de l’homme, assis à la table sous l’unique ampoule restée 
allumée dans la sale; la tête n’a pas eu le moindre hochement, les yeux 
n’ont même pas cillé; et la bouche est toujours close (Labyrinthe 30).  
 
Elsewhere in the text, an unnamed woman “reste immobile à contempler [le soldat]”; 
the child leading the soldier “se tient immobile” (Labyrinthe 57, 65). In Reprise, the 
narrator recounts a bizarre and awkward moment he comes across as he tries to find a 
compartment on a train:  
Il y avait là six hommes…qui se sont immobilisés d’un seul coup à 
mon entrée, dans la posture où je venais de les surprendre; l’un s’était 
mis debout, les deux bras levés au ciel dans un geste d’imprécation, un 
autre, assis, tendait le poing gauche, coude à demi replié, son voisin 
pointait vers lui ses deux index, de part et d’autre de la tête, imitant les 
cornes du diable ou d’un taureau prêt à charger; un quatrième se 
détournait avec un air de tristesse infinie, tandis que son vis-à-vis 
penchait le buste en avant pour se prendre le visage à deux mains 
(Reprise loc. 2018).  
 
This serves the purpose of reinforcing the notion of the human subject in the text as 
art object.  
Moreover, in the instances when human beings are fully present and fully 
observable, they are commonly not presented as an integral whole but as fragments. 
The narrator often reveals a human character by way of enumerating various body 
parts rather than referring to him in terms that would be used for a unified, bounded, 
individual. For example, in the opening of the book when the main character of 
soldier is finally presented, after seven pages of description of material objects, he is 




enumerating body parts does the narration use the word “man:” “Un peu plus haut, 
une hanche, un bras, une épaule s’appuient contre le fût du réverbère. L’homme est 
vêtu d’une capote militaire de teinte douteuse” (Labyrinthe 16). When juxtaposed 
with the text that immediately precedes it, one sees again the description that passes 
from object to human being with no particular transition between the two that would 
signal that one is any different from the other or has any more significance than the 
other: “contre la base conique du support en fonte, évasée vers le bas…s’enroulent de 
maigres rameaux d’un lierre…tiges ondulées, feuilles palmées à cinq lobes pointus et 
cinq nervures très apparentes, où la peinture noire qui s’écaille laisse voir le métal 
rouillé” (Labyrinthe 16). The parts of man and parts of the streetlight are enumerated 
in the same detached manner that does not attribute any particular value to either.  
5.3 Decentering as Absence 
In all of the description that follows the previously cited passage, what is 
perhaps most remarkable is the complete absence of a human subject – both in the 
narration and in the storyline, such as it is. With the exception of the narrative “je” at 
the very beginning of the text, for seven pages only objects are mentioned and no 
human beings are present on the scene.  However, the very first word of the opening 
page is “je:” “Je suis seul ici maintenant, bien à l’abri” (Labyrinthe 9). The narrator 
does not refer to himself again for nearly the entirety of the book, until the closing, 
when the word “moi” is used.  
The fact that first-person pronouns are used by the narrator to refer to himself 
at the opening and closing of the book is significant. On one hand, it establishes a 




and end of the book seems to imply his continued presence throughout the book. 
However the fact that the narrator is almost entirely absent from the narration with the 
exception of these references is also significant. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, 
absence is a major aspect of Robbe-Grillet’s attempt at decentering the human subject 
and dismantling humanist principles. Keeping the narrator largely absent from the 
book may then be seen as an explicit strategy to eliminate the traditional human 
subject at the center of the novel; neither the characters on scene or the narrator are 
fully present. Rather, Robbe-Grillet’s primary reason for highlighting the narrative 
“je” is to emphasize the notion of literary creation, since, as the reader later learns, the 
entire text is in the process of being composed by an anonymous author, a process to 
which the reader is witness. The focus of the book entails the creation of the novel 
itself more so than the actions of a particular human being, including the author-
narrator. Rather than emphasizing the human element in the narrative with the “je” 
and “moi,” then, Robbe-Grillet is emphasizing the notion of writing and process in 
writing. He further emphasizes this point in the preface to the text of Labyrinthe, 
simultaneously valorizing the invention of the text and (devalorizing) the idea of 
“witnessing” objective truth: “Ce recit est une fiction, non un temoignage” 
(Labyrinthe 7). Smith agrees that the main subject is the creation of the text: “If the 
painting in the café has any significance it is “not for what it represents or for any 
symbolic value but for its role in generating further narrative and, most important, for 
what it truly depicts: the narrative process at work in this novel” (53).  
It is not just the author-narrator who is largely absent, but also the characters. 




than their presence. The description focuses on empty streets, seemingly empty 
houses, deserted sidewalks: “La rue est déserte: ni voitures sur la chaussée, ni piétons 
sur les trottoirs;” “Wallon s’en rend compte à présent: depuis qu’il est entré dans cette 
rue provincial, à l’écart de tout trafic, il n’a plus rencontré âme qui vive ni entendu 
quoi que ce soit” (Labyrinthe 23, Reprise loc. 545). Sometimes the emphasis on 
absence is stated explicitly in terms of human beings: “Toute la scène demeure vide: 
sans un homme, ni une femme, ni même un enfant” (Labyrinthe 24). Absence is also 
evoked in the form of human characters having just disappeared: “Un gris jaunâtre, 
produit par le piétinement de personnages maintenant disparus” (Labyrinthe 18). The 
use of “personnages” rather than “personnes” here is interesting in that it signals the 
idea of human characters as being literary creations more so than human beings that 
are “believable” as real or relatable to the reader. In La Reprise, the narrator is much 
more present than in Labyrinthe, but the other characters are absent; again, the 
protagonist wanders through empty streets: “Et personne n’apparaît, sur toute la 
longueur de la rue, non plus que dans les artères laterals qu’elle coupe à l’angle droit, 
pareillement détruites et désertes” (Reprise loc. 440). 
Interestingly, this absence is often described in terms of objects. In the absence 
of human characters, the narrator tends to emphasize the remaining objects or the 
material world rather than the lack of human beings. For example, as previously 
noted, footprints in the snow is a recurring motif throughout Labyrinthe and occurs in 
both books. As with the opening passage and the “coup de chiffon,” the footprints 
indicate the actions of a human being who has been present on the scene but is no 




always concentrates on the forms and patterns of the snow and of the shoe rather than 
any human element:  
Les quelques pas qui rejoignent le sentier montrent avec précision le 
dessin des semelles: une série de chevrons prégnant toute la largeur du 
pied, et sous le talon, une croix imprimée en creux au milieu d’un rond 
en relief…au milieu d’une dépression circulaire creusée dans le 
caoutchouc (un deuxième trou rond, beaucoup moins profond et de 
très faible diamètre), marquant peut-être encore le centre de la croix, 
avec la pointure indiquée par des chiffres en relief: trente-deux, trente-
trois, peut-être, ou trente-quatre (Labyrinthe 51).  
 
And in La Reprise: “La trace de ses pas…Je peux voir ainsi qu’il porte des espadrilles 
de plage semblables aux miennes, avec une semelle caoutchoutée dont les dessins en 
creux sont exactement identiques. La pointure aussi, d’ailleurs” (Reprise 134). In all 
of these cases, the human aspect of this manifestation is not foregrounded, but 
addressed almost as an afterthought, with the physical description of the material 
world taking the primary place in the narration. 
In other instances, the narrator discusses the fact that although humans may be 
present, or have been recently present, it is as if they were absent or perhaps never 
there at all. They are almost “erased” from the narration. For example, in several 
passages, snow covers the footprints again to make it as if the human being had never 
been there:  
Et derrière lui, la neige aussitôt commence à recouvrir la trace cloutée 
des semelles, reconstituant peu à peu la blancheur primitive de la zone 
écrasée…si bien que la différence de niveau devient imperceptible 
avec le régions avoisinantes, la continuité se trouvant alors rétablie, et 
toute la surface égale de nouveau, intacte, inentamée (Labyrinthe 75-
76).  
 
In La Reprise the same footprints on the sand “n’a pas encore été effacée par les 




street show no signs of life and seem uninhabited even though the narrator presumes 
they must be: “Toute la maison a l’air inhabitée” (Labyrinthe 58). In La Reprise, one 
of the characters that should engage the most interest – the murder victim -- 
disappears from the scene: “Je retourne à la fenêtre sans chassis de l’autre pièce. Je 
constate aussitôt que le cadavre a disparu, devant le monument fantôme” (Reprise loc. 
340). 
In this way even when humans are (presumably) present, it is as if they are 
absent. Emphasizing the description of the physical world, one in which human 
beings are largely absent, removes the human from the focus of the narration. In 
many instances, the narrator indicates that the presence of a human being may as well 
be their absence, as in the houses that are not unoccupied but might as well be. In this 
way human presence is equated with absence, signaling that one is equally likely or 
as meaningful as the other, thus removing the significance of the human figure in the 
narration. Finally, in the instances where the natural elements cover up or remove any 
trace of human presence, as in the snow-covered footprints, the narrator is not only 
once again removing the idea of the human characters having any particular 
significance (human beings leave no lasting impression, no legacy, no permanent 
mark on the material world, nor in the narrative); but it is also yet another instance of 
demonstrating the dominance of the physical world over that of the human; in the 





Indeed, in a different passage from Labyrinthe recounting the form of 
footprints in the snow, the narrator indicates to what extent the human element of this 
motif is insignificant:  
Les déformations provoquées par la course, jointes aux incertitudes 
concernant les particularités de celle-ci, font que rien, en somme, ne 
différencie cette piste de n’importe quelle autre laissée par une enfant 
du même âge – qui porterait aussi bien, d’ailleurs, des chaussures aux 
semelles identiques (les mêmes chaussures, peut-être, venant du même 
magasin) et qui effectuerait autour des lampadaires de semblables 
tournoiements (Labyrinthe 77). 
 
The human is not particularly significant; he is a fictional invention that is both 
replaceable and repeatable. Indeed, characters often have doubles or multiples that are 
very similar if not totally identical. This serves to emphasize the lack of individuality 
and integrality of each character, as well as emphasize the created nature of their 
existence -- they are characters in a text, not supposed to be believed as being real 
people. Indeed, “Robbe-Grillet loses no opportunity of reminding his readers that the 
characters of his novels are actors, not real people” (Sturrock 173). Seen from this 
angle, the ultimate focus of the text always returns to textual creation rather than the 
“fate” of any human character. While the text may question what it means to be 
human, it concentrates more on the notion of textual creation in examining the 
question than it does with the story of the type individual human subject Robbe-
Grillet sees as humanist. The same is emphasized in Reprise, where the narrator 
signals directly the invented nature of the text with such statements as “ le monument 
fictif” and “le visage ressemble à celui du vieillard de bronze, ce qui ne veut rien dire, 
puisque je l’avais moi-même inventé” (Reprise loc. 353, 313). With this narrative 




limite le sujet du livre” (Robbe-Grillet PUNR 30). This passage also highlights the 
character’s inability to know, with the questions in parentheses; he does not know 
where this may have taken place, or how, or who may have spoken.  
5.4 Fragmented and Plural Figures 
In opposition to the bounded and unitary figure of the humanist subject, the 
fragmented human appears at numerous points throughout Robbe-Grillet’s novels, 
particularly in Labyrinthe. In many instances the references to the human body stays 
fragmented, with the narrator never acknowledging their appurtenance to a cohesive 
whole (unlike the previous citation, in which “man” is mentioned after listing the 
different body parts). For example, in a scene in which three adults are discussing 
directions for the soldier, observed through a crack in the door by the child character, 
all parties are presented fragmentally, with pieces of their bodies standing in for their 
presence: the man and woman are “la voix d’homme” and “la voix grave de la 
femme,” respectively, and the child peering through the crack in the door is presented 
as “l’oeil de l’enfant [qui] arrive au niveau du bouton du porte” (Labyrinthe 82). It is 
worth noting that in the continuation of this last citation, once again, the narrator’s 
focus jumps from human to object, moving from the child to the details of the door, 
thus attributing equal importance and place to both: “bouton de porte, ovoïde en 
porcelaine blanche. De l’autre cote, un interrupteur électrique, également en 
porcelaine, est fixé près du chambranle” (Labyrinthe 82). The focus of this scene is 
not the conversation between adults, nor the child’s observation of it, but a narrator’s 




By dint of their anonymity and interchangeability the human characters stand 
in direct contrast to the human characters that Robbe-Grillet sees as being emblematic 
of realist literature and its humanist “profondeur.” In the humanist paradigm, Robbe-
Grillet emphasizes that such characters must have backstories, names, and 
backgrounds that show their place in society, their pedigree, and so on. The characters 
in Labyrinthe essentially constitute the antithesis of this model. All of them are 
nameless; the most specific designation that any characters receive is that of their 
profession (the bartender at the café, the soldier), whereas others are even more 
generically referred to as “man,” “woman,” and “child.” The narrator’s use of 
pronouns also helps to preserve their anonymity; the narrator often goes so far as to 
use the more generic pronoun “on,” rather than “il” or “elle” to designate a person (or 
people). The narrator establishes this from the very opening of the book, in the second 
line: “dehors on marche sous la pluie en courbant la tête, s’abritant les yeux d’une 
main tout en regardant quand même devant soi” (Labyrinthe 9). This is significant 
because “on” is perhaps the least specific designation possible; its antecedent can be 
male, female, or both; singular or plural; include the speaker or even the reader; or 
refer only to third person entities. Use of this pronoun by the narrator therefore results 
in a minimum of individuating information being given about the human characters, 
thus keeping their anonymity to a maximum.  
In addition to revealing a minimum of information about any particular 
character, use of this pronoun also serves to dismantle the unitary bounded integral 
human subject. By insisting on a pronoun that can stand in for so many characteristics 




lines between standard binaries characteristic to the humanist conception of an 
individual and integral human subject (male/female, one/more than one), thus 
presenting a human subject that is open to multiple possibilities at once (plural 
genders, plural in number). 
Indeed, generally speaking, in both books, the characters are not singular 
entities but are presented as pluralities, characterized by multiplicity. I have already 
addressed the notion of multiplicity generally in his texts, so I will not elaborate on it 
much here; I will simply give a few examples that demonstrate to what extent the 
human subject put on scene in these texts can be considered to be a multiple subject. 
In Laybrinthe, the soldier and the child are presented in scenes that are repetitions of 
previous ones – presented again and again in variations on a theme. 
In La Reprise, the multiplicity is even more evident. The main character is 
named, rather than anonymous (while most of the other characters retain their 
anonymity). Unlike the characters in Labyrinthe, background information about the 
main character is provided: specific memories of his childhood, the fact that he grew 
up in Brest, his physical appearance. However, the names and details change 
throughout the book. The main character is alternatively known by both the other 
characters in the book and by the narrator as Henri Robin, H.R., Ascher, Franck 
Matthieu, Boris Wallon, and so on. He has multiple nationalities and multiple 
passports – ostensibly as a cover, but without having any “true” identity either. The 
anonymous commentator of the notes even states this point directly: “Le point de vue 
reste toujours bel et bien celui de notre sujet multinominal et volontiers pseudonyme” 




person “je” as spoken by Wall/Henri/etc. to a third-person omniscient narrator who 
seems to work for the same organization as the protagonist, to a commentator adding 
notes to the story who refers to himself as “nous,” indicating a plural presence. In 
Labyrinthe, the narrator, character, and author are all combined in the person of the 
doctor, who speaks both in first person and third person omniscient voices. 
Thus, Robbe-Grillet “decenters” and “demotes” man from his position in 
regards to the environment and to knowledge, putting in place in his fiction a 
manifestation of a theoretical vision. It is clear to see that the human subject thus 
depicted in his texts reflects closely the vision of the posthuman subject described by 
Alan France, who speaks about what constitutes the “distritributed identities" of the 
posthuman: "'multiple personas' -- short-lived fragmented frames of consciousness, 
each used to negotiate whatever virtual world or network they happen to be in at any 
particular moment of time..." and resulting in a "freeing up of human consciousness 
to be more playful, flexible, and even transient . . ." and "a more interdependent and 
embedded means of perceiving reality" (France 181). Such multiple, unbounded 
figures also constitute precisely type of subject-as-cognizing-system conceived in 






Chapter 6:  Posthumanist Subjectivity – Representations of 
Luhmannian Perception and Cognition in Le Voyeur and 
Souvenirs du triangle d’or 
 
6.1 Niklas Luhmann and Alain Robbe-Grillet 
Thus far, I have evaluated Robbe-Grillet’s work from the standpoint of his 
opposition to humanism and the affirmative alternatives he proposes in their stead, 
regarding humanism generally and for the placement of the human subject. I 
examined the idea of knowledge as it relates to the positioning of the human subject 
in Chapters 3 and 5, highlighting how Robbe-Grillet’s emphasis on the limitations of 
such knowledge serves to re-position the human subject in terms of its episteme and 
its environment. But there is another aspect to the “sense-making” subject that 
constitutes the pursuit of knowledge, and that is the operations of the cognitive 
processes at work. In this chapter I propose a reading of two of Robbe-Grillet’s texts 
following Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory of communication. This theory 
addresses the primacy of the idea of cognitive processing in Robbe-Grillet’s work and 
his a-humanist tendencies, both of which are at the heart of Robbe-Grillet’s project, 
while respecting the affirmations he has made in opposition to humanist principles. 
Interestingly, Ben Stoltzfus has also (briefly) used Luhmann’s theory to evaluate 
Robbe-Grillet’s work from the perspective of self-reflexivity.25 Moreover, Ira 
Livingston has signaled the growing use of Luhmann in cultural studies as part of the 
“[expansion of] the interzone between, on one hand, self-reference and performativity 
                                                




in literary and cultural theory and, on the other, related notions of autopoiesis and 
self-organizing systems in biology and other sciences and social sciences” (1).  
 That mental processes are at the heart of the Robbe-Grilletian project is long 
established; critics have conducted numerous phenomenological studies of his works, 
attempting to address the extreme subjectivity in his works and its relationship to 
realit(ies):  
Many of the difficulties which people have experienced in 
understanding or interpreting the novels of Robbe-Grillet stem simply 
from the fact that it is easy to forget, so conditioned are we to the view 
that languge must represent a pre-existent and transcendent reality, that 
the reality of these novels is an immanent one, a subjective one in 
which existence precedes essence and in which the significance of any 
phenomenon can only be determined as the novel proceeds 
[contingency], by close study of the way these phenomena are 
deployed and transformed by consciousness (Sturrock 172).  
 
That processes of consciousness or cognition are central to Robbe-Grillet’s work is 
further demonstrated by the insistence of early critics on producing psychoanalytical 
interpretations of his work, in which objects were proposed as supports for the 
psychological operations of the mind – jealously, sexual impulses, desire, and so 
forth. However, “to treat Robbe-Grillet’s fiction as serious psychoanalytical material 
would be a preposterous mistake,” says Sturrock (234). Another mode of 
interpretation is needed, then, one that would address the importance of the notion of 
an observing consciousness, which has been invoked in Robbe-Grillet’s works from 
the very beginning, while also engaging directly with his a-humanist approach: 
“Roland Barthes louait, à juste titre, dans Les Gommes, la volonté de l’auteur de 




comme il semble correct de le faire, que ces yeux sont ceux d’une conscience 
observatrice…” (Morrissette Romans 40).  
I suggest that Niklas Luhmann’s model of cognition may provide a 
particularly useful interpretive model for understanding this aspect of Robbe-Grillet’s 
texts. One major element of posthumanist theory that was adopted from non-
humanities fields is that of systems theory. With the human displaced as the lynchpin 
of understanding of society’s operations, a new explanation society, not based on the 
human, is needed. Many posthumanist scholars, including Cary Wolfe, Katherine 
Hayles, Bruce Clarke, and Stefen Herbrechter have found potential in systems theory, 
and in particular the version adapted by Niklas Luhmann, a German sociologist. One 
of the most promising and often-cited adaptations of systems theory for use as a 
general posthumanist framework of social operations is Niklas Luhmann’s theory of 
communication, which also serves as social and cognitive theory. In his book 
Neocybernetics and Narrative, Bruce Clarke signals the utility of this theory for 
narrative studies:  
This…line of systems discourse has borne the widest and most 
promising dissemination beyond the home disciplines of cybernetics, 
and the most searching theoretical development beyond science proper 
and into the discursive disciplines. For the kind of work done in the 
posthumanities, Luhmann’s social systems theory in particular 
represents the second-order line’s most thorough unfolding to date 
(Clarke Neocybernetics loc. 52-65). 
 
Luhmann’s goal was to create a “supertheory” that would tie together other major 
theories and offer an all-encompassing theory of society. An ambitious goal, this 
resulted in a generalized and highly adaptable theory that posthumanist scholars like 




on phenomenology, systems theory, and autopoeisis to provide a new framework for 
society and communication that does not use the “human being” as the basic unit of 
its operations. As Moeller notes, “Systems theory recognizes that the world – or 
rather society – can no longer be aptly understood as a human one” (5). In their essay 
explaining the “cognizing system” in constructivist approaches, Niall Palfreyman and 
Janice Miller-Young state, “We do not presuppose a neurological substrate for 
autonomous cognition. If autonomy is naturally feasible, we think it should, at least in 
principle, apply to bacteria, which perform complex and spontaneous cognition-based 
operations” (Palfreyman and Miller-Young 363). His theory could be quite useful for 
reading Robbe-Grillet, with its a-humanist approach to perception and sense-making, 
which, as outlined in Chapter 2, is a major element of Robbe-Grillet’s work. In 
contrast to other theories of cognition, such as phenomenology, Luhmann’s theory is 
explicitly a-humanist and removes the human being from the center of operations 
while at the same time postulating the notion of “human being” as a plural and/or 
fragmented figure -- a perfect scenario for evaluating the Robbe-Grilletian subject. In 
fact, Clarke makes the case for application of Luhmann’s theory to narrative (over 
narratology) for this very reason: “In their prodigious variety, systems may be 
physical or technological, biological or cultural, natural or designed, or some 
combination of these. Unlike stories, nothing restricts the nature of systems to 
“man’s” dominion” (Clarke Neocybernetics loc. 298). 
Luhmann was attempting to create a theoretical framework based on his 
observations and his readings of human history that explained the processes he 




admission, attempted to do much the same with his theoretical and fictional works, 
and for much the same reasons. Furthermore, the two were historically concurrent; 
their observations were of more or less the same world and motivated by many of the 
same factors, including theoretical developments in the sciences and technological 
development generally. Like Robbe-Grillet and his literary project, Luhmann’s desire 
for such a theory was notably motivated at least in part by his dissatisfaction with the 
ability of contemporary theories to explain the full range of human behavior and 
organization he observed around him. As noted in the first chapter, with Robbe-
Grillet’s scientific background, he was likely familiar with many of the scientific 
theories in the course of their development, including systems theory. In fact, Robbe-
Grillet has even described narrative in terms of scientific systems, describing “le 
systeme balzacien” in the following terms:  
Alors à la fin des temps, quand les particules chaudes et les particules 
froides se seront déplacées une fois, deux fois, dix mille fois, etc., on 
va arriver à un état où l’énergie sera toujours la même…c’est ce qu’on 
appelle la mort par entropie du système. L’entropie d’un système – 
d’un système clos bien sûr – est donc la tendance du système a 
produire du travail de plus en plus difficilement (“Ordre et désordre” 
loc. 2306).  
 
It is not inconceivable that the two arrived at similar conclusions about the 
functioning of human systems in the world, and it is interesting to see to what extent 
Robbe-Grillet’s writings parallel Luhmann’s ideas. For example, like Robbe-Grillet, 
Luhmann criticizes the notion of a transcendent essential nature being the driving 
force behind the organization of the socioeconomic status quo, as well as the 




Luhmann and Robbe-Grillet both signal the manner in which notions of society 
had heretofore been structured around these ideas. Luhmann refers to this nature as “a 
central phantom that seems to guarantee the unity of the system,” while, as we have 
seen, Robbe-Grillet often uses the term “naturalité” (“Globalization” 69; “Sur le 
choix des générateurs” 159). Also like Robbe-Grillet, Luhmann criticizes the notion 
of the human subject as the basic unit of measure of society. As Moeller notes,  
The primary starting point of social systems theory – or its “turning 
point” in comparison to its humanist predecessors – is that it no longer 
holds that current society can be successfully analyzed on the basis 
that it is (or should be) fundamentally humane, and that it is, on 
principle, an assembly of individual human beings (5). 
 
In contrast to Luhmann, whose work mainly took place within the domain of 
sociology, Robbe-Grillet applies this notion to the idea of literature. Yet the parallels 
between the two are striking, and interestingly, in 1971 Robbe-Grillet himself 
emphasized the connection between the two realms, remarking on the commonality 
between his own observations on the novel with those of sociologists of the period, 
especially their role in debunking the “myth” of humanism that underpinned social 
structures: “Les sociologues actuels n’ont pas manqué d’etablir un parallèle entre 
cette perte de confiance du romancier dans la naturalité de sa parole et la perte de 
confiance de la bourgeoisie dans la légitimité de ses pouvoirs” (“Sur le choix des 
générateurs” 160).  
In conclusion, Luhmann’s sociological theory of communication (based on 
systems theory) may prove inherently useful as a framework for reading Robbe-
Grillet. It corresponds to his a-humanist stance, his adoption of plurality over 




and the impossibility of its reduction, the representation of perception and cognition 
in his fiction, and the importance of observation and its relation to description in both 
his fictional and theoretical writing; and Robbe-Grillet himself signaled the 
usefulness of such theories for understanding his work. I will begin with a brief 
overview of Luhmann’s theory before moving on to its analysis in two of Robbe-
Grillet’s fictional texts, Le Voyeur and Souvenirs du triangle d’or (referred to 
hereafter as Voyeur and Souvenirs). 
6.2 Luhmann’s Theory of Communication and Social Organization 
Like Robbe-Grillet, Luhmann’s point of departure is from a stance that is 
critical of the “anthropocentrism” of humanist models of social organization and 
communication. Luhman begins from the premise that the human being is too 
complex to be understood through a single concept, e.g. that of the human being. 
Consequently he rejects the widely held notion of the human being as the basis for the 
organization of society. In Luhmann’s view, the human had long been considered as 
the basis for social theory in European and Western thought. Moeller, using the term 
“Old European” to describe Western philosophical tradition, points out that the 
humanist human has dominated Western thought, from Plato’s Republic, in which 
polis is defined as a group of people; to Hobbes and Rousseau’s “social contracts” 
between a populace and its governors, to later communicative models relying on the 
notion of communication “between human beings” (5). For Luhmann, useful as these 
notions are, they are problematic because they oversimplify the complexity inherent 
in society, as well as in the human, and attribute too much importance and focus to 




“anthropocentric” tradition in European and North American social philosophy that is 
certainly hard to overcome and informs the “common sense” understanding of what a 
society is” (5). 
Luhmann found his a-human baseline for his social theory in the system-
environment differentiation of systems theory and in the autopoeisis of Maturana and 
Varela. In a systems-based model, a system would be any particular entity, and 
anything located outside of that entity constitutes its environment. Both of these 
elements can be continually re-bounded and redefined, as they are both emergent; that 
is to say, constantly in a state of transition from one state of being to another; 
constantly coming-into-being. Luhmann’s systems-based model for social 
organization and operations removes the human as the basic unit of society and 
replaces him with events. For Luhmann, individual acts or events constitute the 
smallest, most irreducible unit of society. These events serve different functions. For 
example, one of society’s main functions is what Luhmann terms communication. 
Communication does not only take place in terms of language and media. 
Communication can also take place in almost any social realm where there is an 
exchange – for example, someone purchasing a packet of cigarettes is participating in 
an event that would qualify as economic communication. Someone casting a vote 
would be participating in an event constituting political communication.26 For 
Luhmann these events, not human beings, are the basic indivisible units of social 
composition. And while humans can participate in events, unlike events, they are 
divisible. 
                                                




In this schema of functions and the events that constitute them, humans are 
not an integral standalone whole. They are a plural entity whose parts act 
simultaneously within society’s various distinct systems. Luhmann divides society 
into three main systems, each based on their functions. Life systems – that which is 
organic and biological – or, in a reductive sense, bodies – constitute one function; 
consciousness (or “the mind”) is the second; communication, or the interaction that 
happens between systems, is the third and final major system of society.  
Within this model, a human being is a multiple entity that is located 
simultaneously in each system – body, mind, and communication. Moeller says, “The 
“human being” does not exist as a singular entity. According to systems theory, the 
traditional notion of the “human being” is a simplification of the actual complexity of 
human existence” (10). A person can participate in multiple simultaneous 
communication events – for example, talking on the phone while paying for a meal27 
– and also be participating in multiple systems at once: While talking on the phone 
and offering money, therefore participating in communication, the same person is 
also living and perceiving and cognizing, or thinking, and thus is simultaneously 
located and simultaneously acting in all three social systems. As Moeller puts it, “The 
human being “as such” has no theoretical place in systems theory. When there is talk 
about “human beings,” systems theory would have to ask: do you mean the social 
person who is addressed in communication? The body that can be seen over there? Or 
the mind that thinks and feels within this body?” (10).  As in a Venn diagram, the 
overlap from different events and systems can occur in a single place and time and 
                                                




yet in different ways; their convergence is a pluralistic overlay rather than a singular 
distinct entity. 
From this starting point of the divisible, plural subject/system, Luhmann’s 
theory goes on to develop a notion of cognition by the subject. Borrowing from 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s biological notion of autopoeisis, in which 
any given living system creates its own reality by cognizing and reacting to its 
environment, Luhmann realized how autopoeisis might be further developed in its 
application to the notion of cognition in other fields, and even more widely, to the 
idea of representation and of reality generally:  
This hypothesis implies a radical shift in epistemology and also the 
ontology it supposes….It also breaks with the epistemology of the 
ontological tradition that assumed that something of the environment 
enters the understanding and that the environment is represented, 
mirrored, imitated, or simulated within a cognizing system. In this 
respect, the radicalism of the new approach can hardly be 
underestimated (Moeller 16). 
 
Following the reasoning of operational closure - that no environment can ever be 
directly introduced into a system, and that a system produces its own individual 
response to irritations from the environment, based on its structure and organization - 
one might suppose that the environment of any system constitutes its external 
material, and its reactionary internal operations to the stimuli located therein 
constitute its perception thereof (Luhmann 2002). From this perception, any 
individual cognizing system creates its own reality. As Moeller states, “Reality is not 
an all-embracing whole of many parts, it is rather a variety of self-producing systemic 
realities, each of which forms the environment of all the others. There is no common 




systemic autopoeisis” (13). It is easy to see how closely this parallels Robbe-Grillet’s 
notion of plural subjectivities outlined in Chapter 3.  
 Drawing on Husserl’s phenomenology, Luhman posits that reality is a 
construct, created by and existing within each cognizing system – a cognizing system 
being a system that produces cognition, which can also be understood as sense-
making or meaning-making. In this model, no singular, essential, pre-existing 
defined, cohesive, knowable, objective reality exists; rather, each cognizing system 
creates its own reality from its environment via its operations. Bruce Clarke 
highlights to what extent this conception of reality is opposed to the sort of objective 
knowable singular reality criticized by Robbe-Grillet, noting that Luhmann draws for 
this part of his theory on the work of Hans von Foerster:  
Von Foerster seizes and refines the case against “information in the 
environment” – that is, against a positivist approach to information as 
a preconstituted, empirical datum simpy awaiting a passive reception 
to be registered as a fact of nature…von Foerster now declares, “The 
environment contains no information. The environment is as it is 
(Clarke Neocybernetics loc. 86).  
 
This conception of information and environment lies in almost perfect parallel to 
Robbe-Grillet’s description of the humanist and literary realist author as a transmitter 
of discovered knowledge, outlined in Chapter 3, as well as his affirmation that “le 
monde n’est ni signifiant ni absurd. Il est, tout simplement” (PUNR 18). In 
Luhmann’s theory, a system is located within an environment; that environment 
irritates the system, causing the system to undergo processes that, in a cognizing 
system, can be understood as perception, which then leads to sense-making. Moeller 




By observing the individual data provided by the brain, the mind 
observes, for instance, colors. It selects colors as information in a 
particular way and thus constructs a world of color. The colors 
perceived by an individual human mind differ from those perceived by 
another human mind, and even more from those observed by the mind 
of a horse or –if there is one – the mind of a fly. Every colorobserving 
system establishes its own color spectrum, its own colordistinctions 
and thus its own color-world (69). 
 
 
Here, then, the sense-making or cognizing subject is a plural entity acting in many 
domains at once, not an integral standalone whole. External to this plural subject is 
any number of potentially meaningful items of information; it is up to the cognizing 
subject to select particular items of information, perceive them, and make sense of 
them. It is clear how well this lines up with Robbe-Grillet’s constructivist notion of 
sense-making and reality construction from Chapter 3. 
A key operation of cognizing systems in Luhmann’s interpretation is the idea 
of observation. Observation essentially amounts to making a distinction. It can be 
said that the act of perceiving is an act of observation, that of the system observing its 
environment. In order to observe its environment, however, the system must make the 
distinction between itself and its environment. This other-reference is referred to as 
first-order observation. To take it a step further, the system can recognize that it is the 
entity that makes the distinction, and thus observation, moving from other-reference 
to self-reference. This is called the “observation of observation” and is known as 
second-order observation. Each level of observation brings a new level of 
complexity, but does not bring a cognizing system any closer to “truth” or objective 




cognizing system’s processes. As Moeller puts it, “To observe is to produce 
cognition, and to produce cognition is to construct reality” (69).  
In this model, description and observation are highly intertwined and 
implicated in construction of reality. “If reality is conceived as a cognitive construct, 
as an effect or correlate of observation, then descriptions of reality become 
descriptions of observation…observation becomes an integral part of reality” 
(Moeller 71). In this model a description of an observation cannot be “innocent;” it is 
implicated in the construction of a reality, and a second-order observer realizes this. 
“Observation loses its simplicity – an observer can no longer observe reality without 
taking into account its very observation as a generating element of reality” (Moeller 
71). That reality is generated through description is an idea put forth often by Robbe-
Grillet, and reinforced, for example, through the enigmatic prefaces he places at the 
front of many of his novels, which often deal with each book’s relationship to (a) 
reality/ies. This is perhaps most clearly laid out in his preface to Labyrinthe: “Ce recit 
est une fiction, non un témoignage. Il décrit une réalité qui n’est pas forcement celle 
dont le lecteur a fait lui-meme l’expérience…il s’agit pourtant ici d’une réalité 
strictement materielle, c’est-à-dire qu’elle ne pretend à aucun valeur allégorique” 
(Robbe-Grillet Labyrinthe 7). Here we can surmise that he is portraying the 
construction of realities by human cognizing systems. And if a cognizing system 
constructs its own reality via observation of its environment, then the heavily 
observation-driven plural characters in Robbe-Grillet’s works can be said to be 




operations. I will now examine how this model of cognition is represented in Le 
Voyeur and Souvenirs du triangle d’or. 
6.3 Uncertainty and Knowing: The Limits of Luhmannian Knowledge 
As outlined in Chapter 5, Robbe-Grillet’s works are strongly characterized by 
uncertainty – both at the level of the text as a whole and at the level of individual 
statements. The two texts targeted in this analysis are no exception. In Chapter 5, I 
examined in what ways the idea of lack of knowledge or incapacity to know 
characterized the Robbe-Grilletian human subject. In this section I will look at 
uncertainty as it relates to Luhmannian emergent cognitive processes in their 
subjective constructions of reality, and can be read as being indicative of those 
processes as they happen. To begin with, many (if not most, as in Voyeur) 
affirmations made in Robbe-Grillet’s novels are qualified with a marker of 
uncertainty. Statements that would be asserted with certainty – presented as 
statements of fact -- in a more typical narrative are interspersed with words like 
“peut-être,” “comme si,” “paraître,” “devait être,” “sembler,” and “croire,” so that 
ultimately the narrator presents very little to the reader that can be considered 
objectively true. In Voyeur, this happens straight away, with the opening line: “C’était 
comme si personne n’avait entendu” (Voyeur 9). The “comme si” added to the idea of 
a person (not) hearing negates any certainty on the part of the narrator about whether 
someone heard or not. Just a few pages later, the narrator states, “[le bateau]” est à 
l’heure aujourd’hui,” dit une voix. Et quelqu’un rectifia: “Presque.” Peut-etre que 
c’etait la meme personne” (Voyeur 12). Here the statement of (presumably objective) 




puts the statement into question. The observing narrator then notes that the correction 
may or may not have (“peut-etre”) come from the same speaker. Several levels of 
narrative uncertainty are thus packed into a single line. In Souvenirs, the very first 
word of the text is “impression,” which indicates a feeling or opinion rather than 
certainty; by the second paragraph the narrator is putting into question his own 
affirmations; the description of a door that constitutes the entirety of the second 
paragraph ends with the narrator stating, “cela pourrait même ne pas être une porte” 
(Souvenirs 7-8). The opening of the text thus sets the stage and reader expectations 
for an entire narrative riddled with uncertainty. 
Robbe-Grillet’s narrators also frequently take this act a step further, 
contradicting previous statements and observations with new ones that negate them 
partially or completely. In Voyeur, there is the following passage: 
Mathias finit par arrêter son choix sur un signe en forme de huit, gravé 
avec assez de précision pour qu’il pût servir de repere…il ne fut plus 
tout à fait sûr d’y reconnaitre le dessin repéré; d’autres anfractuosités 
de la pierre ressemblaient autant – et ne ressemblaient pas plus – à ces 
deux petits cercles accolés dont il conservait l’image (Voyeur 16).  
 
Here, we can see both uncertainty markers and direct contradictions: the stone’s 
crannies may or may not resemble the sign in the shape of an eight just previously 
perceived by the narrator (uncertainty); in the beginning of the passage, the engraving 
in the shape of an eight is clearly marked and perceptible, yet toward the end of the 
passage, it is not conspicuous enough to be detectable (contradiction).  
When the verb  “to know” (savoir) is used, it is nearly always in the negative; 
in both books, the narrator frequently states a variation of “je ne sais pas” on many 




a question: “la question de savoir si le frère portrait une montre” (Souvenirs 20, 72; 
Voyeur 42). Occasionally it is used in the subjunctive, whose grammatical function 
renders it hypothetical (and therefore nonexistent). Or, the notion of savoir is invoked 
through its antonyms, such as “j’ignore” (Souvenirs 69). 
Critics have long examined the notion of uncertainty in Robbe-Grillet. One of 
the most interesting evaluations of uncertainty in Robbe-Grillet is Roch Smith’s 
reading of Les Gommes. In this essay, Smith points out that the period in which 
Robbe-Grillet was writing was characterized by advancements in scientific theory 
that promote the principles of uncertainty and complexity as the dominating state of 
the material world, and that as a scientist, Robbe-Grillet would be better positioned 
than most authors to understand and express this link between science and literature 
(21). According to Smith, these new developments in scientific thought have made 
objective truth an artifact of the past and concentrate rather on the search for 
knowledge as a process. The end result of any search would therefore be an answer 
that is the “most efficacious” rather than the one true finality, but in fact the process is 
more meaningful than the answer (21). He thus considers that the narrative of Les 
Gommes may constitute an illustration of this search for efficacious answers, one that 
highlights process over outcome.  
Here we have the foundations of a posthumanist reading of Robbe-Grillet. 
Smith privileges process over conclusive answers, as well as contemporary science 
with its emphasis on complexity. However, he ultimately frames the principle of 
uncertainty in Les Gommes as a question-and-answer structure, in which the text 




“What form would a detective novel take when the crime itself is in question? What 
form might a modern Oedipus tragedy take?” (Smith 22). While I agree with Smith’s 
evaluation of the heavy presence of uncertainty as a marker of the importance of 
process, the complexity of the material world, and the impossibility of objective truth, 
I argue that rather than an attempt at answering questions, the Robbe-Grilletian text 
constitutes an illustration of the operations of perception and cognition in his vision 
of an emergent and plural human subject. Such a reading acknowledges the scientific 
principles at play and also addresses the idea of subjectivity in a way that allows for 
the a-humanist leanings of Robbe-Grillet. It also takes into account the characteristics 
of unboundedness, emergence, and multiplicity he affirms, outlined in Chapter 2.  
In Luhmann’s theory, as we have seen, knowledge is contingent upon 
observation; one can only “know” what one perceives (“observes” in Luhmann’s 
terms). Furthermore, “knowledge” is limited to the individual (though not necessarily 
a unified one), and is completely subjective. If one associates “certainty” with 
“knowing,” one of the functions of uncertainty in Robbe-Grillet’s fiction, then, from 
the level of narrative down to the level of the individual statement, is to indicate for 
the reader the impossibility of existence of the type of objective knowledge indicated 
by techniques such as third-person omniscient narration. These tactics, which have 
frequently been interpreted as constituting a sort of “game” that the Robbe-Grillet 
plays in order to destabilize the reader may in fact serve several purposes, perhaps 
first and foremost to negate the idea for the reader that there exists a certain, 
knowable, singular reality outside of that of the character who is presenting his 




exterior state of the world, Robbe-Grillet does not allow passage of any universally 
ascribed fact from narrator/character to reader. When so many statements are 
qualified, and even outright contradicted among themselves, the reader is left with no 
evidence as to the existence of a singular, knowable reality being inhabited and 
described by the narrator-character.  
Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find a fully omniscient narrator in Robbe-
Grillet’s works. When a narrator speaks, it is nearly always through the filter of his 
own perceptions and observations. Rarely does a narrator make a general statement 
that may be taken as a universal axiom, or even that is simply about something that 
may lie beyond the narrator’s own ken. When an affirmation is made, it is nearly 
always limited to what the speaker is or could be thinking, seeing, remembering, or 
imagining. He resists making more generalized statements about the world around 
him, which would effectively take his commentary out of the realm of observation 
and into the realm of objective truth. For example, in the opening pages of Voyeur the 
narrator describes the shape of an eight: “Au centre du huit, on voyait une 
excroissance rougeâtre qui semblait être le pivot rongé par la rouille, d’un ancien 
piton de fer” (Voyeur 17). The narrator’s description is limited to that which he can 
see and deduce. An omnicient narrator would have described the same scene without 
the qualifications of “on voyait” and “qui semblait être” to make a general statement 
of objective fact: in the center of the “8” shape there was an iron post. Instead the 
reader is presented with the actual version, which is limited to what is observable 





6.4 Cognition as Process 
This emphasis on what is being perceived by the observer can be read as a 
depiction of perception on the part of a cognizing system. The second step in 
Luhmann’s model is the cognition that takes place in the system after perception has 
taken place. Much of the two texts can be seen as a depiction of the processes of such 
cognition. Indeed, if we apply Luhmann’s model to Voyeur, for example, we can see 
clearly the functioning of operations of a cognizing system at work. When the 
narrator in Voyeur says, “Quelque chose tomba, jeté du haut de la digue, et vint se 
poser à la surface de l’eau – un bouchon de papier, de la couleur des paquets de 
cigaretts ordinaires,” the information is given to the reader in the order in which it is 
perceived – firstly, that something has fallen, secondly that is a piece of paper, and 
finally the color of the paper (Voyeur 16). The narrator finishes by making the 
association between the color and that which he has previously experienced and has 
stored in his memory – that of ordinary cigarette packets. One can thus see this 
passage as an illustration of operations of perception (the detail of falling through the 
detail of color), followed by the first operations of sense-making or cognition: 
associating that which is observed with that which is remembered. As Sturrock notes, 
to read Robbe-Grillet’s descriptions of perception as anything but cognition in 
process would be a mistake: “To read this sort of description as a predetermined 
whole instead of the successive movements of a man’s mind as it dwells on a single 
image is almost certain to lead to radical misinterpretation. Understood as a process 
such a description becomes truly revealing” (197). Luhmann’s model allows 




away from the humanist paradigm and demoting of man from the center of 
knowledge. 
When in the previous passage the author says “quelque chose” – a term 
indicating uncertainty -- rather than stating a precise object, he is demonstrating the 
contingent nature of knowledge: Knowing the object depends on his seeing it. He 
cannot name something that he does yet not know, and he can only know what he has 
perceived. In this instance, the narrator has not yet observed what the object is, and 
therefore cannot know it nor communicate it to the reader. This is in direct contrast to 
an omniscient narrator, who might begin by naming the object as a “packet of 
cigarettes.” Unlike this narrator, there is no omniscient observational position located 
outside of the realm of his own internal processes that would allow Robbe-Grillet’s 
narrator to affirm that “a packet of cigarettes fell into the water.” Any knowledge he 
may produce and wish to communicate to the reader is dependent on his internal 
subjective processes, beginning with perception. 
In cases where knowing does occur – the narrator is able to name or identify 
objects and people – this knowledge is often still presented in a way that emphasizes 
its contingency and highlights cognitive processing. At times in Robbe-Grillet’s 
narration, perception and cognition happen more or less simultaneously, rather than 
as a series of steps, as in the previous example, and in these instances Robbe-Grillet 
often uses qualifiers such as “reconnaitre” or “identifier.” Using terms that indicate 
identification or recognition allows the narrator to provide a “factual” statement – 
something is known – in a way that avoids omniscience and emphasizes the processes 




contrast to vocabulary invoking vision or observation, or knowing, involves both 
perception (the sight of a person or object) and sense-making (referring to memory to 
name or know the person or object). In a passage from Souvenirs, for example, the 
narrator perceives a person who is positioned nearby and whose “pas grâcieusement 
balancé de bayadère…me permet de l’identifier, au premier coup d’oeil, dès qu’elle a 
surgi dans mon champ visuel” (Souvenirs 13). Here the narrator does not simply 
narrate the presence of the woman as being there; he indicates the processes of 
observation (perception through the visual field) and identification (knowing through 
memory) that allow him to state with a minimal degree of (subjective) certainty that 
the woman is there. 
Further cementing this concentration on the processes of cognition is the use 
by narrators of verbs indicative of thought and reflection in affirmative statements. In 
addition to using the markers of uncertainty noted above, Robbe-Grillet’s narrators 
often narrate their very thought processes or thinking-through of observations. Or 
they qualify would-be statements of fact with such verbs, including “penser;” 
“contempler,” “considérer,” “calculer,” and “déchiffrer,” among others. The 
narrator(s) of Souvenirs says, “plus j’y réfléchis” while trying to remember the 
provenance of a particular fur coat, and “la seule pensée qui aurait encore quelque 
importance” in determining which facts of events are significant for a narrative, 
referring to his own reflections in the placement of ideas in the storyline (Souvenirs 
22, 25). In another instance, “La présence de la glace, à la réflexion, est inusitée dans 
ce genre d’endroit” (Souvenirs 41). An omniscient writer would likely leave out the 




location. In Voyeur, the narrator states, “Mathias pensa néanmoins qu’il y avait 
quelque chose qui n’allait pas – ou bien qui manquait” and “un calcul s’imposait: s’il 
voulait vendre ses quatre-vignt-neuf montres, combien de temps pouvait-il consacrer 
à chacune d’elles?” (Voyeur 22, 34). In all of these cases, the narrator refers not only 
to the events of the narrative but also to his own cognitive processes and their role in 
the act of his storytelling. 
Because of the uncertainty he communicates, the Robbe-Grilletian narrator is 
often considered to be “unreliable.” The changing, fluid, and often contradictory 
nature of the material he communicates could certainly serve as a means of 
destabilizing the reader and keeping him guessing, as part of a sort of game that the 
narrator plays with the reader, but the purpose is perhaps not limited to this 
destabilization. I have already examined how such fluidity can be understood as an 
opposition to what Robbe-Grillet sees as the unity, integrality, and boundedness of 
humanism; and constitute a breakdown of “standard” boundaries in humanistic 
narration. However, such narrative changeability can also be understood as a 
demonstration of the emergent nature of the processes of observation and cognition. I 
have outlined in Chapter 2 how Robbe-Grillet emphasizes emergence and coming-
into-being over fixity as a general response to the humanist essentialism; Luhmann’s 
model is therefore also particularly useful in that it also accounts for Robbe-Grillet’s 
adoption of the notion of emergence. 
Luhmann’s model of communication is indeed an emergent one. As 
autopoeitic systems, his cognizing systems are in a continual state of transition, 




evaluation of this emergent nature of consciousness: “Whatever consciousnesses of 
their environments psychic systems achieve are always emergent and selective 
performances, but are nevertheless performances that mediating structures such as 
narratives can potentially bring into resonant redundancy” (Clarke Metamorphosis 
34). 
 Their existence is based on a constant give-and-take relationship with their 
environment, one from which cognition is produced via the processes outlined in the 
analyses above, and the system in turn moves and reacts in its environment, and so 
on. Such systems are said to be operationally closed; they cannot directly “take in” 
any aspect of their environment, but they may react to it through internal processes, to 
which the environment may then react, and so on. As such, cognition is not simply a 
recognition of a staged and represented environment, it is a fluid and continual 
exchange of interactions, where flow and process are dominant. As Evan Thompson 
explains in his essay on autopoetic cognition, “cognition is effective conduct in [the 
domain of interactions specified by its circular and self-referential organization], not 
the representation of an independent environment. In Maturana’s words, “Living 
systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition” (82). 
Thus, although the system is a product of its process, the concentration is on process 
rather than product. Clarke also notes that the objective is “to interpret cognitive 
processes as neverending recursive processes of computation” (Clarke 
Neocybernetics loc. 125). That these processes are continual; always happening, and 
characterized by flow is emphasized by Clarke: “Systems theory catalyzes the 




concept of self-organization, by “order from noise,” “order from chaos,” and 
“complexity from noise:” “the flow of energy through a system acts to organize that 
system” (Neocybernetics loc. 331). 
The observations made in Robbe-Grillet’s texts correspond accordingly to this 
notion of continuous coming-into-being; for example, the occurrences of corrections 
or contradictions in the narrative statements in his fiction can be read as constituting a 
process. The text represents the mise en scene of cognition as it is happening. If the 
narrator does not say “the packet of cigarettes fell into the water” it is because such a 
statement would be a narration of cognition post-facto. Such a statement can take 
place only after the processes of perception, cognition, and interpretation by the 
individual have been completed. In a statement such as this, understanding has taken 
place and meaning attributed (the color means that this is a packet of ordinary 
cigarettes). This is not so for the representation of cognition that Robbe-Grillet 
depicts. The observations of the characters and their subsequent sense-making is 
represented as being in the process of, in the middle of, en train de. Just as Clarke 
emphasizes the idea of flow, Robbe-Grillet emphasizes that of motion, stating, “Tout 
l’intérêt des pages descriptives…n’est donc plus dans la chose décrite mais dans le 
mouvement même de la description.” (“Description, représentation” loc. 1137-1141). 
It is worth noting that he points out that such descriptions are “sans cesse en train de 
s’inventer dans l’esprit de l’homme,” emphasizing with the word “esprit” the idea 
that such processes are indeed cognitive ones (“Description, représentation” loc. 
1137). Rather than putting on scene a finalized interpretation of external events, then, 




process. In this case, uncertainty is present because it is sense-making in action; there 
cannot be certainty because sense has not yet been at the moment of narration; or, 
should the time of narration be posterior to the action, the narration is expressly 
looking to narrate the process, rather than the outcome, of this cognition. 
6.5 Sense-making 
In Luhmann’s model, cognition essentially amounts to making sense, or 
meaning, from that which is perceived or observed by the system. As Thompson 
states,  
Sense-making = cognition (perception/action). Sense-making is 
tantamount to cognition…such conduct is oriented toward and subject 
to signification and valence. Signification and valence do not preexist 
“out there” but are enacted or constituted by the living being. Living 
entails sense-making, which equals cognition (83).  
 
Thompson thus emphasizes the constructed nature of an individual reality through 
cognition, rather than an external intact reality that can be “captured” by an observer. 
Furthermore, he makes such cognition an essential element of life; a living being is a 
cognizing one. As I have already demonstrated, the human subject in Robbe-Grillet’s 
texts can be said to struggle with or fail at making meaning; this constitutes one way 
in which Robbe-Grillet displaces the human from the center of the humanist 
epistemological paradigm. However, cognition also serves another purpose – the 
construction of individual subjective realities. Reading Robbe-Grillet’s characters’ 
attempts at meaning-making through Luhmann’s model allows us to examine more 
closely the cognitive processes he is depicting in those failed attempts and in the 




addition to outlining a process of sense-making that aligns closely with Robbe-
Grillet’s conception of possibility (outlined in Chapter 2), Luhmannian subjectivity 
constitutes a “repudiation of objectivistic truisms in favor of what we would now call 
a form of epistemological constructivism,” in much the same way that Robbe-Grillet 
rejects objective essential truth in favor of subjective construction of multiple realities 
(Thompson 99). 
As outlined in Chapter 2, in Luhmann’s model, sense-making occurs as the 
realization of a series of possibilities. In a world where no transcendent rules exist as 
the guiding order of events, the driving force behind their occurrence is that of 
possibility. When creating meaning from an observed phenomenon, a cognizing 
system selects one interpretation from among many possible ones. Luhmann uses the 
term Sinnhorizont or “horizon of sense” to illustrate his concept of external “reality:”  
If one accepts this theoretical disposition, one can neither assume that 
there exists a world at hand consisting of things, substances, and ideas, 
nor can one designate their entirety with the concept of a 
“world.”…The world is rather an immeasurable potential for surprises, 
it is virtual information that needs systems to…ascribe to selected 
information the sense of being information (Moeller 68). 
 
 
Any information thereby produced is thus the actualization of a previously existing 
possibility, one that was chosen by the system. Every tidbit of information processed 
by a cognizing system constitutes an actualized possibility; for each of these there is a 
potentially infinite number of unrealized possibilities. “Sense-making is this interplay 
between the actual and possible,” or as Luhmann himself puts it, sense is the “unity of 




totality for the cognizing system of actualized possibilities “of sense” and manifests 
itself uniquely within the system.  
The seeming contradictions and “impossible” statements made by Robbe-
Grillet’s narrators, can thus be read additionally as signaling the process of meaning-
making, where a plurality of possibilities are displayed, selected, and re-selected. 
When viewed as a report of real-world circumstances, such seemingly contradictory 
statements can seem impossible and and frustrating to a reader accustomed to 
“Balzacian” literary forms. However, if one reads the text as a sort of illustration of 
cognition in process, these contradictions can actually be understood as steps or 
attempts at sense-making within a cognizing system that chooses among possibilities 
according to Luhmann’s model. It is interesting to note that critics like Stoltzfus see 
this Luhmannian process – sense-making as a selection from a multitude or 
possibilities and subsequently, generation of meaning --  as essential elements of 
Robbe-Grillet’s work, in this case invoking the reader: “The work will always retain a 
limited number of rational possibilities, more or less in- tended by the author, and, as 
Philip Pettit phrases it, subject to ‘reflective equilibrium.’"' It is these internal 
possibilities, constantly in motion, that the reader picks up and which he uses to gen- 
erate meaning” (Stoltzfus “Labyrinths” 304). As Robbe-Grillet puts it, “Le nouveau 
roman débute dans une sorte de grisaille, au réveil comme d’habitude; des possibles 
errant dans les coins – des vies possibles, des littératures possibles.” (PUNR 110). He 
affirms that these possibilities coexist in a multiplicity: “[l’aventure du texte] reste 
ouverte à toutes les possibilities. Une aventure qui n’a plus de possibilités n’est plus 




Because Robbe-Grillet’s literature is not necessarily chronological (“Il ne 
s’agit plus ici de temps qui coule, puisque paradoxalement les gestes ne sont au 
contraire que figés dans l’instant”), when a narrator makes a statement only to 
contradict it, or supplement it with information that would make the statement an 
impossibility as a real-world event, it might thus be understood to be a cognizing 
system selecting one possibility of interpretation from among many, rather than a 
reporting of occurrences in the external world (Robbe-Grillet “Description, 
représentation” loc. 1137). The seemingly impossible coexistence of multiple options 
constitutes a laying out of the possibilities at hand, to be chosen from, and perhaps 
even a series of attempts interpretation by the cognizing observer, making of the text 
a space of cognition, where “the novel…which dwells self-consciously…and 
creatively on hypothetical alternatives demonstrates the free play of imaginative 
possibility – the imaginative possibilities of a mind which refuses tragedy and is 
therefore free to give some kind of meaning and order to the chaos of innumerable 
alternatives” (Stoltzfus New French Novel 101). Thus, when contradictions are made, 
in addition to signaling a lack of objective knowledge, they can be seen as 
constituting sense-making in the sense of actualizing a possibility resulting from an 
observation. This process concerns not just contradictions in the text, but reprisals, 
the frequent repetition with variations that occur throughout Robbe-Grillet’s texts. 
The manner in which “the writing goes through a series of analogous scenes in a 
process of repetition and rejection” represents a reprisal of possibility on the part of 




For example, in Voyeur, in a passage in which the narrator recounts a 
(presumably) singular childhood memory, the description repeats itself with 
variations on a theme; the narrator states variously, “C’était par un jour de pluie,” 
“c’était un jour de pluie – en apparence un jour de pluie comme les autres;” “La pièce 
était très sombre. Dehors il pleuvait;” “il tombait une pluie fine, continue” (Voyeur 
18-19). In Souvenirs, the narrator reprises a scene with a variation, in which he takes 
the place of a character: “Deux hommes en trench-coat clair et chapeau de feutre se 
sont installés à une table, comme s’ils attendaient le retour d’un hypothétique serveur 
en veste blanche,” and by the end of the same passage, the narrator states, “la seule 
pensée qui aurait encore quelque importance concerne le petit appareil dont le signal 
ouvre la porte noire du sanctuaire: malencontreusement demeuré dans la poche 
intérieure de cette veste blanche que je porte aujourd’hui” (Souvenirs 23-25). Each of 
these can be seen to be the presence and selection of a possibility; this time of textual 
structure, and in so being, depict the cognitive processes of the system that is the 
writer and/or narrator. In an achronological text, the type of “denarration” evoked in 
Chapter 4 (“Outside it is raining…”) can thus also be understood as the processes of a 
cognizing system that is in the act of selecting from among various possibilities of 
interpretation (Richardson Unnatural 2006). 
Thus the simultaneous existence of multiple possibilities of narration and 
interpretation are possible. “Like a composer, Robbe-Grillet begins with a simple 
statement of his themes and then goes on to explore their various possibilities.” 
(Goodstein 93). What were once “spatial and temporal impossibilities (inside is 




the floor in the room where the victim has already been killed” become possibilities 
of interpretation. The achronology of the functioning of the cognizing system allows 
for their simultaneous coexistence (Bogue 36). The text constitutes the field in which 
these possibilities are possible: “All these possibilities are suggested in the text. 
Intertextual allusions provide even more alternatives” (Smith 69). 
Thus, questions like those posed by Roch Smith in his analysis of Maison are 
unproductive -- “Do these pronouncements cancel each other out? If only one is to be 
velived, on what basis can the choice be made? Can both somehow be true?” -- as 
they constitute a forced dichotomy between possibilities, when, as read through 
Luhmann, Robbe-Grillet is actually insisting on their coexistence (63). 
Achronological coexistence displaces sequential impossibilities; in statements like 
Sturrock’s: “In La Maison de rendez-vous, for example, visual expressions are 
permitted to change at a hysterical speed,” in fact what is being put on scene is an 
array of possibilities, not a series of lightning fast affirmations  (218). Such 
contradictions as the one presented by the two prefaces to Maison not only constitute 
a possibility chosen by the author/narrator, but is also a presentation of possibilities of 
interpretation to the reader:  “It is from and to that inscription, a point of semantic 
fixity that opens a range of possibilities in its reading.” (Heath 150). 
In Luhmann’s model, once an observation has been made, the individual 
cognizing system resorts to his own interiority to provide an interpretation – his own 
knowledge base, lived experiences, imagination, and so forth. In Chapter 4, I 
demonstrated how Robbe-Grillet mixes the imaginary, the lived, the recounted, the 




these (formerly) distinct cognitive functions. Their simultaneous coexistence may 
also constitute the Luhmannian process of cognitive functioning, at the level of 
interpretation. The characters who undertake this mix of elements constitute the mise-
en-scene of an individual who has made an observation and who has recourse to all 
the various functions of his brain in order to interpret, to “make sense” happen. As in 
life, in which these processes occur in an emergent and plural manner, these 
processes refuse a linear chronology. A cognizing individual may remember and 
imagine at the same time, for example. In the same passage in Voyeur as that cited 
above, the observations that the main character Mathias makes of the boat he is on is 
mixed with childhood memories of drawing a seagull (Voyeur 18-20). They are 
mixed together without transition or delineation because they are simultenaousely as 
parts of the process of cognition. The lack of chronology evoked in Robbe-Grillet’s 
text indicates the Luhmannian functioning of the cognizing system. As Robbe-Grillet 
states, “Pourquoi chercher à reconstituer le temps des horloges dans un récit qui ne 
s’inquiète que du temps humain? N’est-il pas plus sage de penser à notre propre 
mémoire, qui n’est jamais chronologique” (PUNR 118-119). 
6.6 Observation 
 The notion of Luhmannian observation, especially second-order observation, 
has particular consequences for reading “le regard” in the texts of Robbe-Grillet. 
Robbe-Grillet’s near obsession with the notion of observing or seeing caused the 
Nouveau Roman to be labeled “l’Ecole du Regard.” Some likened this voyeurism to 
the objective lens of the video camera; others to a complete and total subjectivity, 




to interpret it. Within Luhmannian theory, as previously noted, observation is 
understood to be the making of a distinction between self and the environment. This 
distinction can be repeated ad infinitum, moving the systems toward ever-increasing 
levels of complexity as cognitive systems “make sense” of their environments. The 
“jeu de regards” in the texts of Robbe-Grillet can be read as this particular symptom 
of Luhmannian cognitive function, and a move toward greater complexity. 
 For example, consider the layers of “regards” in the opening passage of Le 
Voyeur:  
Mathias se baissa pour ramasser [un objet]. En se relevant il aperçut, à 
quelques pas sur la droite, une petite fille de sept ou huit ans qui le 
dévisageait avec sérieux, ses grands yeux tranquillement posés sur lui. 
Il esquissa un demi-sourire, mais elle ne prit pas la peine de le lui 
rendre et ce n’est qu’au bout de plusieurs seconds qu’il vit ses 
prunelles glisser vers la pélote de ficelle qu’il tenait dans la main 
(Voyeur 10). 
 
In this seemingly simple passage is a surprisingly complex network of observation. 
Mathias observes an object, which he bends down to pick up. This is followed by his 
remarking a little girl, who he observes observing him, in a two-directional 
observational exchange. After this realization, he turns his attention to the object, now 
observing it, while the little girl continues to observe him, increasing the levels of 
narrated observation to three. All of this is recounted from the point of view of an 
anonymous third-person narrator, who is observing or has observed the scene (as the 
verbs are conjugated in the literary passé simple, so the chronological relationship of 
the actions to their recounting is not entirely clear). And, finally, the reader acts as 
observer as well, of the scene, and, as the text repeats and reprises itself, ultimately of 




observation occur in Souvenirs; for example, the narrator (who may also be a violent 
sexual criminal) describes the unsettling exchange of surveillance that constitutes his 
observation of a potential victim at a café. The passage opens with a description of a 
young girl that implies her observation by the narrator. This is followed by the 
narrator stating, “regardant toujours en arrière dans ma direction, elle poursuit son 
examen critique, investigateur, intéressé, attentif en tout cas…bien que je soutienne 
ce regard sans difficulté…la jeune fille se tarde à se détourner, peu impressionnée 
selon toute apparence par mon diagnostic de praticien, qui la contemple” (Souvenirs 
49). Such mises-en-scene constitute a precise illustration of second-order obesrvation: 
“’Introducing the observer as an active participant…in the process of explaining the 
observer’ is a classic second-order statement. Its recursive arc perfectly captures what 
“second-order” means – the redoubling or rendering circular of an input or an 
outcome, the reentry of a product into the process of its own ongoing production.” 
(Clarke Neocybernetics loc. 76). Recall that in a Luhmannian system, no “truth” is 
ever reached by increases in complexity; the systems and their interactions simply 
become more complex. This is in alignment with Robbe-Grillet’s refusal to grant a 
previously formed “meaning” to the reader in the form of, say, a sufficiently resolved 
murder mystery. The “regards” in his books, rather than moving the reader toward a 
final, singular, and conclusive solution, then, serve to increase complexity, leaving 
the reader to undertake similar complex cognitive processes to arrive – or not - at an 





6.7 Text as Process: Cognition and Reality 
Indeed, the reader has a particular and multiple role to play in the reception 
and interpretation of Robbe-Grillet’s text. If we understand the reader as a cognizing 
system in Luhmann’s model, just as those depicted in the text, then the text serves as 
that “élément générateur,” in Robbe-Grillet’s terms or “input,” in systems theory 
terms, an external phenomenon that would provoke processes of cognition within 
himself. The plurality of possibilities of interpretation within the text are such that 
any cognition produced by such a reader would be unique and individual to him and 
him alone. The result is the replacement of an overall singular, unitary model of 
reality by a plural one, as many as there are readers and as many as a single reader 
would choose to undertake. “There is not “one” reality…but rather a plurality of 
realities created through [Luhmannian] cognition,” just as in Robbe-Grillet’s fiction 
“meaning derives from reader rapport-a rapport that will shift whenever the work 
changes hands. Each reader brings a different focus to bear in determining the value 
of the work, which, more and more these days, is perceived as "open”” (Moeller 70; 
Stoltzfus “Labyrinths” 303). 
The reader is thus assigned the role of making meaning. Some see the Robbe-
Grilletian mise-en-scene of an active mind as one trying to construct a story or a 
myth; the desire for conclusion and finality is a manifestation of this (Sturrock 221). 
“Once the novel has come into being, its objects, that is to say the discontinuous units 
out of which it has been constructed, confront the reader with the same sort of 
problems as the narrator who has been confronted with by [sic] the objects of his own 




noted, Robbe-Grillet continuously seeks to subvert the ability of any individual reader 
to arrive at a definitive conclusion. Like the human subject depicted in his texts, the 
reader is called to attempt – and fails – to create meaning, at least in an essential and 
objective sense. Heath talking about the reader of Robbe-Grilletian text: “We are 
confronted with a text,…its use of various elements which we recognize as elements 
of comforting sense and which we would like to relate as usual to achieve the 
satisfaction of meaning, and yet which here…resist our recuperation” (Heath 151). 
Thus does the text serve as both an illustration of Luhmannian cognition (via 
the actions of the characters) and a generator of it (within the reader). But the function 
of the text does not end there. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, Robbe-Grillet considers 
the text itself to be the creation of a reality: “Il en va de meme pour une symphonie, 
une peinture, un roman: c’est dans leur forme que réside leur réalité” (PUNR 41). 
This corresponds to his understanding of the function of literary description, which 
for him in the New Novel has changed from a demonstrative function to one that is 
generative of reality (or realities). Whereas for him realist descriptions of the 
Balzacian type served to “show” (“faire voir”) elements of an objective external 
reality that were significant only insofar as they served as supports for the (human) 
protagonist, literary description in the New Novel serves to create an individual 
reality:  “Elle prétendait reproduire une réalité préexistante; elle affirme à présent sa 
fonction créatrice” (Robbe-Grillet “Description, représentation” loc. 1125). Thus the 
text not only provokes the process of subjective construction of reality within the 
reader but also constitutes one generated by the author: “l’auteur aujourd’hui 




conscient, créateur…c’est…participer à une creation, d’inventer à son tour l’oeuvre – 
et le monde – et d’apprendre ainsi à inventer sa propre vie” and “Il n’y a pas de réalité 
du film en dehors du film lui-même” (PUNR 134; “L’Année dernière à Marienbad” 
1:29-1:23). Speaking of the Nouveau Roman, he says, “Nous, la vie que nous 
peignons, c’est celle de l’esprit. Nous n’imposons aucune image de la réalité à notre 
lecteur. Nous lui demandons de nous suivre dans l’effort de création pure, donc 
poétique que nous faisons” (“L’Orient m’intéresse” loc. 5095). In this way the text is 
at once a mise-en-scene of the processes of cognition and the reality that is produced 
by the very same processes. It is at once process and product, a system that 
corresponds to the autopoeitic nature of Luhmannian systems. Coined by the 
biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, the concept was adapted by 
Luhmann and refers to “poiesis as its product…What is meant here is a system that is 
its own product. The operation si the condition for the prudction of operations” 
(Luhmann Introduction 110-111). This concept has much potential for the exploration 
of Robbe-Grillet’s texts, as demonstrated by Ben Stoltzfus’s publication of The 








In conclusion, Robbe-Grillet has undertaken a project of “invention,” that of 
reconceptualizing the human subject and his place in the world, a project that falls 
neatly in line with that of posthumanist critical theory. Drawing on his scientific 
experience and knowledge of scientific theory, as well as “French” theory, Robbe-
Grillet attempted to innovate a new type of literature that would refuse the 
anthropomorphism of humanism and its associated essentialism, superiority, 
centrality, and integrality of the human subject. 
All of this must seem rather clinical; indeed, Robbe-Grillet has been accused 
of coldness and detachment in his writing.28 But human passion is not absent from his 
works; in fact, scenes of lust, violence, murder, and obsession are common. His book 
La Jalousie has as its principal subject the obsession and jealousy felt by a man 
consumed by the idea that his wife may be having an affair. Indeed, for Robbe-Grillet 
the emotion felt by the characters and narrators in his texts and films is a primary 
motor of their content: “Il ne s’agit plus de ce qui se passe “vraiment;” mais de ce 
qu’un personnage plus ou moins dans l’état d’angoisse ou de frayeur ou de passion 
imagine et même qu’il communique à l’autre.” (“Echos du Cinéma” 18:00-18:12). 
The mental machinations of the human subject, as we have seen, are central to his 
project; these include the “feeling” of emotions and passions:  
On connaît ces intrigues linéaires du cinema dit “de papa” où l’on nous 
fait grâce d’aucun maillon dans la succession des événements trop 
attendus: le téléphone sonne, l’homme décroche, [etc.]…Notre esprit, 
en réalité, va plus vite – ou plus lentement, d’autres fois. Sa démarche 
                                                
28 For example, Yvonne Guers, in her article “La technique romanesque d’Alain Robbe-Grillet” 
describes the first impression of the reader on encountering Robbe-Grillet’s texts as reading “un récit 




est plus variée, plus riche, et moins rassurante: il saute des passages, il 
enregistre avec precision des elements “sans importance”, il se répète, 
il revient en arrière. Et ce temps mental est bien celui qui nous 
intéresse, avec ses étrangétés, ses trous, ses obsessions, ses régions 
obscures, puisqu’il est celui de nos passions, de notre vie (Robbe-
Grillet “L’Année dernière à Marienbad” loc. 872-877). 
 
And if the achronological temporality of his text disturbs some readers, its importance 
lies in the fact that this atemporality is a function of “notre vie passionnelle,” which is 
“plus importante…que la chronologie du calendrier;” indeed, he refers to this 
achronology as “la chronologie humaine” (“Echos du Cinéma” 19:33-19:47).  
Not only does he depict the workings of a human mind subjected to emotions, 
obsessions, and passions, but he seeks to extract these from the reader as well. If he 
demands the active participation of the reader in his texts, he also calls upon their 
passion: “[les éléments du film] ont besoin de l’intervention, de la passion même du 
spectateur pour que la passion des héros prennent vraiment corps” (“Echos du 
cinéma” 21:20-21:27). And in reading his texts, the reader goes through a series of 
feelings, impressions, and sentiments; in a 1965 televised interview the presenter 
Pierre Dumayet describes the sensation of reading and re-reading La Maison de 
rendez-vous: “Si je retrace les étapes de lecture de La Maison de rendez-vous, j’ai 
d’abord été séduit, puis exaspéré, puis à nouveau séduit, et j’ai le sentiment que vous 
m’avez donné quelque chose, c’est-à-dire le vertige” (“Maison” 9:20-9:29). What 
Robbe-Grillet seeks to elicit from the reader, then, rather than a straightforward 
emotional response, is nothing less than passionate and active participation in the 





Like those who would proclaim themselves humanists, Robbe-Grillet is 
concerned with the idea of the human and his place in the world: “Je prendrai 
volontiers [Claude Simon] de l’exemple même de ce que j’entends par le Nouveau 
Roman…c’est cette passion pour le monde réel, pour l’homme vivant et pour la 
liberté d’expression que couronne aujourd’hui le prix Nobel” (“Claude Simon” loc. 
3482). The question of what it means to be human is the driving force of his work, the 
human and “care” for the human his central preoccupations. He does not seek to turn 
away from the human or to make of him a robot devoid of significance or emotion. 
Rather, he proposes an alternative vision to humanism that would respect and care for 
the human, as well as that which “makes” him so – including mental and emotional 
capabilities – and that would address the complexities raised by the technoscientific 
and theoretical developments of his day. 
In this project I have attempted to excavate a coherent vision of Robbe-
Grillet’s literary project and demonstrate that it may be considered a posthumanist 
one. By considering him from this standpoint, a coherent worldview may be extracted 
from his theory and his fiction that situates him neatly with respect to his particular 
sociohistorical situation and theoretical heritage, including his scientific training and 
the French theory that so heavily influenced literature and literary criticism at the 
time he was active. The posthumanist lens additionally allows for a comprehensive 
approach to individual problematics that have long been examined in his work – such 
as his non-traditional narrative technique, the role of consciousness, and the question 




which I did not address comprehensively in this project, might benefit from 
evaluation that takes into account a posthuman perspective.  
I hope to have demonstrated that both Robbe-Grillet and posthumanist critics 
share a common vision and project; that, beginning with a contestation that humanism 
is no longer a relevant means of understanding a technologically and scientifically 
mediated human, new frameworks are needed that would move away from humanism 
and address the sort of complexities revealed by developments in scientific studies. 
They share a common goal of developing such new hermeneutic frameworks and new 
visions of the human subject through the generative power of narrative. In this 
project, I have laid out a brief description of posthumanist critical theory, its 
genealogy and development, and the ways in which Robbe-Grillet’s literary project 
parallels that of posthumanist criticism. In the preceding chapters, I outlined the ways 
in which the posthumanist critical project aligns with Robbe-Grillet’s in its criticisms 
and affirmations of the precepts of humanism; and in its criticisms and affirmations of 
the figure of the human subject, in particular in response to what they see as its 
“placement” in the humanist paradigm. I then evaluated Robbe-Grillet’s work 
according to these same affirmations, to demonstrate the ways in which they can be 
said to manifest themselves in his fiction, as part of his literary project to develop new 
paradigms of the human. Finally, I undertook a reading of cognition in Robbe-Grillet 
through Niklas Luhmann’s theory of cognition, communication, and society, to 
demonstrate the ways in which posthumanist theory might prove useful for new 




This paper furthermore responds to a turn in the humanities toward a trend of 
the “post-“ and a movement toward the merging of scientific and humanities theory. 
Evaluating his work through this perspective may illuminate Robbe-Grillet, but it also 
has much potential for evaluation of other authors and problematics within French 
studies, including, but not limited to, those authors who are considered to be members 
of the Nouveau Roman. Such a project, also, I hope, demonstrates the potential utility 
of posthumanist critical theory for use in French studies generally. Robbe-Grillet’s 
work, as well as posthumanist critical theory, is a varied, changing, complex, and 
contradictory beast, but by putting them together in this way, perhaps new and useful 
modes of understanding might be made in both literary studies and in the 
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